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The central concern of this study is the nature of informal economic activities 
among urban traders in Harare, Zimbabwe. The study focuses on a particular flea 
market and describes the precarious lives of a sample of informal traders. It is 
shown that, as through much of Africa, the market is a social as well as an 
economic nexus. It is not only the site of economic production and exchange 
constituting the survivalist activities that are increasingly important in the 
collapsing Zimbabwe economy, but also the site of diverse social relations. The 
thesis also shows that the formal and informal are part of the same deeply 
segmented economy and not two distinct, separate economies. The extended case 
study method is used to describe and analyse the nature of informal trading 
activities among traders dealing in four types of goods commonly found at the flea 
market: clothes and shoes, DVDs and video games, arts and crafts, and second-
hand books. Primary and secondary sources, interviews with policy experts, 
researchers and activists, a total of 70 semi-structured interviews with traders and 
participant observation, over a period of one and a half years were used to obtain 
data on the nature of the informal economy in the current Zimbabwe crisis, and to 
profile these traders. The thesis describes the daily lives of the traders, their social 
characteristics and work histories, and the social relations of trust and reciprocity 
which enable them to source their goods. It is shown that the majority of the 
traders live an extremely precarious existence marked by low, unstable incomes. 
However, they should not be viewed as passive victims of the economic crisis, as 
they demonstrate qualities of resourcefulness and innovation. Nor are they totally 
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excluded from global circuits of production and exchange. Global connections are 
identified and shown to be relevant to the sourcing and sale of goods. These 
connections suggest an alternative way of conceptualising globalisation.   
 
Key words: informal economic activities; informal traders; Harare, Zimbabwe; 
precariousness; globalisation; extended case method; localisation of the global; 
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Introduction to the Research 
 
 
1.1 Research aims  
 
The central concern of this study is the nature of informal economic activities 
among urban traders in Harare, Zimbabwe. The study focuses on a particular flea 
market and describes the extremely precarious lives of a sample of informal 
traders. It is shown that, as through much of Africa, the market is a social as well 
as an economic nexus. It is not only the site of economic production and exchange 
constituting survivalist activities that are increasingly important in the collapsing 
Zimbabwe economy, but also the site of diverse social relations. Some of these 
relations involve support and solidarity (among the traders), while others involve 
a level of exploitation (of customers and suppliers). The market brings together a 
wide range of interests from former “Rhodesians” expressing nostalgic sentiments 
for their colonial past, to desperate peasants from the rural areas, to precarious 
(cross-border) informal traders, to Chinese retailers from Johannesburg, to French 
collectors of African “chic”. In doing so, it reflects connections which span the 
globe. The social ties and social networks of the traders than span southern 
African borders are conduits of the informalisation of the social welfare economy 
in Zimbabwe. For instance, money remitted to traders for various reasons 
circumvents the formal banking system. An analysis of the lives of traders reveals 
a latticework of various connections. 
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The study describes these connections from the local, to the regional and 
on to the global. These connections suggest an alternative way of conceptualising 
globalisation. It could be argued that this study indicates processes of 
globalisation both from above and from below. “Globalisation from above” refers 
to the growing power of economic institutions situated in the North such as the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the increasing 
connections between multinational corporations (MNCs) which operate in many 
different countries in both the global North and the South. According to Barlow 
and Clarke (2002: 84): 
The corporation is the most powerful institution of contemporary 
 economic life. There are now over 45,000 transnational corporations in the 
 world and the top 200 are so large and powerful that their combined 
 annual sales are greater than the sum total of the economies of 182 of the 
 191 countries in the world.  
 
This shows the reach of the power of global corporations. Another 
example of the power of MNCs is indicated by Brodie, (2003: 56): 
Transnational corporations may still be headquartered in one country, but 
their operations are increasingly deterritorialized. They can demand 
subsidies and expensive infrastructure in one state, elect to pay taxes in 
another and download the human and environmental costs of production 
on yet another jurisdiction.  
 
“Globalisation from below” is sometimes used to refer to the response of groups 
like non-governmental organisations (NGOs) which increasingly link up across 
the globe to fight the dominant workings of these corporations and institutions 
whose activities have deleterious impacts on the lives of the local populations. 
This is a form of resistance which is forging a grassroots international solidarity. 
Appadurai (2002) has referred to this as “grassroots globalization.” These NGOs 
are “concerned with mobilizing highly specific local, national, and regional 
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groups on matters of equity, access, justice, and redistribution” (Appadurai, 2002: 
281).  
This formulation has been criticised by Ferguson (2006) who prefers the 
notion of global resistance “from across”. He asks: 
Can we learn to conceive, theoretically and politically, of a „grassroots‟ 
that would be not local, communal or authentic, but worldly, well 
connected and opportunistic? Are we ready for social movements that fight 
not „from below‟ but „across‟ using their „foreign policy‟ to fight struggles 
not against „the state‟ but against that hydra-headed transnational 
apparatus of banks, international agencies and market institutions through 
which contemporary capitalist domination functions? (Ferguson, 2006: 
107). 
 
This study documents “globalisation from above” in the form of structural 
adjustment programmes imposed by the IMF, which had devastating impacts on 
the Zimbabwean population. One response to this devastation is a form of 
“globalisation from below” in the activities of informal traders who sometimes 
connect to the “global” in the sourcing of goods. Examples are second-hand 
clothing from the global North, and DVDs and video games whose content is 
developed in countries such as the United States of America (USA). 
Informal economic activities have intensified in Zimbabwe over the years, 
a pattern which is not restricted to the global South. The global increase in the 
level of informal economic activities is related to capitalist restructuring and crises 
(Castells and Portes, 1989; Castells, 1996; Standing, 1997). There has been 
recognition that “…informal employment tends to expand during economic crises 
or downturns…” (Chen, Vanek and Heintz, 2006: 2132). For example, a linkage 
has been drawn between the increase in the level of informal economic activities 
in Asian cities and the 1998 financial crisis (Bhowmik, 2005). The crisis in 
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Zimbabwe resulted in a similar pattern, as demonstrated by the growth of informal 
economic activities because of structural adjustment and during the recent 
economic turmoil in the country. Those with the means to do so migrated from 
Zimbabwe to regional and international destinations in search of better 
employment opportunities.  
This study provides a perspective from Southern Africa on how those 
people who chose not to migrate, or who did not have the means to do so on a 
long-term or permanent basis, survive in the face of economic involution. The 
lives of traders are one of the lenses through which to look into how different 
people react differently to similar processes of economic restructuring and 
globalisation at the local level. Another angle is to consider the nature of the 
economic activities in which they engage. The informal and the formal segments 
of the economy have both been affected by economic restructuring, and different 
lenses can be used to examine the impacts of economic restructuring and 
globalisation on these segments of the economy.  
The focus of this study is on a collapsing Zimbabwean economy as 
opposed to a collapsed Zimbabwean economy. This study follows an approach 
which views the state of the Zimbabwean economy not as static but rather as 
going through several processes of change. The lingering question is whether 
economies ever really collapse or totter on, on the brink of collapse. This study 
views the case of Zimbabwe as more of a collapsing economy, which is 
processual, in contradistinction to a collapsed economy, which is static. In such a 
conjuncture the narratives of traders, for instance, are important in examining how 
they survive in an economy in constant flux.  
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There has often been a tendency to marginalise the narratives of those 
living in areas that are seen as not being “globally connected” as far as the impact 
of globalisation is concerned. Some authors, like Ferguson (2006: 25), have 
indicted recent narratives on globalisation which manage to “characterize „the 
globe‟ and „the entire world‟ in ways that say almost nothing at all about a 
continent of some 800 million people that takes up fully 20 percent of the planet‟s 
land mass”. Achille Mbembe (2001: 4) argues that Africa is “the supreme 
receptacle of the West‟s obsession with, and circular discourse about, the facts of 
„absence,‟ „lack,‟ and „non-being,‟ of identity and difference, of negativeness – in 
short, of nothingness”.  
Analysts like Ferguson (2006) take umbrage at the fact that academic 
blockbusters like Saskia Sassen‟s (1999) Globalization and Its Discontents and 
Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz‟s (2003) book of the same title only devote a few 
pages to discussions on Africa. The African continent suffered tremendously 
under structural adjustment, one of the discontents of globalisation. Ferguson 
(2006: 23) argues that: 
The questions raised by considering Africa‟s place-in-the-world, then, are 
indeed „global‟ ones, but not in the way that most discussion of 
globalization would imply. Instead, they point to the need for a new 
framing of discussions of the global: centered less on transnational flows 
and images of unfettered connection than on the social relations that 
selectively constitute global society; the statuses and ranks that it 
comprises; and the relations, rights, and obligations that characterize it. To 
take seriously African experiences of the global requires that any 
discussion of „globalization‟ and the „new world orders‟ must first of all be 
a discussion of social relations of membership, responsibility, and 
inequality on a truly planetary scale. 
 
This study, although not focusing on the African continent as a whole, attempts to 
fill this gap by bringing to the fore a perspective from a country on the continent: 
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Zimbabwe. Ferguson (2006) makes a clarion call for “situated understandings” of 
what is happening in specific places across the globe instead of all-encompassing 
narratives. The study utilises the case of Zimbabwe to “excavate” what is really 
happening in the so-called “black hole” or “fourth world”, appellations which are 
loosely used by authors like Castells (1998). For example, the study considers the 
connectedness, albeit in a different and unequal way, of informal economic 
activities at a flea market in urban Harare to what is happening at the global level. 
 This study is about the lives of traders, their struggles, their fears and their 
hopes. The dissertation frames the accounts of traders in a broader discussion 
about globalisation. The lives of the traders are parallel to the fortunes and 
misfortunes that post-colonial Zimbabwe has gone through. As the country sank 
deeper into crisis, so did the lives of the majority of the informal traders who are 
the subject of this study. If anything, the story that traders have to tell about their 
lives is also the story of Zimbabwe, that Southern African country which had so 
much promise just after independence. Within the first decade of independence, 




Case studies of informal economic activity are important in that they demonstrate 
the linkages between the so-called “first and “second” economies. For example, 
former South African president, Thabo Mbeki (2003), has referred to the informal 
economy as “the second economy” or the “marginalised economy”, and describes 
it as being “structurally disconnected from both the first and the global economy”. 
The notion of disconnection (the dual economy thesis) has however been 
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criticised for failing to recognise that there are multiple forward and backward 
linkages as people move between formal and informal realms in terms of their 
economic activities, a movement which Devey, Skinner and Valodia (2006) refer 
to as “churning”. This study explores these linkages. The study also recognises 
that state economic policy will invariably have an impact on the range of survival 
strategies that individuals in developing societies undertake, especially when 
economies are in crisis. The state, through various institutions and policy 
instruments, affects the access that individuals have to the resources necessary for 
their social reproduction. 
Studies on Zimbabwe have tended to focus mainly on the collapse of the 
economy, political repression, social disorganisation and the concomitant exodus 
of qualified professionals (Bond, 1998; Bond and Manyanya, 2003; Chikanda, 
2004; Masunungure, 2004). A significant gap in the literature, especially on the 
contemporary crises, is a lack of up-to-date studies that examine the innovative 
and creative ways in which Zimbabweans themselves are dealing with economic 
difficulties. Traders are not just passive victims of Zimbabwe‟s economic 
implosion, and this study contributes to addressing this gap in research. Most 
studies have also not considered and theorised the possibly contradictory nature of 
the relationship between the state and the informal sector in Zimbabwe. In 
particular historical conjunctures in Zimbabwe, the state supported informal 
economic activities, and in other moments neglected and even attempted to 




Studies of informal economic activities like this one also illuminate the 
problems that the working class has to deal with as capitalist restructuring takes 
places across the globe, and how those left without employment react to these 
processes of restructuring. Standing (1997) argues that a new era of labour market 
flexibility and insecurity in the world of work has been spawned across the globe 
and that, as a result, new social forms are necessary in order to cater for those 
individuals who are, for example, dispossessed of their jobs as the juggernaut of 
capitalist restructuring proceeds. The growth of informal economic activities may 
be a clarion call to how we consider the “future of work”. 
Conceptualisation of work in the twenty-first century involves rethinking 
the concept of work and how households and communities are reproducing 
themselves materially by engaging in “new forms of work” (Von Holdt and 
Webster, 2005). These new forms of work involve making a living on the 
“periphery” of the economy, on the “representational gap” or on the “margins” 
(Philip, 2005; Von Holdt and Webster 2005; Webster, 2005). Von Holdt and 
Webster (2005) have conceptualised these changes in the world of work in terms 
of three major zones: the core, formal-sector workers in stable employment 
relations with wages and benefits; the zone of casualised and externalised work 
often involving less stable employment relations with sub-contractorsl and the 
zone of the periphery where people secure their livelihoods through informal 
economic activities. Connections exist among these different zones, and between 
them and the “global”. 
Studying informal economic activities in contemporary Zimbabwe 
unpacks the “forces” and “connections” between the “local and the global” and in 
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the process casts informality not only in a particular historical conjuncture, but 
also a specific geographical context. The study seeks to do this by focusing on a 
single case and examining how this case (the local) connects to the global. 
Geographical specificity is important in that, at the local level, the policy 
instruments and promulgations of the state play a role in shaping the trajectory 
and patterns of individual survival strategies. Important in the case of Zimbabwe 
is the general environment of economic and political crises in recent years. 
Globally there is a crisis of social reproduction (Bakker, 2003; Bakker and Gill, 
2003a, b) and the situation in Zimbabwe should be understood within this broader 
context. Over the years the country as a whole had been lurching from crisis to 
crisis and the local population has been engaging in informal economic activities 
that, although they have been shaped by local conditions, can also be found in 
other countries which have gone through similar socio-economic and in some 
cases political trajectories. 
This study contributes both empirical and theoretical knowledge on the 
multiple crises in Zimbabwe and the multidimensional sources of theses crises. It 
also contributes knowledge on how individuals are coping with the harsh 
economic and political environment perpetuated by the state, and on how they 
have reproduced themselves and their families both in the past and in the present. 
The study excavates the nature of these local responses. It is structured upon the 
central role played by informal economic activities in the survival of 
impoverished groups of people. These informal economic activities should be 
understood within a historical context. 
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 In many urban African cities, and in many other cities of the developing 
world, informal economic activities have, historically, played a central role in the 
lives of the poor and dispossessed. In a country like Zimbabwe, with estimates of 
over 80 per cent unemployment and, up until recently, hyperinflation of 




 continues to play 
a key role in survival. Zimbabwe‟s currency has since become defunct.3 The lives 
of the urban populace in Zimbabwe, many of them poor, have over the past years 
grown increasingly precarious. Working people across the country have witnessed 
the erosion of their pensions and savings and many have lost their jobs under the 
weight of a “crisis” which has lasted for well over a decade. This study examines 
how these people, who have witnessed their lives being violently assaulted by the 
economic crisis, have adapted to an economy in constant flux.  
The economic, political and social history of Zimbabwe frames this study. 
Of central importance is the collapse of the productive sectors of the economy 
brought about by the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in the 
1990s. Intimately connected to structural adjustment is the issue of globalisation. 
The globalisation of free market economic fundamentals as an ideology and 
                                                 
1
 Rigorous study and documentation of behaviours associated with hyperinflation in the social and 
economic sciences followed its occurrence in the Weimar Republic (present-day Germany) in the 
period between the two World Wars. Zimbabwe‟s inflation approached but failed to surpass the 
world record setting inflation experienced in Hungary in 1946.  
2
 In some cases I use the terms informality and informal economy interchangeably in the 
dissertation.  
3
 Towards the end of 2008 most companies stopped trading in Zimbabwe dollars, and by the 
beginning of 2009 the Zimbabwean dollar was largely defunct. The US dollar and the South 
African rand, along with other foreign currencies, have since become de facto currencies of the 
country. The research for this study took place from January 2007 to the middle of 2008. While 
having a historical lens, the study largely covers this period and does not consider the more recent 
political, social and economic events that have been unfolding in the country, including what has 
been dubbed the “dollarisation” of the economy where the US dollar and (and other hard 
currencies), are used as de facto currencies.    
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subsequently the implementation of policies aligned to the dictates of the “free 
market” greatly affected the economic performance of many developing countries 
like Zimbabwe. Free market economic principles largely emphasised the “rolling 
back” of the state.4 In Zimbabwe, this meant a heavy trimming of the public sector 
workforce, which spawned massive unemployment. Those left without jobs in 
both the public and private sectors were increasingly propelled into informal 
economic activities so as to cope with the crisis. The issue as indicated earlier is 
how the dispossessed are surviving in such an environment. There is need for a 
much more nuanced and textured understanding of their lives and this study 
contributes to generating knowledge on this.  
While economic restructuring triggered poor economic performance (if not 
economic collapse), economic mismanagement, corruption and a protracted 
political impasse, among other things, worsened the trajectory of the Zimbabwean 
economy in subsequent years. In dealing with the economic crisis, those who 
chose the route of the informal economy have come to symbolise the resilience 
and innovation of the local populace in protecting themselves against the “tide” of 
economic collapse. However, this resilience and innovation does not equal 
triumph at all. The large majority of informal traders continue to lead a very 
precarious existence. 
Most traders do not have life savings, pensions or affordable health care 
plans. They also face myriad other challenges similar to those faced by a large 
                                                 
4
 It could be argued that prescriptions by the international financial system that the state should 
scale back are in fact anti-development, especially in the developing world. A developing country 
may need the state to spend on a range development projects such as infrastructure and other 
public works, in an environment where private-sector investment for a variety of reasons, some of 
them political, is for the most part not forthcoming. The state may be the only actor that may 
actually have an interest in funding such projects without necessarily seeking monetary returns as 
is usually the case with the private sector. 
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number of inhabitants of cities in Africa and across the developing world. These 
challenges include an unreliable public transport system, inefficient and corrupt 
bureaucracies, inadequate and unreliable provision of amenities like water and 
electricity, and problems with accommodation. Those who still had formal jobs 
after structural adjustment in more recent times have had to watch as companies 
have either relocated or permanently shut down their operations, leaving workers 
unemployed and with very little or nothing at all to fall back on. It is also 
important to note that what happened in Zimbabwe during the period of economic 
restructuring is not particular to the country. Several other countries have gone 
through similar crises, a majority of them triggered by economic restructuring and 
the subsequent implosion of their economies. 
The question that one may ask, then, is how do societies with historically 
disparate economic, political and social trajectories respond to processes of global 
restructuring and the implosion of local economies? In the volume of essays 
edited by Burawoy and Verdery (1999) titled Uncertain Transitions: 
Ethnographies of Change in a Postsocialist World, the contributors examine the 
varying responses of different people to systemic transformations in the former 
Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe for instance. In the wake of the “great 
transformation” charted in the work of authors like Castells (1996, 1998), when 
the world goes though change, the issue is whether or not we can simply label one 
part of globe as belonging to a “network society” or whether it is part of an un-
networked “marginalised” society that belongs to the so-called “black-hole”.  
 13 
 
Zimbabwe emerged from a history of a racist, colonial, capitalist 
economy
5
 which continued to shape the post-colonial trajectory of the country. On 
the other hand, the former Soviet Union emerged from a highly centralised 
socialist economy. All this had an impact on the range of survival strategies that 
ordinary people could take up. In post-colonial Zimbabwe there were also 
compounding factors like structural adjustment, partly implemented to service the 
debt of the colonial regime. The well-documented history of structural adjustment 
demonstrates how restructuring served as a mechanism by international financial 
institutions to insert Africa into the world economy. Saul (2005: 9) argues that the 
“African crisis … has … roots in the nature of colonialism‟s impact on Africa and 
in the kind of transition to independence”. The author goes on to add that:  
the problems of Africa (including those of Southern Africa) in the new 
millennium are sharply defined by the particular mode of the continent‟s 
insertion into the wider global capitalist system and, further, that African 
countries are most unlikely to realize either substantial economic growth 
or a significant measure of humane development along the lines defined by 
such a circumstance (Saul, 2005: 15).  
 
Southern Africa has had a long history of migration. This dates back to the 
colonial period, which saw large numbers of people moving within the region to 
countries like South Africa and Zimbabwe where they worked as cheap mine and 
farm labour (Crush, Jeeves and Yudelman, 1991; Chirwa, 1996, 1997; Crush, 
2000; Christiansen and Kydd, 1983). After independence in Zimbabwe, especially 
following ESAP, there was also acceleration in the pace of immigration to other 
locales outside the country in search of better working and living conditions. 
                                                 
5
 In the first decade or so of independence, state-driven welfarism with a dose of state-supported 
capitalism managed to deliver tangible benefits to the populace in a variety of areas like health 
care, education and employment. The gains of this project were eroded by the economic 
restructuring which eventually triggered the implosion of the economy. 
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There was already a long tradition of people migrating throughout the Southern 
African region and internationally in search of better economic opportunities. It is 
not new because in the current economic milieu, after the economic involution, 
people have been engaging in economic activities, whether formal or informal, 
that are globally connected and involve migratory tendencies. 
Those in the diaspora are important in the flow of, among other things, 
ideas and material and cultural capital. As noted by Bayart (2000: 252), “Practices 
of consumption, far from amounting to a process of Westernization or alienation, 
have enabled local actors to appropriate a modernity which was originally 
imported, and hence to effect a „reinvention of difference‟ which is inherent in the 
process of globalization”. Remittances are also important in an understanding of 
the connections between African countries and other parts of the globe. Those 
from African countries migrate to the very same countries which, through 
powerful institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, 
may have been the root cause of the ills that result in their migration. 
Research on Zimbabwe has shown the importance of remittances for 
survival among those still in the country who have lived through the Zimbabwean 
crisis (Bracking and Sachikonye, 2006, 2008; Maphosa, 2007). Those in the 
diaspora can also facilitate the movement of kin and friends to foreign 
destinations by providing, for example, money for travelling. Diasporic 
connections have also been found to be very important in providing new arrivals 
with accommodation and in networking them with potential employers 
(Andersson, 2006). Connections that would have been established in the country 
of origin of the immigrants are reproduced in a variety of ways among the 
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immigrants in destination countries, and they are important in the immigrant‟s 
endeavours to establish themselves there (Andersson, 2006). In the case of 
Zimbabwe some of these remittances are important in the very survival of those at 
the local level. The issue that needs to be understood is how those at the local 
level are deploying these resources (remittances) in their daily lives so as to shield 
themselves against the economic crisis. Only then can a fully textured and 
nuanced understanding of their survival mechanisms, and how these mechanisms 
connect to the global, emerge. 
 




Though there are many variants of what constitutes globalisation,
6
 there seems to 
be much agreement that “the globe”, the “planet”, “the world” has become an 
increasingly interconnected whole. Still there are those who argue that in the 
current conjuncture Africa is still not part of that globalised, networked society. 
For example, Castells (1998) maintains that much of Africa is largely a “fourth 
world”, a “black hole” where wars, hunger and conflicts dominate and where the 
vast majority of the populations are “marginalized” from the “global networks” 
that make up what he terms the “network society”. It seems in Castells‟ account 
that much of African remains the “dark continent”.  
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Analysts like Bayart (2000: 237) have argued that the current events in 
Africa reflect something totally different to most of the narratives that are 
ubiquitous in the literature: 
Current conflicts do not stem from the fundamental fault of construction 
which has distorted the relationship between the state and society ever 
since, but rather from the long osmosis between these two spheres. 
Africa‟s contemporary political struggles and wars are not the 
consequence of a radical rupture – colonization – but more symptomatic of 
a historical line of continuity, namely a practice of extraversion. They are 
not an expression of the marginalization of Africa within the world 
economy but of older dynamics (or occasionally of very new ones) 
generated by the manner of its insertion into the world economy. 
  
Bayart (2000: 240) further asserts that: 
Africa is thus, in its way, a player in the process of globalization. Some of 
the events which are often said to be evidence of its alleged de-linking 
with the world in fact serve as most eloquently to demonstrate the 
opposite. Thus some of Africa‟s bloodiest conflicts, often predictably 
interpreted as manifestations of its supposed primitiveness, cannot be 
separated from the ebbs and flows of the global economy and also from 
global cultural practices…. 
 
Also pertinent according to Bayart is that it was through air transport that diseases 
like cholera were brought to regions like the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea, which 
had never known such sickness; in fact, Africa has become the continent most 
severely affected by the most modern of diseases, HIV and AIDS, which are 
“tragic expressions of its globalization…” (Bayart, 2000: 240). Above all, the 
author concludes, the “discourse on Africa‟s marginality is a nonsense” (Bayart, 
2000: 207). 
This dissertation takes a similar position, arguing that those in the global 
South, for example in Africa, are not totally disconnected at all. The argument is 
that through their economic activities, the informal traders in the case study are 
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variably connected to the “global” or the “network society” albeit in an unequal 
manner. There are instances of the “localization of the global” (where 
commodities produced at the global level are sold at the local level by traders in 
Zimbabwe) and the “globalization of the local” (where commodities manufactured 
at the local level in Zimbabwe find global pathways when sold by traders). 
Commodities and ideas have long been a point of connection between Africa and 
the rest of the world. One analyst argues that, “considered in the view of the 
history over the longue duree, Africa has never ceased to exchange both ideas and 
goods with Europe and Asia, and later with the Americas” (Bayart, 2000: 218). 
The issue of ideas is important here in that it was through ideologies around 
economic restructuring – a form of globalisation – that the African economies 
were most devastated. 
Processes associated with economic globalisation triggered the collapse of 
the economy in Zimbabwe in the 1990s (Bond, 1998). Concurrently, through 
processes associated with globalisation, some traders were and continue to be able 
to make a living. The sociology of a post-apartheid Southern Africa involves 
analysis of issues of connection at economic, social and possibly political levels. 
These connections exist at the regional level and at the global level. 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has played an 
important role in the integration
7
 of the Southern African region as a whole. For 
example, through the easing of cross-border movement between the countries of 
the SADC bloc there has been considerable movement of goods and people within 
                                                 
7
 Weeks (1996) provides a short but cogent account of economic integration in the SADC region 
and how the World Bank used this economic integration to promote neo-liberal economic 
restructuring in the region. 
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the region. Since becoming a member of the SADC bloc in 1994, South Africa 
has become an economic and political powerhouse in the region and attracts 
economic migrants not only from across the Southern African region but also 
from the African continent at large. Research on globalisation and economic 
regionalism has to be grounded in the dynamics involved in some of these 
processes. South Africa is also an important node in the migration of, for example, 
qualified African professionals in the Southern African region and on the 
continent as whole. These professionals sometimes migrate to South Africa where 
many global companies operate. After working and gaining experience in South 
Africa, they move on to other locations outside the continent, such as Europe and 
North America. 
This study follows in the footsteps of works like the collaborative 
Grounding Globalization by Webster, Lambert, Bezuidenhout (2008) and Global 
Ethnography by Burawoy et al (2000). These works essentially put a “human 
face” on processes of globalisation. The first work “grounds” globalisation by 
analysing how workers in Australia, South Africa and South Korea deal with the 
growing insecurity associated with global restructuring in white goods
8
 
manufacturing plants. The authors demonstrate the variable responses in different 
societies to similar processes of globalisation. The second work utilises case 
studies from Brazil, Hungary, Ireland and a host of other countries, and considers 
how globalisation affects diverse groups of people such as breast cancer activists, 
                                                 
8
 The term “white goods” generally refers to the appliances used for house keeping. They used to 
be painted only in white hence “white goods”. However, now a range of colours exist but the use 
of the term persists. 
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environmental groups and software engineers in what the authors dub a “post-
modern world”. 
Generally, globalisation as a process allows ease of movement of goods, 
money and in some cases people not only between regional countries but also 
globally. Indeed, emigration is one form of extraversion whereby African 
countries are inserting themselves into the international economic system (Bayart, 
2000). Besides migration, legal or illegal, African countries are also inserting 
themselves into the international system through their participation in illegal 
activities such as trafficking in narcotics and smuggling of “blood diamonds” and 
weapons (Bayart, 2000; Nordstrom, 2004, 2007). It is important then to recognise 
that in a global era, (global) space is a “product of interrelations; as constituted 
through interactions, from the immensity of the global to the intimately tiny” 
(Massey, 2005: 9). At the same time space, in such a global moment, is constantly 
being constructed and reconstructed (ibid). 
So while processes of globalisation are limiting they can also be enabling 
in that they facilitate some level of economic exchange. In the Southern African 
context informal traders can move within the countries of the region to source 
goods. This does not mean that this movement is always unfettered. Human 
movement has its own spatial challenges. Traders have to deal with immigration 
and customs regulations in Zimbabwe and similar regulations in the countries that 
they visit. They have to negotiate entry and exit with these gatekeepers, who can 
deny them entry into “their territory” and may use the “plight” of traders for their 
own personal gain. For example, gatekeepers may want favours, financial or 
otherwise, from the traders. 
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This study analyses the lives of four types of traders at an informal market: 
clothes and shoe traders; DVD and video game traders; arts and crafts traders; and 
second-hand book traders. The choice of these types of traders was based on the 
fact that they sold the most commonly available goods at the market. Informal 
traders and their activities connect to the global in a variety of ways. This is a 
form of extraversion which looks outward to the global in search of ways to make 
a living, particularly in an economy in crisis. While these connections to the 
global are structurally unequal, they are an alternative way of conceptualising 
globalisation. Informal traders responded to the socio-economic crisis by 
engaging in activities that may in some instances be connected to this global level. 
The two different ways of conceptualising this connection to the global are 
illustrated in Table 1.1. 
 
Table 1.1 Typology of globalisation among informal traders 
Type of globalisation Goods 
Localisation of the global Clothes and shoes 
DVDs and video games 
Globalisation of the local Arts and crafts 
Second-hand books 
 
 Commodities like clothes and shoes with production sites in the East and 
DVDs and video games from the West and in some cases the East
9
 are sold on the 
local Zimbabwe market. This is what I term the “localisation of the global”. On 
the other hand, arts and crafts and second-hand books that are sourced locally are 
sold regionally and in some cases internationally. I term this the “globalisation of 
                                                 
9
 The visual content is mainly developed in the West – for example, in Hollywood in the United 




the local”. Essentially these two types of globalisation illustrate responses to the 
failure of the Zimbabwean economy. Economic crises in some developing 
countries across the globe were triggered by the structural adjustment programmes 
carried out in the developing world in the 1980s and 1990s, which were largely 
under the aegis of the World Bank and the IMF. Zimbabwe went through a period 
of restructuring, and the consequences were deleterious, particularly for poor 
people. Economic restructuring also connected developing world countries as 
wealth flowed from their coffers in the form of balance of payments to institutions 
such as the World Bank and the IMF based in the global North. 
Bayart (2000: 227) maintains that “financial extraversion can take the 
form of direct financial aid by friendly governments and multilateral institutions, 
such as the World Bank, the IMF and the European Development Fund”. In some 
cases it can take the “guise” of structural adjustment aid (Bayart, 2000). As 
indicated earlier, in the developing world we have seen local populations dealing 
innovatively with the challenges emanating from the restructuring of economies. 
By engaging in informal economic activities, poor people in the developing world 
were confronting head-on the challenges emanating from a World Bank-IMF led 
attempt to insert Africa and the developing world into the world economy. 
Economic involution triggered by World Bank and IMF policies, and later 
worsened by economic mismanagement, propelled Zimbabweans to migrate 
throughout the region and to other international destinations in search of better 
livelihoods. In the case of traders, travel to those countries where they could 
source goods cheaply continues to be an important way to survive. These traders 
contend with many challenges as they travel within the region; for example, the 
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xenophobic violence in May 2008 in South African targeting largely foreign-born 
nationals demonstrates some of these challenges (Pillay, 2009). The xenophobic 
violence had antecedents in other smaller, less publicised incidents in some of the 
country‟s provinces (Nyamjoh, 2006). For a while during and after the 
xenophobic violence, some of the traders interviewed stated that they stopped 
travelling to South Africa to source goods because they feared for their lives. 
Curtailed movement had enormous negative impacts on their ability to make a 
living.  
It is estimated that there are some 25 000 informal traders “on the books” 
in SADC (Keepile and Kadida, 2009), where the informal economy continues to 
be a flash point of contestation and sometimes outright conflict between informal 
traders and municipal and national authorities. There are many such cases in other 
parts of Africa and throughout much of the developing world in general. For 
example, in its March 2009 newsletter, StreetNet International
10
 reported on the 
decision to relocate some of the informal traders at the Warwick Market in 
Durban, South Africa (Roberts, 2009). The decision was made by city officials 
without consulting the traders themselves, leading to outcries from the affected 
traders. 
In a synthesis of studies focusing on street trading and other informal 
activities in six African countries (Kenya, Uganda, South Africa, Cote D‟Ivoire, 
Ghana and Zimbabwe), one analyst concluded that authorities in urban areas in 
these countries made by-laws arbitrarily, resulting in inappropriate laws that 
                                                 
10
 StreetNet is an international alliance of street trader and hawker organizations launched in 
Durban, November 2002. 
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continued to be an obstacle to the traders (Mitullah, 2003). The author asserts, 
with reference to local authorities, that: 
Most of them use out-dated restrictive policies, by-laws and regulations 
originally intended to control and regulate the growth of indigenous 
enterprises. The restrictions make vending principally illegal, and view 
vendors as responsible [for] making cities dirty, obstructing traffic and 
therefore a public nuisance. Such provisions and perceptions were for 
dealing with cities planned for colonial governors. The policies did not 
provide for any trade within the Central Business District [CBD], and most 
street trading activities that take place within the CBD had no legal 
provisions. The policies did not appreciate the role of street vending in an 
urban economy (Mitullah, 2003: 10). 
 
The case of Zambia,
11
 where there has been a “love-hate” relationship between 
traders and authorities over the years, also demonstrates the contestations that are 
involved when it comes to informal economic activity in some African countries. 
In a fascinating analysis of the situation in Zambia, Hansen (2004: 77) calls “not 
for an iron fist of control actions to be applied across the economic board, but a 
policy that is flexible enough to reckon with the distinct needs of some of the 
many diverse branches of activity conducted on the streets”. This clarion call 
could apply to most governments in Southern Africa. In a globalised or post-
modern world in which there continues to be a restructuring of the world of work, 
informal economic activities “from below” may very well hold the key to up-
lifting the standards of living in both the global South and North. 
Governments need to take a much more progressive, less elitist perspective 
on informal trading that does not view informal traders as harbingers of chaos 
responsible for defacing the modern city. Rather, they can and do contribute to 
                                                 
11
 During the early years of Chiluba‟s presidency the authorities extended a friendly hand towards 
traders. However, the situation changed later on. For example, in April and May 1999 there were 
major crackdowns on street vendors in Zambia.  
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income-earning activities that provide goods and services to the city‟s inhabitants. 
There will always be legitimate contestations about the use of space in African 
cities. However, these claims to the use of city space by the well-off and powerful 
on the one hand and by the poor and less powerful on the other can be better 
managed. This will involve putting in place much more innovative, less parochial 
legislation which balances the interests of all stakeholders. The poor and the well-
off do have equally legitimate claims to the use of urban space. In the case of the 
poor in the developing world in general and Zimbabwe in particular, informal 
economic activities such as trading at flea markets are a protective “moat” that 
individuals use to shield themselves against the tide of economic involution.  
 
1.4 Research methods and sampling 
 
There are specific problems of sampling and researching those who are informally 
employed (Gaughan and Fermean, 1987; Portes and Sassen-Koob, 1987; Pratt, 
1987). One analyst has maintained that it is very difficult to establish whether or 
not a person is truly informally employed (Jurik, 1998). It has been suggested by 
another author that “an attempt to measure … social phenomena whose raison 
d’etre is to defy observations is fraught with empirical difficulties” (Feige, 1990: 
113). All research, whether it is quantitative or qualitative, is fraught with its own 
problems. There are issues of generalisability, validity and representativity to be 
considered.  
Informal economic activities are very prevalent in African cities, to which 
historically increasing numbers of individuals have migrated for better economic 
opportunities (Rakodi, 1995). Harare reveals the possibly contradictory nature of 
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government actions when it comes to the informal economy, for example, in the 
case of the clean-up exercise, Operation Murambatsvina. In previous years local 
government turned a blind eye or even supported informal economic activities in 
the city but during the clean up exercise attacked and destroyed some of them 
(Mlambo, 2008).  
This study uses the extended case study method at a flea market in urban 
Harare. The method as expounded by Burawoy (1998, 2000) seeks to do four 
things. Firstly, it seeks to extend the researcher into the world of the participants. 
Secondly, it extends observations over time and space. Thirdly, it extends out 
from micro-processes to macro-forces, tracing the source of small differences 
from “the space-time rhythms of the site to the geographical and historical context 
of the field” (Burawoy, 1998: 19). Lastly, it seeks to reconstruct theory, looking 
for theory‟s refutation and not its confirmation.  
This four-pronged method had several implications for the study. Firstly, 
extending into the world of the participants meant becoming familiar with the 
entrepreneurs at the markets. This involved both semi-structured interviews and 
participant observation. Field interviews involved “…asking questions, listening, 
expressing interest, and recording what was said” (Neuman, 1997: 371). The field 
interview is a “joint production of a researcher and the respondent … where 
respondents are active participants whose insights, feelings, and cooperation are 
essential parts of a discussion that reveals subjective meanings” (Neuman, 1997: 
371). Field interviews include a mutual sharing of experience, and the researcher 
might reveal his or her background to build trust and encourage openness from the 
respondents (Neuman, 1997). 
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Semi-structured interviews were the main method of data collection. 
Anonymity of all the respondents in this study is maintained by use of 
pseudonyms. A sample of 70 “own account” informal traders at the market was 
interviewed and the dissertation largely reports on and analyses these findings. 
“Own account workers” are those workers in the informal economy who “do not 
hire others and who contribute both their own capital and labour to the enterprise 
(either a single person operation or a family business/farm)” (Chen, Vanek and 
Heintz, 2006: 2132. Such traders are likely to have more “expert” knowledge on 
the dynamics of sourcing goods since they usually source them on their own. 
They also have better knowledge of the dynamics of trading at the market as they 
normally attend to the stalls themselves. In addition, own account traders come to 
the market much more regularly and are easier to follow up on. They spend most 
of their time at the market it is also easier to establish meaningful relationships 
with them. These issues informed the choice of own account workers at the flea 
market as interviewees. 
Selected key informants with expert knowledge on informal economic 
activities in Zimbabwe were also interviewed. These included academics at a local 
university, especially policy experts and researchers. Their understanding of the 
informal economy as a “soak-pit” for the unemployed or a necessary social evil 
was probed, particularly in relation to events like Operation Murambatsvina. The 
Combined Harare Residents Association (CHRA) has been prominent in 
advocating the rights of informal traders (especially following Operation 
Murambatsvina), and some of the organisation‟s representatives were interviewed.  
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Social research also involves some “...form of participant observation because we 
cannot study the social world without being part of it” (Atkinson and 
Hammersley, 1994: 249). The researcher in participant observation joins 
respondents for “…extended periods of time as well as in different places” 
(Burawoy, 1998). Observations and experiential knowledge gathered from 
immersion in the world of informality are used in this study. Immersion into the 
world of informal trading entailed helping out at some of the stalls at the flea 
market. Observations enabled the gathering of information on some of the hidden 
aspects of the informal economy, like the handling of stolen goods. Through 
observations, information issues such as the relationship between informal traders 
and their customers – for instance, payment procedures (whether credit is allowed 
and to what type of customers) – and negotiation of prices was also gathered. 
There were also brief observations of the transactions between traders and the 
shop owners in Johannesburg where goods are sourced. I accompanied some of 
the male traders when they searched for merchandise in Johannesburg, and 
engaged in informal conversations with some of the suppliers. 
Secondly, extending observations over time and space meant ensuring that 
the study was sensitive to the connectedness of events occurring at different 
moments and in spatially different locations. It also meant taking into 
consideration the social and historical context in which informal economic 
activities take place. For example, comparative research data can be gathered from 
primary sources, secondary sources, running records and recollections (Neuman, 
1997). Primary sources consist of “letters, diaries, newspapers, novels, articles of 
clothing, photographs and so forth of those who have lived in the past and 
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survived to the present” (Neuman, 1997: 396). Secondary sources are the 
“writings of specialist historians who have spent years studying primary sources” 
(Neuman, 1997: 398). This study drew on primary and secondary sources. 
Running records “consist of files or existing statistical documents maintained by 
organizations” and recollections “consist of words or writings of individuals about 
their past lives or experiences” (Neuman, 1997: 398).  
Archival newspaper articles were analysed to trace the trajectory of 
informal economic activities in Zimbabwe from a historical perspective as well as 
debates following Operation Murambatsvina. Documents from the post-
independence period were mainly used. An extensive review of the literature on 
the informal economy from a global and particularly Zimbabwean context was 
undertaken so as to illuminate the changing perspectives and the ideological 
contestations as far as informality is concerned.  
Thirdly, extending micro-processes to macro-forces involved relating the 
individual experiences of entrepreneurs to structural conditions such as 
restructuring and unemployment. The study, for example, considers how global 
forces
12
 in the form of ESAP in the 1990s shaped the development of informal 
economic activities in Zimbabwe in general and more specifically in Harare. 
Added to this is the contemporary environment of political repression, the 
economic crisis and the general social disorganisation which has been shaping life 
among the populace and the traders in important ways. As Burawoy and Verdery 
(1999: 14) maintain, “the economy is always thoroughly embedded in a variety of 
                                                 
12
 In their volume, Global Ethnography: Forces, Connections and Imaginations in a Postmodern 
World, Burawoy et al. (2000) consider these global forces and how individuals in different 
localities engage with and are affected by them. 
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non-economic practices” and there “can be no pure economy”. “What exists is a 
“political and cultural economy” (Burawoy and Verdery, 1999: 14). 
Lastly, extending theory meant engaging with globalisation theories and 
the theory on economic involution and then re-casting these theories in a new 
dimension.  
The approach used for the study meant linking structure, process and 
meaning. This involved locating Zimbabwe in a long-term historical perspective, 
what Comaroff and Comaroff (1992) refer to as “the historical imagination”, and 
at the same time geographically grounding informality in the experiences and 
understandings of a sample of informal traders and entrepreneurs. C. Wright Mills 
(1959: 5), in his classic The Sociological Imagination, notes that the “sociological 
imagination enables its possessor to understand the larger historical scene in terms 
of its meaning for the inner life and the external career of a variety of 
individuals”. It enables us to “grasp history and biography and the relations 
between the two within society” (Mills, 1959: 6). This study “reaches out” for this 
“sociological imagination” and considers how the lives of informal traders (their 
biographies) intersect with “historical change” and “institutional contradictions.” 
Mills maintains that there are “structural transformations” which affect the 
biographies of particular individuals and the sociological imagination takes these 
transformations into consideration (Mills, 1959).  
The lives of informal traders, then, cannot be fully understood without 
considering the economic, political and social conditions within Zimbabwe. Their 
lives are embedded within these structural conditions. The lives of traders and 
their informal economic activities were analysed in terms of issues like the impact 
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of state policy, the social characteristics of the traders, the kinds of goods and 
services provided at the market, the social ties and the social networks in which 
the traders are embedded, the income levels, the skills among traders, and the 
work histories and experiences of the traders, particularly the degree of 
“churning”. Goods and money also move between the formal and the informal 
economies. 
The sampling was a mixture of purposive sampling and snowballing.
13
 For 
instance, it was necessarily purposive to cover the heterogeneity of types of goods 
sold at the market and to also include both males and females and the young and 
old. As stated earlier, the traders interviewed were those who sold the four most 
common types of goods available at the market. Some of the traders were also 
important in recruiting other traders for interviews (snowballing). These traders 
referred me to other traders within their social networks. All in all, 70 “own 
account” informal traders were interviewed at the market; 46 were male and 24 
female. All the 12 DVDs and video games traders at the market were male. There 
were only 2 female traders out of a total of 11 traders in the arts and crafts trade. 
Of all the 10 second hand book traders at the market, only 3 were female. These 
factors accounted for the larger number of males in the sample. Among the 
clothes and shoe traders 18 males and 19 females were interviewed. The period in 
which the research was carried out was marred by political hostilities and violence 
in the country. Thus traders were suspicious about my identity. Some thought that 
I worked for the police and some flatly refused to be interviewed. Once 
relationships were established with some of the traders, they facilitated access to 
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other traders whom they knew. They “put in a good word” for me. The more time 
I spent at the market, the more the traders opened up to me regarding their 
“world”. 
Penetrating the field involved getting to know some of the traders on a 
very personal basis. I have maintained contacts with some of the traders and 
sometimes meet with them on the occasions that they come to Johannesburg to 
source goods. This indicates how relationships of trust established in the field can 
actually grow beyond the field. In some cases I found myself sharing food with 
some of the male traders. I also found myself helping out at some of the stalls and 
on some occasions attending to customers when traders ran personal errands for 
long periods of time during the day.  
During fieldwork I also found myself being “fashion conscious”. My 
friends have always accused me of being “preppy”. I had to tone down my style of 
dress but at the same time remain “smart”. For example, it was important to 
appear stylish among the clothing traders; this was viewed as one of the ways of 
attracting customers to stalls. Most other traders emphasised that it was important 
to be smart every day and to wear “nice” clothes. I found myself having to toe this 
fine line by learning from the traders themselves. At some point I was even a 
customer to some of the traders as I “updated” my wardrobe. Purchasing goods 
from some of the traders was also a tactical way of establishing rapport with them, 
especially the male traders. 
This study acknowledges the limitations of research that uses non-
probability sampling methods. For instance, it is important not to generalise to the 
whole population (Neuman, 1997). The research method used aims for a textured 
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and nuanced understanding of the nature of informal economic activities and the 
lives of informal traders. 
 
1.5 Organisation of the dissertation 
 
Chapter 2 reviews some of the literature on the informal “economy” and considers 
the various debates dealing with its origins. It considers the contested nature of the 
informal sector/economy concept. The chapter also looks into concepts such as 
economic involution, commodity chains, social networks and globalisation. In the 
process the chapter maps out the theoretical approach that is utilised in the rest of 
the dissertation. The theoretical approach that is developed in this chapter has 
several elements. For example, informality and formality have to be understood as 
existing within a single economy that is deeply “structurally segmented”. The 
other issue is that an understanding of the lives of the informal traders and their 
responses to economic involution can only be fully grasped by considering how 
the precarious lifestyles they lead are embedded within Zimbabwe‟s social, 
economic and political conditions. By considering theories of economic 
involution the argument here is that traders respond to the economic crisis by 
engaging in activities that are not inward looking and of a subsistence domestic 
nature, but in fact are outward looking and have “global” connections. In other 
words there is “extraversion”. 
Chapter 3 maps the trajectory of what has come to be commonly known as 
the Zimbabwean crisis. This chapter essentially charts the social, economic and 
political fortunes of the country. To reiterate, Mills (1959: 5) states that the 
“sociological imagination allows its possessor to understand the larger historical 
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scene in terms of its meaning for the inner life and the external career of a variety 
of individuals”. In terms of this, chapter 3 maps Zimbabwe‟s historical scene, 
especially the trajectory of the political economy. This sets the terra firma on 
which to explain the lives of the traders in subsequent chapters. The argument is 
that a majority of the populace were propelled into informal economic activities as 
result of the economic structural adjustment regime. The “scaling back” of the 
state also meant that the populace could not depend on it for social provisioning in 
times of need, unleashing a crisis of social reproduction. This chapter sets the 
scene for the argument that connections exist between the structural conditions in 
Zimbabwe and the particular lives of traders. Here, history and biography 
intersect. 
Chapter 4 reports on primary data. Firstly, the chapter briefly describes the 
informal market which is the focus of the study and contextualises it within the 
informal segment of the economy and other informal markets in urban Harare and 
the broader Zimbabwean crisis. The chapter then identifies the four types of 
traders based on the goods they sell. Thirdly, there is a brief discussion of the 
socio-economic characteristics of the customers that frequent the market. Finally, 
the greater part of the chapter reports on and analyses the socio-economic 
characteristics of traders based largely on data gathered from the 70 “own account 
workers”. The majority of trades lived a very precarious existence in which they 
were individually responsible for their social reproduction. Sometimes they were 
unable to sell anything at the market for days or weeks, which further worsened 
their social and economic conditions. Their „savings‟ were stored in the goods 
they sold at the market, and most of them did not have any assets to fall back on. 
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In looking at the lives of traders, the chapter briefly considers the notions of social 
capital and social networks and sets the scene for the analysis in subsequent 
chapters.  
Chapter 5 considers in more detail the utility and applicability of the 
notion of social networks in understanding how traders “get the goods” to the flea 
market for purposes of trading. The social network concept is the central 
analytical pin of this chapter. Informal traders interact with customers, other 
traders, friends and kin in various ways, and in the process they produce social 
capital. This chapter focuses on the sourcing of goods by those traders who sell 
clothes and shoes, and those who sell DVDs and video games. I argue that the 
global is localised (“localisation of the global”) by the traders to reinforce the 
argument that the traders are not globally disconnected at all but are actually 
connected in a different, albeit unequal way. This chapter also illustrates that the 
informal economic activities of traders have regional and global extensions. These 
activities are not inward looking, primitivist domestic activities. They are outward 
looking and connect to the global. This is a process of extraversion, as stated 
earlier. 
Chapter 6 follows the same analytical framework as Chapter 5 but shifts 
focus to the case of arts and crafts traders and the second-hand book traders. Here, 
the argument is that the activities of some of the informal traders link up to the 
global through what I term a “globalisation of the local‟ as opposed to the 
“localisation of the global” referred to in Chapter 5. This chapter again illustrates 
again how the activities of seemingly disconnected informal traders connect to the 
global. Social networks are also shown to be important in understanding how the 
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traders “get the goods” to the market and to their customers. The chapter shows 
that informality has not only encroached on the world of work but also the 
remitting of money between individuals in different countries. This demonstrates 
the informalisation of the social welfare economy which has been taking place not 
only in Zimbabwe but also across the globe as the burden of social reproduction 
has been “downloaded” back onto individuals. This has had particularly 
deleterious impacts on the poor. 
Chapter 7, the concluding chapter, revisits and ties together the central 
argument of the dissertation. The conclusion reached is that informal economic 
activities, as a response to the country‟s challenges, are largely a precarious and 
insecure existence. These economic activities depend on and are embedded in the 
various social networks and social ties based on trust, reciprocity and cooperation 
among traders. At the same time these activities are in some instances the conduits 
of globalisation, even if in an unequal manner. It is flawed to think of the African 
continent only in negative terms, as an abyss or a black hole. The nature of the 
interactions between the African continent and the global North are symptomatic 
of the unequal and exploitative nature of the insertion of the continent, and the 












This chapter maps out some of the theoretical issues relevant to an analysis of the 
research context, the socio-economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe. It will 
argue that informal economic activities are highly heterogeneous and are 
structurally connected to formal economic activities. The contested nature of the 
notion of the “informal sector” and later, the “informal economy” will be 
examined and the chapter will trace the contours of the development of the 
concept in the literature. This chapter reviews some of the literature and 
concurrently develops the theoretical approach utilised in the dissertation. The 
informal economy and the formal economy are not two separate economies, but a 
single deeply segmented economy. Rather than seeing informal economic 
activities as being at the margins, informality forms the centre of survival in the 
lives of the Zimbabwean populace. Consequently, “the economic involutionary 
moment” in Zimbabwe has resulted in responses that are connected to the 
Southern African and African region, and to the globe. Instead of a retreat to a 
“primitivist” domestic economy, this chapter argues, among other things, that 
there has been in some instances a regional and global extension of informal 
economic activities over time and space. Social networks play an important role in 
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this extension of informal economic activities regionally and globally in addition 
to their important role at the local level. 
In developing the theoretical approach that ties the dissertation together, 
the chapter argues that value chain analysis is a useful conceptual schema that can 
be used to demonstrate not only the movement of commodities across the globe 
and the inequalities and socio-economic exclusion involved in globalisation, but 
also the concentration of market power. Dynamics in the global economy, like the 
increased use of outsourced and flexible labour, and relocation to cheaper sites of 
production, have resulted in the informalisation of work. Workers are becoming 
increasingly insecure as capital searches for cheaper and cheaper labour, and those 
who lose the permanent, more „stable‟ jobs, sometimes have to resort to “eking 
out a living” in the so-called informal economy. 
 
2.2 The informal sector concept and its contested nature 
 
The “informal sector” is a contested concept. Researchers and policy makers who 
apply the concept employ discrepant definitions which are so often incoherent that 
the usefulness of the concept has been called into question (Moser, 1978; Crow, 
1989; Scott, 1991; Rakowski, 1994; Roberts, 1994). A panoply of terms has been 
used to describe informal economic activities, including: the shadow economy 
(Frey, Weck and Pommerehne, 1982; Cassel and Cichy, 1986), the black economy 
(Dilnot and Morris, 1981), the irregular economy (Ferman and Ferman, 1973), the 
underground economy (Simon and Witte, 1982; Houston, 1987), and the 
subterranean economy (Gutmann, 1977, 1980). 
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The concept of the informal sector was introduced into international usage 
in 1972 by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in its report on Kenya, 
and later followed by Hart (1973)
14
 in his work on the poor urban populace in 
Ghana. Informality was seen as characterised by “ease of entry, reliance on 
indigenous resources, family ownership, small scale operations, labour intensive 
and adaptable technology, skills acquired outside of the formal sector and 
unregulated and competitive markets” (ILO, 1972: 2). Some authors assert that a 
central feature of the informal sector is that it is “unregulated by the institutions of 
society, in a legal and social environment in which similar activities are regulated” 
(Castells and Portes, 1989: 12).  
The 1993 International Conference of Labour Statisticians defined the 
informal sector in terms of “the characteristics of the enterprises in which 
activities take place rather than the characteristics of the persons involved or their 
jobs” (Samson, 2004: 6). In 2002 the Committee on the Informal Economy at the 
90
th
 Session of the International Labour Conference opted for the term “informal 
economy” on the grounds that it could “accommodate the diversity of enterprises 
and workers who are not covered by formal arrangements, and not confined to any 
specific sector of economic activity but cut across many sectors” (ILO, 2002b: 
53). In the conclusions of the conference the term “informal economy” was used 
to refer to: 
activities that are not included in the law, which means that they are 
operating within the formal reach of the law … or they are not covered in 
practice, which means that although they are operating within the formal 
reach of the law, the law is not applied or enforced; or the law discourages 
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 Though credited to anthropologist Keith Hart, who popularized the concept, the ILO had alluded 
to it in the 1972 report on Kenya. 
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compliance because it is burdensome, or imposes excessive costs (ILO, 
2002b: 53). 
 
According to Samson (2004: 6) the notion of the “informal economy” amplifies 
the concept of informality to include both “enterprise and employment relations”, 
and therefore captures the “totality and heterogeneity of the informal economy”. 
The notion of heterogeneity is important in that informal economic activity is 
made up of a variety of activities (Devey, Skinner and Valodia, 2006). Informal 
economic activities are also highly stratified, and the study will demonstrate this. 
In the 1970s the dualist school called for a conceptualisation of 
informality that disconnected the informal sector from the formal sector, and saw 
the former as a distinct and separate entity (Chen, Vanek and Carr, 2004). The 
crux of dualist argument is that informal economic activities are made up of small 
family firms which rely on family labour, are labour-intensive, have low levels of 
capital input, use unsophisticated technology and have very low levels of 
productivity (Chen, Vanek and Carr, 2004). These informal economic activities 
are seen as forming part of the second economy. In contradistinction to this, the 
formal level of production is capital-intensive, uses sophisticated technology, is 
made up of large capitalist firms and has high levels of productivity (Chen, Vanek 
and Carr, 2004). Despite acknowledging that the informal economy acts as a 
safety net for the unemployed and the dispossessed from the formal sector (ILO, 
1972; Senthuraman, 1976; Tokman, 1978; Pahl, 1987), the major criticism of this 
school has been its continual use of a dual, informal versus formal, 
conceptualisation (Castells and Portes, 1989). 
The approach followed in this dissertation concurs with the view that: 
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The concept of a second economy is a metaphor that should not be taken 
literally to mean that there are two geographically separate economies. 
Instead, the notion of a second economy is best seen as a form of short-
hand to describe the deeply segmented nature of an extremely unequal 




Most importantly there has been a realisation that a great deal of movement of not 
only goods but also of workers themselves occurs between the formal and the 
informal realms of the economy, a phenomenon known as “churning” (Devey, 
Skinner and Valodia, 2006). 
The structuralist school in the 1970s and 1980s “rectified” the 
disconnection problematic within dualist theorisation. Structuralist scholars 
conceptualised the informal sector as being made up of economic units 
subordinated by larger firms which are always looking at ways of reducing input 
and labour costs and therefore intensify the competitive advantage of larger 
capitalist firms (Chen, Vanek and Carr, 2004). The structuralists, unlike the 
dualists, acknowledge not only that the informal and formal co-exist, but that the 
relationship is one of interdependence of the different forms of production 
(Moser, 1978; Henry, 1987; Castells and Portes, 1989). For example, large 
capitalist firms, which are capital and technology intensive, subcontract some of 
their activities to much smaller labour-intensive firms (Castells and Portes, 1989; 
Rakowski, 1994). Hiring informal labour is seen by formal enterprises as a way to 
cut on labour and other associated costs, and it is argued that it leads to the 
lowering of industry wage standards (Portes and Walton, 1981). Evidence does 
show that there has been an increase in the number of home workers who are 
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 Edward Webster, Asanda Benya, Xoliswa Dilata, Katherine Joynt, Kholofelo Ngoepe and 
Mariane Tsoeu 2008 “Making Visible the invisible: Confronting the Challenges of South Africa‟s 
Decent Work Deficit”. 
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subcontracted by big firms in Australia, Britain, India and South Africa, among 
others (WIEGO, 2006a). 
In the 1980s and 1990s the legalist school argued that the cumbersome and 
expensive nature of operating and registering formally is the main reason why 
entrepreneurs move into the informal sector (Chen, Vanek and Carr, 2004). De 
Soto (1989) is one of the main proponents of this argument, following the studies 
on Peru by the Institute of Liberty and Democracy which document the circuitous 
process of registering formally in operations like street trading and public 
transport. The proponents of this approach have gone on to emphasise that among 
the informal traders lies the hope of competitive capitalist development if the 
elimination of the bureaucratic maze and costs associated with legalising business 
operations takes place (De Soto, 1989, 2000; Rakowski, 1994). De Soto‟s 
approach has been criticised for not recognising the complexity of informal 
property regimes and how formalising them could actually disadvantage the poor 
(Cousins et al 2005)
16
. Perhaps, those in the informal may actually have more to 
lose if they upgrade themselves to operating formally. 
Another approach which concurs with De Soto is the microenterprise 
development approach which sees “microenterprises as synonymous with 
informality, poverty and entrepreneurship” (Rakowski, 1994: 43). Promoters of 
microenterprises are non-governmental organisations, international donor and 
development agencies, and private business groups working in poverty alleviation 
who, like De Soto, see procedures to register formally as cumbersome (Rakowski, 
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 Ben Cousins, Tessa Cousins, Donna Hornby, Rosalie Kingwill, Lauren Royston and Warren 
Smit, in a paper titled “Will Formalising Property Rights Reduce Poverty in South Africa‟s Second 
Economy‟?, questioning the mythologies of Hernado Desoto. 
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1994). Their approach has been to level the playing field, and to expand jobs, 
income and productivity among entrepreneurs through unveiling credit facilities 
and providing training in management and accounting for the poor. Criticisms of 
the microenterprise approach include its neo-liberal inclinations like the 
promotion of deregulation, tax reform, the general emphasis on economic 
efficiency and the “menu approach” which just lists recommendations to promote 
microenterprises while lacking rigorous analysis in some cases (Rakowski, 1994). 
There has also been the illegalist school of thought, popularised by neo-
classical and neo-liberal economists over the decades (WIEGO, 2006b). This 
school of thought argues that there is a conscious and intentional motive among 
informal entrepreneurs to avoid taxation and regulations and, in certain cases, to 
engage in criminal activities. The main argument is that informal operators want 
to evade the costs of operating formally (Maloney, 2004). This debate invokes 
images of a vibrant, illegal, underground economy. 
The fundamental and most important shift in the debate between 1983 and 
1994 was the shift from viewing an expanding informal sector as an indicator of 
the failure of development paradigms to an emphasis on the informal sector as an 
asset or solution to economic activities and poverty (Rakowski, 1994). Integrally 
linked to this development is the realisation that informal economic activity is 
“here to stay” and that it is expanding with modern, industrial growth (Chen, 
Vanek and Carr, 2004). This position implies an indictment of some of the actions 




Recent thinking, which has roots in the post-1990 period, has gone further 
to argue that informal economic activity is in fact made up of a wide range of 
economic occupations ranging from casual day labour to “emerging new 
occupations” like temporary part-time jobs to home working in the high-tech and 
footwear industries (Chen, Vanek and Carr, 2004). Informal economic activities 
are made up of non-standard wage workers as well as entrepreneurs and self-
employed individuals who are producing legal goods and services, albeit through 
irregular or unregulated means (Chen, Vanek and Carr, 2004). 
Informal employment does not only consist of self-employment but also 
includes wage employment (Chen, Vanek and Carr, 2004). Most recent thinking 
has also prioritised the need for an integration of the different schools in a 
conceptualisation of informal economic activities and to identify how the differing 
elements of for example the dualist, structuralist, legalist and illegalist theories are 
appropriate for an understanding of particular segments of informal employment 
in certain contexts (WIEGO, 2006b). Essentially, this is a call for an eclectic kind 
of theoretical application of the various strands of conceptualising informality 
which have come out over the years that take cognisance of the data which shows 
the increase in informality. 
Globally, informal economic activity accounts for more than one third of 
non-agricultural employment (ILO, 2002a). The informal economy is said to 
make up over 70 per cent of non-agricultural employment on the African 
continent (WIEGO, 2006a: 1). Taking South Africa out of the sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) figures, for example, increases the percentage of non-agricultural informal 
employment from 72 per cent to 78 per cent (Chen, Vanek and Heintz, 2006: 
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2133). Informal employment makes up 30 to 50 per cent and 50 to 80 per cent of 
the non-agricultural employment in South East Asia and South Asia respectively 
(Chen, Vanek and Heintz, 2006: 2133). Data from Latin America and the 
Caribbean shows that it makes up over 55 per cent of non-agricultural 
employment, and in southern Europe and western Europe it makes up 24 per cent 
and 10 per cent respectively (Chen, Vanek and Heintz, 2006: 2133). The North 
American figures show that in Canada, informal employment accounts for nearly 
18 per cent of total employment and in the United States just over 8 per cent of 
total employment is made up of the informally employed (WIEGO, 2006a: 1).  
The data shows greater participation of women in informal economic 
activities, especially in the developing world. The exception seems to be in North 
Africa where only 43 per cent of women workers are in informal employment 
(ILO, 2002a: 8). In the developing world over 60 per cent of women workers are 
found in informal employment [outside agriculture] (ILO, 2002a: 8). In sub-
Saharan Africa 84 per cent of women non-agricultural workers are in informal 
employment, compared to 63 per cent of male non-agricultural workers (ILO, 
2002a: 8; Chen, Vanek and Heintz 2006: 2131). The Latin American data shows 
similar trends, with 58 per cent of non-agricultural workers being women and 48 
per cent being men, while the numbers of women and men in informal 
employment (outside agriculture) in Asia are roughly the same (Chen, Vanek and 
Heintz, 2006: 2131). The ILO (2002a: 8) indicates that “although women‟s labour 
force participation rates are lower than men‟s, the limited data available point to 
the importance of women in home-based and street vending in the developing 
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countries”. What is important is that most of this informal work is seasonal, 
sporadic and lacks substantial benefits. 
For this study, informal economic activities will be conceptualised in 
terms of two criteria. First is the degree of state regulation. Conceptually, the 
focus is on those economic activities that are not as tightly regulated in terms of 
formal contracts, labour laws and corporate taxes as in the formal part of the 
economy. The second criterion relates to the level of social exclusion. The focus 
will be on the precarious, insecure and vulnerable situation of informal sector 
workers who have low incomes. They are often the self-employed, or those whose 
contracts are either non-existent or unstable, and who lack benefits compared to 
that part of the population employed formally who may have access to pensions 
and other employment benefits. 
To reiterate, in their analysis of work in general, and more specifically 
work restructuring in post-apartheid South Africa, Von Holdt and Webster (2005) 
conceptualise the differentiation of work into three distinct zones. The first zone is 
that of the “core” where workers have access to set wages and to “legislative 
rights”, the second is what they call the non-core zone where “workers are subject 
to job insecurity, low wages and alienation at work” and the third zone is the 
“periphery of unemployment and informal subsistence activities” (Von Holdt and 
Webster, 2005: 28). The authors conceptualise the last zone as that of 
precariousness and uncertainty. This study considers the nature of informal 
economic activities inside the third zone of this conceptual schema. 
The case of Zimbabwe at times defies compartmentalisation into this neat 
box of theory. As a result of the collapse of the formal part of the economy, 
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increasing numbers of people have been propelled into informality. There has 
been a contraction of the “core zone” of formal employment, and informal 
economic activities have become central to the survival of the Zimbabwean 
populace. Even in the remaining core, wages have become negligible, a problem 
which is further compounded by hyperinflation, making incomes there grossly 
inadequate even for basic survival (Chapter 3). The notion of a core does remain 
important, however, as a heuristic and also for (comparative) analytical purposes. 
A rethinking of the concentric zones model conceptualised by Von Holdt 
and Webster (2005) entails a shift from thinking of informal economic activities 
as being at the periphery of the “world of work” to seeing them as central to the 
survival of the majority of the populace. This is the case in Zimbabwe which has 
been referred to as the “fastest shrinking economy outside of a war zone” 
(Raftopoulous, 2007b: 36). The situation had a pernicious impact on workers for 
instance. Raftopoulous (2007b: 36) notes that: 
For workers, in particular, the picture since the 1990s has been one of 
unrelenting decline. Average minimum wages at the end of the 2006 were 
16.6% of the Poverty Datum Line, while the share of salaries in Gross 
Domestic Income declined from an average of 49% during the pre-
Economic Structural Adjustment period 1985-90, to 41.5% between 1991-
96, dropping further to 29.9% from 1997-2003. Formal employment 
dropped from 1.4 million in 1998 to approximately 950 000 by 2004. In 
the last three years indicators have declined further with estimates that 
80% of Zimbabweans live below the Poverty Datum Line. Moreover, the 
monthly wage of a commercial sector worker only covered about 10% of 
the Consumer Council of Zimbabwe‟s basket of household goods in 2007. 
 
In such an environment it becomes important to highlight the centrality of 
informal economic activities in rethinking the concentric circle model devised by 
Von Holdt and Webster. Informal economic activities have become the pillar of 
survival among not only informal traders but also the broader populace, hence our 
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argument that they can hardly be seen as marginal in the lives of the Zimbabwean 
populace. 
Dual labour market theory (Doeringer and Piore, 1971; Saint-Paul, 1997) 
resembles the model developed by Von Holdt and Webster (2005). Dual labour 
market theorists divide the labour market into primary, secondary, informal and 
illegal categories. The primary sector in the dual labour market theorisation 
corresponds with the core in Von Holdt and Webster‟s (2005) conceptualisation, 
and this is where there are regular, wage jobs that are taxed. The secondary sector 
(corresponding to the non-core) is the sector of less secure jobs which are not so 
well regulated as in the service economy (Cross and Johnson, 2000). The informal 
sector, which corresponds to the periphery, is the category of low-wage, low-
security, and poorly regulated jobs. Dual labour market theorists go on to add the 
illegal sector which is where illegal, unregulated criminal activity lies (Cross and 
Johnson, 2000).  
The broad general argument of dual labour market theory is that 
“…workers have different degrees of access to the labour market” (Cross and 
Johnson, 2000: 101). Essentially, the dominant, privileged groups in society are 
able to “…obtain the highest skill and thus control the best positions in the 
primary sector where they are able to extract the high wages and benefits from 
employers” while those with lower skills and/or less access, like minorities and 
women, are propelled into the secondary labour market “…where their lack of 
control over the workplace leads to lower income and worse working conditions” 
(Cross and Johnson, 2000: 102).  
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Recent (marginalised) immigrants, for example, and others who are unable 
to access the primary and secondary labour markets “…search for opportunities in 
the informal sector, where ethnic networking can make up for lack of skills related 
to the local formal labour market” (Cross and Johnson, 2000: 102). The analysis 
followed here will focus on the informal employment that is largely legal. This 
includes precarious informal economic activity like street trading, hawking and 
flea markets. However, the criterion followed in this conceptualisation of informal 
work is blurred by the fact that precariousness is becoming a common feature of 
all forms of employment globally. 
 
2.3 Precarious work   
 
The notion of “precarious work” is becoming mainstream in the sociology of 
work literature, and refers to “employment that is uncertain, unpredictable and 
risky from the point of view of the worker” (Kalleberg, 2008: 1). Workers live 
under the constant threat of job loss and, when experienced, job loss often triggers 
a domino effect which has an impact on other aspects of life. For example, those 
who lose their jobs also lose health insurance, have problems paying their 
mortgages, and may even have to file for bankruptcy (Kalleberg, 2008). The issue 
is that precarious work, not only creates anxieties and uncertainties among 
workers concerning their work, but its effects also cascade into non-work-related 
issues like the family, the community, and into the political realm (Kalleberg, 
2008; Webster, Lambert and Bezuindenhout, 2008). 
The advent of precarious employment in the formal world of work can be 
linked to “intensified economic integration” as a result of globalisation which has 
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led to increased competition across the world (Kalleberg, 2008: 3). There has been 
a hyper-geographical mobility of capital in recent years, which has meant that 
sometimes workers are left without jobs, at little or no notice, as capital moves in 
search of cheaper labour (Harvey, 1990; Carr, Chen and Tate, 2000). There has 
also been outsourcing to lower wage countries (Lee, 1998; Silver, 2002; 
Salzinger, 2003; Ngai, 2005; Kalleberg, 2008). Companies have increased their 
use of less labour-intensive technologies (Harvey, 1990), and where there are 
labour problems capital simply relocates (“spatial manoeuvre”) to a less 
tumultuous region (Webster, Lambert and Bezuidenhout, 2008). Globally, we can 
see markers of an increase in the level of precarious formal and informal work. 
“Precariousness” is closely related to increasing social and economic 
insecurity. Across the globe we have witnessed, in recent times, following the 
Polanyian Great Transformation, a “Second Great Transformation”. This second 
transformation is an instance of increased social and economic insecurity 
(Webster, Lambert and Bezuidenhout, 2008: vii). Job insecurity is on the rise as 
global companies have the capability to easily relocate their manufacturing 
networks, leaving employees with neither jobs nor benefits to fall back on after 
employment termination. There has been a growth in outsourced and flexible 
temporary work: work which is “uncertain and unpredictable” and does not have 
employment benefits like pensions and medical aid among other things 
(Kalleberg, 2008; Webster, Lambert and Bezuidenhout, 2008). Even in situations 
of war and reconstruction (e.g. in Iraq), there has been the outsourcing of certain 
functions (like security), traditionally the responsibility of the state, to private 
contractors and to private military companies (Klein, 2007). Most of those 
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employed by these companies have no benefits and, when maimed in the “line of 
duty”, have to fund health care on their own. With the growth in the level of 
precarious employment in the formal sector there has also been a concomitant rise 
in precarious informal employment globally. 
In their compelling analysis of economic restructuring in three towns 
located in South Africa, South Korea and Australia, Webster, Lambert and 
Bezuindenhout (2008) chart the impact of increased insecurity among workers in 
the white goods industry. Their analysis is grounded in global economic dynamics 
and develops a powerful conceptual schema that illustrates the growing 
inequalities that come with globalisation. Their analysis illustrates the way in 
which global companies in the white goods industry like LG and Electrolux have 
so much power that its effect, as we mentioned earlier, not only cascades into the 
working relationship but also into non-work aspects of life. As far as the realm of 
work is concerned, these companies are so powerful that they control the pricing 
of components supplied to them by the companies to which they outsource this 
part of the production chain (Webster, Lambert and Bezuidenhout, 2008). 
Consequently, global companies even dictate the type of employment relationship 
in some of these downstream component industries and they have tremendous 
power over workplace organising. For example, in the case of Electrolux in 
Orange, Australia, the authors argue that the company has so much power that it 
has the “capacity to command and produce space” and to “use geography to 
reinforce its structural domination over labour” such that this has “further 
undermined the workers‟ belief in the value of unionism, for unions seem 
paralysed by these changes” (Webster, Lambert and Bezuidenhout, 2008: 144). 
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So while there may have been secure permanent jobs in the “first 
transformation”, in the current wave of the “second transformation” there has 
been an accelerated commoditisation of labour, a “fictitious commodity” whose 
reproduction, Polanyi (2001 [1944]) argues, was never meant for sale on the 
labour market. As a result countries now compete to have the best, most attractive 
conditions that can attract direct foreign investment. Workers bear the major brunt 
of these dynamics in the global economy which have concentrated power in the 
hands of “the corporation” which is mobile and has no commitments to 
geographic space, while on the other hand workers have been dispossessed and 
left with little or no capability to organise effectively in the face of the (almost) 
inexorable march of capitalism. Globally, previously permanent workers are 
becoming “contingent” workers, and companies have shifted risk from themselves 
to employees (Hacker, 2006). There has been a decline in “defined benefit plans 
(in which the employer absorbs more of the risk than the employee by 
guaranteeing a certain level of benefits)” (Kalleberg, 2008: 14). This is the age of 
the “risk society” (Beck, 2000). 
Analysts argue that precarious work is increasingly contributing to 
instability within families, and that there has been a concomitant increase in stress 
levels and related health problems (Kalleberg, 2000). In the United States, for 
example, signs of the increase in precariousness include issues like a decline in 
attachment to employers (Cappelli, 2008; Farber, 2008), increasing long-term 
unemployment (Mishel, Bernestein and Shierholz, 2009), growth in perceived job 
insecurity among workers (Fullerton and Wallace, 2005; Kalleberg, 2008), the 
accelerated growth in non-standard and contingent work (Kalleberg, 2000, 2001; 
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Kalleberg and Marsden, 2005), and, as mentioned earlier, the displacement of risk 
from employers to employees (Kalleberg, 2008). The growth of contingent, 
temporary work has also been found in countries like Australia, South Korea and 
South Africa (Webster, Lambert and Bezuidenhout, 2008), with consequences like 
violence and family instability in some of the country cases. 
In the late 1990s, the Zimbabwe Republic Police and the Musasa Project 
(which deals with gender violence) became “concerned about the escalation of 
gender violence especially in relation to economic stresses on men and women in 
households and families” (Gaidzanwa, 1998: 24). This was linked to the advent of 
structural adjustment which resulted in unemployment in several sectors of the 
economy. What is clear is that across the globe, in the past two decades or so and 
presently, many people have become dispossessed and live in very desperate 
circumstances. Increasingly, the differences in incomes between highly paid top 
company executives with access to stock options and a long list of benefits, and 
those of the contingent, casualised and temporary workers who have to eke out a 
living in a “new economy”, with unstable insecure forms of employment, are 
becoming glaringly divergent.  
This is a new and unprecedented era of social inequality, marginalisation 
and social exclusion (Kalleberg, 2008; Webster, Lambert and Bezuidenhout, 
2008). It is in the global South that poverty is estimated to be at its most severe. 
For example, in a 2004 report the Chronic Poverty Research Centre (CPRC) 
indicated that “between 28% and 38% of the absolute poor population in sub-
Saharan Africa is estimated to be chronically poor, totalling between 90 and 120 
million people” (CPRC, 2004: 24). In an analysis of poverty in 22 sub-Saharan 
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African countries for which data was available the CPRC (2004: 12), using the 
US$1/day figure as an indicator of poverty, concluded, “Of these 22 countries, 
approximately 310 million people live in 12 desperately deprived countries, about 
150 million of whom live on less than US$1/day”. In South Asia, with its high 
population levels, the number of chronically poor people was estimated at 135 to 
190 million people in 2004 (CPRC, 2004: 24). 
Across the globe, migrant workers are unable to afford the very 
commodities they produce. This situation has been compounded by the global 
recession which has resulted in contraction of the disposable income among 
workers in general. Increasingly, there is dissatisfaction among workers with their 
standard of life, which is exacerbated by glaring income inequalities across the 
globe. Precarious work, it is argued, differs across countries, “depending on their 
stage in development, social institutions, cultures, and other national differences” 
(Kalleberg, 2008: 28). For example, in advanced industrialised countries 
precarious work is evidenced by wage inequalities in the formal economy, 
unequal levels of insecurity, and unequal levels of vulnerability to job dismissal 
(Maurin and Postel-Vinay, 2005). In the developing, transitional economies, 
precariousness is seen as more prevalent in the informal economy (Kalleberg, 
2008). However, as mentioned earlier on, it is clear that in the present conjuncture 
precariousness prevails in both formal and informal work right across the globe. 
An analysis of the case of Zimbabwe reveals aspects of this precariousness 
among those in both the formal and informal segments of the economy. Their 
situation has not been made any easier by recent economic problems, especially 
hyperinflation which has wiped out savings. The value of pensions has gone down 
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dramatically because of currency fluctuations, which means that these pensions 
are of little value in terms of their contribution to the quality of life. At the local 
level we see the populace engaging in economic activities that have some linkages 
to the world economy as a response to the involution of the Zimbabwean 
economy. The political dispensation in Zimbabwe has resulted in the 
concentration of wealth and power in the hands of the elite, who have access to 
the patronage system of the state (Saul, 2005). Glaring social inequalities are 
visible between the majority of Zimbabweans and a small clique of elites who 
have captured and “privatised” the state and use it to socially, politically and 
economically exclude the rest of the populace while they enrich themselves 
(Raftopoulos, 2004). If anything, the fruits of the struggle promised to all at 
independence have not materialised for the majority of the populace. 
 
2.4 Involution, the black hole thesis and social embeddedness  
 
Economic involution in Zimbabwe has resulted in individuals who previously 
held secure formal jobs having to engage in informal economic activities in order 
to survive in Zimbabwe‟s unprecedented hyperinflationary environment. Chapter 
3 will trace the contours of the economic involutionary moment in Zimbabwe‟s 
economic trajectory. As a result of the collapsed Zimbabwean economy, a large 
proportion of the populace is unemployed and lives in poverty. Current estimates 
show that 80 per cent of Zimbabweans may be living below the poverty datum 
line (Raftopoulos, 2007b). 
The notion of economic involution refers to the collapse of the productive 
industrial and agricultural sectors (Burawoy, Krotov and Lytkina, 2000). The 
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theoretical task here is to establish a framework that considers the utility of the 
notion of involution and, if need be, to extend the concept and apply it to the 
Zimbabwean context. The concept of agricultural involution is used by Geertz 
(1963) to refer to the way in which Javanese peasants responded to the 
intensification of sugar production (the estate economy) for export purposes by 
the Dutch. Geertz identifies three characteristics of agricultural involution among 
the Javanese. Firstly, as the peasants were driven into forced labour or had their 
land expropriated for sugar production, they intensified their own production of 
rice. “The Javanese could not themselves become part of the estate economy, and 
they could not transform their general pattern of already intensive farming in an 
extensive direction, for they lacked capital … and were administratively barred 
from the bulk of their own frontier…” (Geertz, 1963: 80). 
Secondly, facing the “…pressure of increasing numbers and the limited 
resources Javanese life did not bifurcate, as did so many other „underdeveloped‟ 
nations. Rather it maintained a comparatively high degree of social and economic 
homogeneity by dividing the economic pie into a steadily increasing number of 
minute pieces” (Geertz, 1963: 97). This was an “egalitarian” response in which 
the Javanese tried to defend themselves against the onslaught of “agro-capitalism” 
(Burawoy, Krotov and Lytkina, 2000: 61). The involutionary process results in the 
“…the overdriving of an established form in such a way that it becomes rigid 
through an inward over elaboration of detail” (Geertz, 1963: 82). The third 
characteristic of involution that Geertz identifies among the Javanese peasants is 
that they did not introduce new agricultural techniques but reverted to old forms 
of production (Geertz, 1963).  
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Burawoy, Krotov and Lytkina (2000), in their analysis of the Russian 
transition, go on to identify, on top of the defensive strategies identified earlier by 
Geertz (1963), what they term entrepreneurial strategies. For them, “defensive 
strategies retreat to a primitive domestic economy in the face of the collapse of 
industry and agriculture while entrepreneurial strategies reach into the more 
dynamic sector of trade and service” (Burawoy, Krotov and Lytkina (2000: 43).  
The other dimension of involutionary process can be seen as a global 
moment. Rather than responding to involution by retreating to a so called 
“primitive domestic economy”, an inward collapse, there has been in some 
instances an extension to the global. One of the arguments in this dissertation is 
that rather than a complete retreat as identified by Geertz (1963) and later on by 
Burawoy, Krotov and Lytkina (2000), what has happened in Zimbabwe is a 
moment of global extension in which individuals are connecting with the global as 
a response to economic involution. The conceptualisation of involution by 
Burawoy, Krotov and Lytkina (2000) is still very useful in that it acknowledges 
that the populace engages in a multiplicity of strategies (as subsequent chapters 
will show) in response to the involutionary moment. However, the thesis will seek 
to extend the conceptualisation by arguing that responses to the involutionary 
moment are also embedded in global economic processes, a point which we argue 
is absent in the work of Geertz (1963) and not fully developed by Burawoy, 
Krotov and Lytkina (2000). 
Theorists like Castells (1996) view the so-called third world as being 
essentially disconnected from the global in the age of the “global network 
society”. Images of the “black hole” pervade much of his commentary on the 
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African continent; wars, hunger and totalitarian regimes seem to be the order of 
the day. Africa is not a black hole as Castells would have us believe. It has always 
been globally connected, even before the colonial period marked by the “scramble 
for Africa”, as evidenced by slave trade and exchange in other commodities. 
Indeed, “contemporary Africa is clearly not a featureless void defined only by its 
exclusion from the benefits of global capitalism, nor is it an informational „black 
hole‟” (Ferguson, 2006: 29). There is a need to consider some of these positions 
when examining the case of Zimbabwe in southern Africa. 
 In the period between 1873 and 1973, southern Africa was very much 
linked to the cyclical rhythms of the capitalist world economy (Wallerstein and 
Viera, 1992). According to some analysts: 
Processes within the region – political struggles, economic 
transformations, and social restructuring – occurred within the framework 
of the larger world system of which they were now a part, and local actors 
had to take account of far-away actors, but conversely far-away actors now 
were being affected by developments in southern Africa (Wallerstein and 
Viera, 1992: 5).  
 
In the present conjuncture Africa is being linked to the global in a number of 
ways. For instance, there is growing evidence that the biggest economy in the 
world, the United States of America, is already “heavily dependent on African oil 
imports” and these “developments challenge the idea that Africa‟s place in the 
global economy is defined simply by marginalization or that the continent is 
simply irrelevant to the wider global economy” (Ferguson, 2006: 195). The reality 
is that “specific forms of „global‟ integration on the continent exist with specific – 
and equally „global‟ – forms of exclusion, marginalization, and disconnection” 
(Ferguson, 2006: 41). 
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The notion of a southern Africa, therefore, has conceptual implications on 
how we view global dynamics, and implies an indictment of conceptual 
frameworks that see Africa, and more specifically southern African, as 
disconnected from the “global network society.” For example, large population 
movements within Africa and out of southern Africa to other parts of the world 
illustrate that Africa and southern Africa are globally connected. The Migration 
Policy Institute (MPI) estimated that as of 2002 there were over one million 
foreign-born Africans in the United States, with 7 per cent of those being from 
southern Africa (MPI, 2008).  
Turning to the case of Zimbabwe, the International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM) notes that despite the myriad socio-economic problems facing 
Zimbabwe, it is still a transit and destination country for irregular migration from 
other countries in Africa and also from Asia (IOM, 2005). The Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung (FES), in a paper about Sino-Zimbabwean relationships, reported on the 
presence of Chinese residents in Zimbabwe who are very prominent in the 
importing and selling of cheap textiles in Zimbabwe, much to the detriment of the 
local textile industry (FES, 2004). This reveals that even though the country has 
been in economic decline nationals from other countries move there to exploit 
niche economic opportunities. At the same time there has also been movement of 
people out of Zimbabwe. According to the Centre for Development and Enterprise 
(CDE) estimates of Zimbabweans living in South Africa are as high as three 
million (CDE, 2008). 
The thesis will argue that what occurred in the past in Zimbabwe, and 
what is going on presently, cannot be separated from the events on the global 
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stage. This is a new global moment. While there has been social exclusion of the 
populace in terms of their “immiseration” in the wake of the collapse of industry 
and agriculture (see Chapter 3), an examination of the case of the flea market 
traders reveals that they are actually engaged in creative ways in dealing with the 
involutionary moment in Zimbabwe. These creative ways reveal multiple and 
complex connections to the global. 
Theorising the role of informal economic activity within the Zimbabwean 
crisis would be incomplete without a reference to how informal economic activity 
is embedded in the social, economic and political trajectory of the country. By 
embeddedness here we mean the notion that “…social actors can be understood 
and interpreted only within relational, institutional and cultural contexts and 
cannot be seen as atomized decision makers maximizing their own utility” 
(Ghezzi and Mingione, 2007: 11). Essentially then, economic actors “…do not 
behave or decide as atoms outside a social context, nor do they adhere slavishly to 
a script written for them by the particular intersection of social categories that they 
happen to occupy. Their attempts at purposive action are instead embedded in 
concrete, ongoing systems of social relations” (Granovetter, 1985: 487). At a 
theoretical level, the actions of the informal traders who are the main focus of this 
study cannot be separated from local economic dynamics. Economic difficulties, 
as discussed in Chapter 3, have historically led to more and more Zimbabweans 
being propelled into the realm of informality as a way of defending themselves 
against the vicissitudes of an economy in tailspin.  
Also, the informal economic activities of the traders are necessarily 
embedded in the networks of social relations (see Chapters 5 and 6) that exist 
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among the traders themselves. The thesis will seek to demonstrate, among other 
things, that relations of co-operation and reciprocity are a norm in the day-to-day 
operations of informal traders, and that these relations are used not only to take 
advantage of economic opportunities but also to deal with problems, whether 
economic or social, that traders encounter. Informal economic activities are 
embedded in the broader social, political and economic milieu in Zimbabwe, and 
these activities are concomitantly (socially) embedded in the relations of informal 
traders. While there was substantial employment in the formal sector in the post-
independence phase, and informal economic activities may have been marginal to 
the survival of the populace, in recent time these informal economic activities 
have become a linchpin of survival in the lives of Zimbabweans in an increasingly 
globalised world. The thesis argues that Zimbabwe is part of this globalised 
world, and it is because of these connections that part of the populace has been 
able to, and continues to, make a living in the current difficult environment. 
 
2.5 Globalisation and its contested nature 
 
Globalisation is another contested concept. In as much as it unites the planet, 
globalization as a phenomenon also divides that same planet (Ferguson, 2006). 
Though globalisation has its “uncertainties and inadequacies as a term”, it “does 
usefully call attention to a series of developments associated with the ongoing 
dynamic of economic restructuring at the global level” (Falk, 1997: 17). For 
Appadurai (2002: 282), 
Globalization (understood as a particular, contemporary configuration in 
the relationship between capital and the nation-state) is demonstrably 
creating inequalities both within and across societies, spiraling processes 
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of ecological degradation and crisis, and unviable relations between 
finance and manufacturing capital, as well as between goods and the 
wealth required to purchase them. 
 
One analyst has questioned the utility of the concept of globalisation, asserting 
that in talking about globalisation very crucial questions about the “limits of 
interconnection, about the areas where capital cannot go, and about the specificity 
of the structures necessary to make the connections work” are not asked (Cooper, 
2001: 189). In addition, according to the same analyst, “What is missing from the 
discussion of globalization today is the historical depth of the interconnections 
and a focus on just what the structures and limits of the connecting mechanisms 
are” (Cooper, 2001: 190).  
The dissertation acknowledges that there are many “globalisations”. In 
other words, there are variable experiences of what constitutes globalisation. Even 
where the global forces may be similar, there are variant responses to these forces, 
as the case of Zimbabwe shows. So, despite Zimbabwe being a pariah economy at 
this juncture, there have been among informal traders some instances of a 
connection to global sites of commodity production, and this is linked to 
processes of globalisation. This is one of the theoretical innovations of the 
approach followed by this thesis. 
The “processes and actions” that refer to the notion of globalisation have 
“been proceeding, with interruptions, for many centuries, but the main focus of 
the discussion of globalization is on relatively recent times” (Robertson, 1992: 8). 
If globalisation is associated with “developments such as the emergence of world 
markets for commodities, and technological improvements to communication, 
attention might, in the first instance, shift back several centuries” (Holton, 1998: 
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24). For instance, the sixteenth century is seen by some scholars as marking an 
important point in the development of a global capitalist world economy 
(Wallerstein, 1974). Other scholars argue that long-distance trade existed well 
before this time, in the thirteenth century, linking parts of Europe, Asia and Africa 
(Abu-Lughod, 1989). The issue really is that various theorists and scholars tackle 
different aspects of globalisation debates: some consider economic aspects 
(Holton, 1998: Chapter 3), some the socio-cultural (Gurnah, 1997; Jalan, 1997; 
Street, 1997; Tao and Ho, 1997; Holton, 2000), and yet others the international 
dimensions of the political and the role of the nation-state on the global stage 
(Holton, 1998: Chapters 4 and 5). 
Globalisation reflects for some the “intensification of economic, political, 
social and cultural relations across the borders” (Holm and Sorenson, 1995: 1). It 
refers “both to the compression of the world and the intensification of 
consciousness of the world as a whole” (Robertson, 1992: 8). Other theorists see 
globalisation in terms of the “compression of time and space” (Harvey, 1989). For 
Giddens (1990: 21), “the concept of globalization is best understood as expressing 
fundamental aspects of time-space distanciation. Globalization concerns the 
intersection of presence and absence, the interlacing of social events and social 
relations „at a distance‟ with local contextualities”. Immanuel Wallerstein‟s (1974, 
1979, 1984) work, which considers the domination of the capitalist system on a 
planetary scale driven by the logic of capital accumulation, is another alternative 
way of perceiving globalisation.  
As indicated by Gopalkrishnan (2001: 41), “economic globalization as it 
exists today is a more recent phenomenon, defined by rapid changes in technology 
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that collapse time and space, and establish global players who have enabled a 
world-wide restructuring of states and people to take place” and the consequent 
“government deregulation” and “technological change” has created an 
environment in which capital has the capability to be hyper-mobile. Multinational 
corporations (MNCs) have in the process become very powerful “pathological” 
“governing institutions” with the power to “force” their will on governments and 
societies (Bakan, 2004). MNCs are at the apex of the “topography of power” in 
the current conjuncture. 
For Holton (1998: 16), globalisation could alternatively be seen as the way 
in which “we understand, experience, and act within the world and not simply the 
large transnational structures that form the subject matter of the political economy 
or international relations”. In this conceptualisation there is room for how local 
communities act within and interact with “globalising tendencies” 
(“glocalisation”). Burawoy et al. (2000) speak of individuals in the “postmodern 
world” having certain “imaginations” of the globe. Some scholars note that 
“globalization is occurring in the absence of either a cultural or economic 
„hegemon‟ and that processes of standardization and diversification, and 
unification and fragmentation, are occurring simultaneously” (Scott, 1997: 7). 
There is a “complex fabric of globalization, that of hybridization, or 
syncretization. It centers on intercultural exchange and the incorporation of 
cultural elements from a variety of sources within particular cultural practices” 
(Holton, 2000: 148). Indeed globalisation is “uneven, problematic and contested” 
(Holton, 1998: 17). The “global cultural economy has to be understood as a 
complex, overlapping, disjunctive order” and the “complexity of the current 
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global economy has to do with certain fundamental disjunctures between 
economy, culture, and politics” (Robertson, 1992: 296).  
The issue of disjuncture in the global cultural economy is articulated by 
Appadurai (1990) who uses the framework of “ethnoscapes”, “mediascapes”, 
“technoscapes”, “finanscapes” and “ideoscapes” to explore interactions on a 
global scale. Ethnoscape refers to the “landscape of persons who constitute the 
shifting world in which we live: tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles, 
guestworkers and other moving groups and persons” (Appadurai, 1990: 297). In 
the southern African region in recent times there has been movement in search of 
employment, and also due to war and famine in other parts of the continent. Most 
recently, because of diseases like cholera, there has been a movement of people 
from Zimbabwe into other parts of the region (especially South Africa) in search 
of treatment. The technoscape refers to the “global configuration, also ever fluid, 
of technology, and the fact that technology, both high and low, both mechanical 
and informational, now moves at high speeds across various kinds of previously 
impervious borders” (Appadurai, 1990: 298). It is closely linked to the idea of the 
finanscape which is the landscape of global capital, currency markets, national 
stock exchanges and commodity speculations on a world scale (Appadurai, 1990: 
298). In last the few months of 2008 we witnessed a global economic recession in 
most financial markets across the globe, which illustrates how interconnected the 
world really is. 
Mediascapes refer to the “distribution of the electronic capabilities to 
produce and disseminate information (newspapers, magazines, television stations, 
film production studios, etc), which are now available to a growing number of 
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private and public interests throughout the world; and to the images of the world 
created by these media” (Appadurai, 1990: 299). Closely related to this are 
ideoscapes which are “concatenations of images” which are often “political and 
frequently have to do with ideologies of states and the counter-ideologies of 
movements explicitly oriented to capturing state power or a piece of it” 
(Appadurai, 1990: 299). The latter is becoming especially central with the 
resurgence in recent years of what are seen as terrorist elements, not only in the 
United States and the United Kingdom (UK) but most recently in India and 
Pakistan. All this serves to show not only the contested and multiple ways of 
conceptualising globalisation, but also of what fundamentally constitutes 
globalisation. 
Meyer (2000) has identified five dimensions of globalisation. The first 
dimension is “the increased political and military interdependence of a set of 
sovereign nation-states and the expanded and strengthened set of organizations 
involved: here, states are the main actors” (Meyer, 2000: 233). This aspect is very 
important in an understanding of the southern African region dating back to the 
formation of the Southern African Development Community in 1980. Greater 
regional co-operation among states in the past has involved issues like peace 
keeping and electoral reform, although the success of the later remains to be seen 
given the continuing problems with elections in some countries. We have also 
seen the United Nations being involved in attempts to solve the political impasse 
in Zimbabwe, with varying degrees of success. 
The second dimension, in which states and firms are the main actors, is the 
“increased economic interdependence of a set of national or sub-national 
 66 
 
economies and the relevant multilateral and international public and private 
organisations (Meyer, 2000: 233). This necessarily follows from the first aspect in 
that greater political and military collaboration in most cases results in the 
creation of an environment in which it is much easier for economic synergies to 
develop. Whether these synergies are equally beneficial to all the actors is of 
course debatable. This second dimension of globalisation is important in any 
analysis of the economic history of much of the developing world, especially 
Africa, and especially when it comes to the analysis of structural adjustment. 
According to Saul (2005: 22) the era of “disciplining Africa”, was an era in which 
“the neo-liberal reorientation of economic policy became required medicine for 
virtually all sub-Saharan African economies”. He further indicates that: 
Given that most of Africa‟s debt was to the World Bank and other 
multilateral agencies, the Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
emerged as particularly central to the process of dictating global 
capitalism‟s new terms to Africa. As manifested in their aggressive 
administering of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), the invasive 
impact of the international financial institutions (IFIs) on the national 
sovereignty of the target economies cannot be overstated (Saul, 2005: 22). 
 
Chapter 3 will trace the contours of the impact of structural adjustment on the 
Zimbabwean economy. Structural adjustment perhaps marked the beginning of 
the economic involutionary moment in Zimbabwe, which was further 
compounded by, among other things, economic mismanagement and a prolonged 
political impasse. In the era of structural adjustment, free market economic theory 





Meyer‟s (2000: 233) third dimension of globalisation means “an expanded flow of 
individual persons among societies through socio-economic migration, travel and 
political expulsion”, and here states and individuals are central to the analysis. 
The African region has witnessed enormous cross-border movements in recent 
times due to economic collapse and civil war in countries such as Rwanda. South 
Africa has had to deal with the problems that come with being a magnet, not only 
for economic migrants but also for those fleeing political expulsion and civil 
strife, for example, from countries like Zimbabwe, some parts of central Africa 
and parts of West Africa.  
Fourthly, globalisation means “the expanded flow of instrumental culture 
around the world”, resulting in a situation in which “common models of social 
order become authoritative in many different social settings (Meyer, 2000: 233-4). 
In this fifth dimension globalisation involves the “creation of common models of 
national state identity and purpose”, the creation of “common models of socio-
economic development” in “which national policies change with changes in world 
scripts”, the scripting of “common models of human rights” which “produce 
waves of national policy and practice in areas such as the status of ethno-racial 
minorities or women” and, lastly, “education, linking both ideologies of human 
rights and of social progress, has been highly scripted with enormous impact on 
educational expansion around the world” (Meyer: 2000: 234). 
The issue of models of socio-economic development will become 
important when considering the historical (and perhaps contemporary) role of the 
World Bank and the IMF in the structural adjustment era, not only in Zimbabwe 
but across the globe. It will also be important when considering the impasse that 
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has been in existence between Zimbabwe and the international community when it 
comes to certain economic fundamentals that the World Bank and the IMF tout as 
central to the genesis of a robust, well-oiled and functioning economy. It is the 
transgression of some of these fundamentals that these international institutions 
see as the cause of past and present problems in Zimbabwe. 
Lastly for Meyer (2000: 233), globalisation also means the “expanded 
interdependence of expressive culture through intensified global communication”. 
Actors from “individuals to organisations to national states” are involved in this 
fourth dimension (Meyer, 2000: 233). The commodity chain analysis approach 
will be useful in an analysis of the cross-national movements of commodities like 
clothes – a “web of brands” (Klein, 2001: xii) – and arts and crafts, among others, 
and how the peddling of some of these “expressive cultures” is being driven by 
certain consumption patterns, not only locally but also globally. 
Notions of globalisation have several important implications for the study. 
Zimbabwe is still connected to the globe, especially through the images that have 
been generated about the country. At the same time the issue of remittances, as 
mentioned earlier, remains an important element in the connection as kin send 
money back to the country through other relatives and colleagues for instance. 
Zimbabwean migrants (inclusive of illegal migrants) working in South Africa 
have, for example, been found to transfer significant amounts of money, using 
both formal and informal channels, to households in southern Zimbabwe, and 
these incomes are an important part of survival (Maphosa, 2007). The World 
Bank (2008) estimates that between 2004 and 2007 money totalling US$38.4 
billion was received in the form of inward remittance flows in sub-Saharan Africa, 
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and this was just from officially recorded sources. If unrecorded formal and 
informal flows were to be included, the size of remittances would be significantly 
larger (World Bank, 2008). An aspect of this flow of remittances, especially how 
it is used in income-generating projects by the recipients in Zimbabwe, is one of 
the ways of “grounding globalisation”. 
Globalisation is grounded in this study by considering aspects of the 
regional and global flow of commodities in and out of Zimbabwe and how traders 
are tapping into this flow to make a living in the current economic crisis. While an 
analysis of global value chains may reveal that major corporations are endowed 
with market power, which allows them to pursue aggressive marketing strategies 
that sometimes affect consumption patterns in the global economy, the focus in 
this study is on traders who may be at the penultimate end of particular value 
chains. This is a much more modest approach to an analysis of commodity chains. 
 
2.6 Commodity and values chains 
 
The value chain concept has its genesis in attempts by analysts in the 1960s and 
1970s to map out the trajectory of development for mineral-exporting countries 
(Kaplinsky, 2000). A variant of it, the French filiere approach, has been “applied 
mostly to agricultural commodities originating from former French colonies 
(Raikes, Jensen and Ponte, 2000). It has also been used prominently in the 
analysis of global capitalism especially by Gereffi (1994, 1999a, b). The notion of 
the “value stream” has also been used to refer to the value chain concept 
(Womack and Jones, 1996). 
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Global value chains, also called global commodity or supply chains (Carr, 
Chen and Tate 2000: 125), “describe the full range of activities which are required 
to bring a product or service from conception, through the intermediary phases of 
production (involving a combination of physical transformation and the input of 
various producer services), delivery to final consumers, and the final disposal after 
use” (Kaplinsky, 2000: 121). Value chains are “networks that link the labour, 
production, and distribution processes that result in different commodities or 
products” and they “represent an important dimension of global integration” 
(Carr, Chen and Tate 2000: 125). When looked at in this manner “the value chain 
is merely a descriptive construct, at most providing a heuristic framework for the 
generation of data” (Kaplinsky, 2000: 122).  
For Kaplinsky, there are three important components of the value chain 
which: 
transform an heuristic device into an analytical tool: the first, is that value 
chains are repositories for rent and these rents are dynamic, the second is 
that effectively functioning value chains involve some degree of 
governance and the third is that effective value chains arise from systemic, 
as opposed to point efficiency (2000: 122).  
 
The rent component, especially in the form of “barriers to entry”, has been eroded 
with more and more countries having “developed their capabilities in industrial 
activities”; this erosion has become more glaring with the entrance of the Chinese 
into the world market with their highly educated and abundant supply of labour 
(Khan, 1999; Kaplinsky, 2000).   
The notion of governance means that certain actors within the chain are 
responsible for the “inter-firm division of labour, and for capacities of particular 
participants to upgrade their activities” (Kaplinsky, 2000: 124). Systemic 
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efficiency means that focus is not on the individual nodes/links/points in the 
system but on the overall efficiency of the integrated system. This integration 
means that there is more responsibility for governors of the value chain, and there 
is also an increase in levels of trust among the different nodes and link in the 
value chain (Kaplinsky, 2000: 126). 
Other analysts have added a fourth component which they see as important 
to the value chain (Bair, 2005). This is the institutional context of the value chain. 
Value chains are embedded in the broader political and socio-economic 
environment, which may to a great extent be regulated by the workings of the 
nation-state. The issue is that commodity chains are related to and affected by the 
institutions of the nation-state, and they are also impacted by global imperatives, 
especially global forms of regulation (Bair, 2005). Certainly, nation-states play a 
very important role in the way that global firms operate, and have an impact on 
the environment in which firms operate. The current global economic crisis may 
well see the return of a much more robust state in which there could be greater 
state regulation of firms and less reliance on free market fundamentals. In the case 
of Zimbabwe the state plays an important role in the promulgation of rules and 
regulations that are not explicitly aimed at regulating value chains at a global 
level, but that nonetheless have an influence on the flow of goods into and out of 
the country. For instance, clothes and shoe traders in this study had to pay 
customs and excise duty in accordance with rules and regulations. 
There are many variables that have an impact on the global dynamics at 
play in the production of certain commodities. For example, economic 
competition more or less results in retailers locating their production networks in 
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countries with much lower costs (Carr, Chen and Tate, 2000). Clothing items for 
sale on the informal market in Zimbabwe are manufactured in China as evidenced 
by the “Made in China” labels inside the collar. It is through a very complex value 
chain that products manufactured in Asia and other parts of the world, where 
labour and other costs are cheaper, end up in some of these informal markets.  
There are several complexities involved in carrying out a commodity chain 
analysis at a global level, and here the study relies on research that has already 
been carried out to trace some parts of the flow of these commodities (for example 
Lee, 1998; Salzinger, 2003). Some of the stages of the production of certain goods 
are outside the observable scope of the study: for example, the manufacturing of 
clothes in factories located in Asia. However, some data was gathered by 
interviewing some of the traders, identifying the source of goods and following up 
on these nodes in places like South Africa. 
An analysis of globalisation and commodity chains opens up a whole 
Pandora‟s Box of inequalities and social exclusion within an increasingly 
globalised world economy. While there have been tremendous gains – like greater 
income and the availability of better quality goods – there has also been 
“increasing tendency towards growing unequalisation within and between 
countries and a stubborn incidence in the absolute levels of poverty, not just in 
poor countries” (Kaplinsky, 2000: 117). It appears “globalization has bypassed 
much of the world‟s population” (Kaplinsky, 2000: 118). In the summary of its 
2008-09 Chronic Poverty Report, the Chronic Poverty Research Centre (CPRC) 
indicates that “Globalization is creating a world in which the poorest are exposed 
to new, and perhaps greater, levels of hazard – financial crisis, economic 
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restructuring, increased food prices and global warming” (CPRC, 2008: 3). The 
report also indicated that across the globe, “Between 320 and 443 million people 
are now trapped in poverty that lasts for many years, often for their entire 
lifetime” and that the children of these people will often inherit chronic poverty, if 
indeed they survive infancy (CPRC, 2008: 1). In their 2004-2005 report, the 
CPRC put the estimate of those leaving in chronic poverty at between 300 and 
400 million (CPRC, 2004). 
For the purposes of this study the analysis considers some of the regional 
nodes in the flow of commodities. For instance, South Africa is an important 
economic node regionally and on the continent, and is also an important source of 
many of the commodities sold in the informal market in Zimbabwe. Traders who 
import and sometimes export goods have to manoeuvre around various types of 
barriers at the local and cross-border level in the process of doing business. These 
barriers include the shortage of foreign currency locally, dealing with corrupt 
immigration officials on both the Zimbabwean and non-Zimbabwean side of the 
border, transport constraints especially during peak seasons, and the sometimes 
prohibitive import and export regulations.  
The study will engage with some of the issues raised above, issues which 
are not normally analysed by some of the more economistic approaches to 
commodity chain analysis. This analysis will, among other things, reveal the 
unequal access to power, resources and even to markets occurring among the 
different traders and also between the traders and their suppliers for instance. The 
study will also examine the role of social networks in the lives of the traders and 
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in the flow of commodities from a variety of sources to the market where they are 
sold. 
 
2.7 Social networks and social capital 
 
 Social networks have been considered to be “invaluable in the analysis of 
informal economies and their role in processes of economic change” (Meagher, 
2005: 217). Across the globe “informal economic arrangements based on ties of 
kinship, friendship and community have entered into the heart of contemporary 
economies through processes of subcontracting, moonlighting, transnational 
migration, and diminishing state involvement in popular welfare and 
employment” (Meagher, 2005: 217). Social networks have been “found to 
engender trust and flexibility, reduce transaction costs, and facilitate integration 
into the global economy” (Meagher, 2006: 554). Meagher (2006: 554) maintains 
that there is some agreement, even among neo-liberal thinkers, that “where states 
and markets are weak, social networks offer an informal mechanism of economic 
co-ordination capable of filling gaps in formal institutional provision and 
regulatory capacity. It could be argued, however, that while the state in Zimbabwe 
is weak in terms of its delivery of social services, it is strong in terms of its 
monopoly over the “means of violence” and political repression. 
The notion of social networks refers to “informal organizational 
arrangements based on social ties” (Meagher 2005: 219). Meagher (2005: 224) 
argues that “African social networks are either celebrated as social capital to the 
extent that they appear to promote stability and economic growth, or denounced as 
social liabilities if they fail to do so”, and in the process what is lost “is the fine-
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grained analysis of informal institutions that the concept was originally intended 
to promote”.  
This study will move toward such a textured, “fine-grained” analysis of, 
among other things, the role of social networks in the sourcing of goods by 
Zimbabwean traders. The approach taken in this study maintains that social 
networks should be understood within their specific contexts. Therefore, it is 
imperative to move away from stereotypical generic approaches to the nature and 
role of social networks and social capital in Africa that exist in the literature. 
Pierre Bourdieu (1985: 248) defines social capital as “the aggregate of the actual 
or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more 
or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition”. 
 Portes (1998: 3) states that social networks “are not a natural given and 
must be constructed through investment strategies oriented to the 
institutionalization of group relations, usable as a reliable source of other benefits” 
(Portes, 1998: 3). While there have been other definitions of the concept of social 
capital, “consensus is growing in the literature that social capital stands for the 
ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership or other social 
structures” (Portes, 1998: 3). Actors, therefore, operate within certain social ties or 
networks that allow them to access the benefits that come as part of that 
membership. 
 Social capital perspectives can be put into four categories: the 
communitarian perspective, the institutional perspective, the synergy perspective, 
and the networks perspective (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000). Proponents of the 
communitarian perspective emphasise the importance of local organisations like 
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associations and civic groups, and “look at the number and density of these groups 
in a given community”: the greater the number of these groups within a 
community the more positive the effect on the welfare of the community 
(Woolcock and Narayan, 2000: 229). However, in a study of violence in 
Colombia, Mauricio Rubio (1997: 814) states that it is inadequate to argue that 
“social capital always and naturally contributes positively…”, as the persistence 
of perverse forms of social capital which rely on gang membership and 
criminality illustrates. The Colombian example illustrates that “it is not enough to 
limit the analysis of social capital to what takes place in the society‟s formal 
productive” system (Rubio, 1997: 815). It is also not enough to just analyse legal 
economic formations. Social capital in the illegal, underground and criminal 
world should also be researched and analysed for a holistic understanding of the 
concept. However, this study considers social capital in largely legal informal 
economic processes. 
 The institutional view argues that the “vitality of community networks and 
civil society is largely a product of the political, legal, and institutional 
environment” and the very “capacity of social groups to act in their collective 
interest depends on the quality of the formal institutions under which they reside” 
(Woolcock and Narayan, 2000: 234). The work of Skocpol (1995, 1996) 
illustrates that civil society can flourish when the state supports it. The clear 
message from most of the studies that implement this approach is that “rampant 
corruption, frustrating bureaucratic delays, suppressed civil liberties, vast 
inequality, divisive ethnic tensions, and failure to safeguard property rights (to the 
extent that they exist at all) are major impediments to prosperity” (Woolcock and 
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Narayan, 2000: 235). Some commentators argue that this perspective fails to 
acknowledge that “coherent and competent bureaucracies may take decades to 
construct and may yield benefits more immediately suited for the corporate 
interests than to those of the poor” (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000: 235). 
Proponents of the synergy
17
 view, who have synthesised some of the major 
perspectives on social capital, broadly argue that: “governments, corporations, and 
civic groups are variable in the impact they can have on the attainment of 
collective goals‟; that it is important to consider the “synergies that occur amongst 
states, firms, and communities as each on their own cannot foster prosperity”; and 
that the state‟s role for economic prosperity is the most important but conversely 
the most problematic because the state is “not only the ultimate provider of public 
goods” and the “final arbiter and enforcer of the rule of law”, it is the state that is 
also best able to “facilitate enduring alliances across the boundaries of class, 
ethnicity, race gender, politics and religion” (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000: 236). 
This study does not go into the debate on synergy, which is more relevant to the 
analysis of the role of the state and private sector in national development 
The network perspective of social capital “stresses the importance of 
vertical as well as horizontal associations between people and of relationships 
within and among such organizational entities as community groups and firms” 
                                                 
17
 Evans (1996) is one of the more popular proponents of the synergy view. He asserts that the 
notion of synergy can best be understood by considering the concepts of “complementarity” and 
“embeddedness”. The former is the “conventional way of conceptualizing mutually supportive 
relations between public and private actors” and the latter refers to the “ties that connect citizens 
and public officials across the public-private divide”. The synergy view proposes that 
“governments are best suited to delivering certain kinds of collective goods which complement the 
inputs more efficiently delivered by private actors” and in merging the two kinds of inputs there is 
“greater output than either public or private sectors would deliver on their own” (Evans, 1996: 
1120). It is important, however, to indicate that state-society relations may not always be positive 




(Woolcock and Narayan, 2000: 230). In this view, social capital can have both 
benefits and costs. For example, social “ties can place considerable non-economic 
claims on the members‟ sense of obligation and commitment, with negative 
economic consequences” (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000: 231). It is also important 
to consider that “imputing only desirable outcomes to social capital, or equating 
them with it, ignores the possibility that these outcomes may be attained at 
another group‟s expense, that given outcomes are suboptimal, or that desirable 
outcomes attained today come at the price of significant costs tomorrow” 
(Woolcock and Narayan, 2000:231).  
Still, studies that utilise this perspective have illustrated the importance of 
social networks in, for example, minimising risk and in protecting individuals 
from economic uncertainty (Barr, 1998). Social networks also have a solidarity 
function, as demonstrated in a study of Malawian immigrants in Johannesburg. 
Andersson (2006) found that new immigrants depended on kin and friends already 
settled in the city for moral support, accommodation and finding employment. A 
study of social networks among informal manufacturers in Nigeria demonstrated 
their importance in the economic organisation of these types of firms (Meagher, 
2006). It could also be argued that criminal networks can even promote perverse 
or negative social capital. The section below briefly considers some social 
capitalist perspectives on African social networks, since this study deals with an 
African country. 
Three broad perspectives on African social networks in the literature have 
been identified by Meagher (2005). The first perspective maintains that social 
networks in Africa have played a more efficacious role than states in economic 
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development, and have actually been hampered in the process by inept state 
intervention. The literature repeatedly points to the “the vast ethnic trading 
networks and dynamic informal sectors of the African economies, which provide 
livelihoods, housing and services in the face of crumbling official economies” 
(Meagher, 2005: 554). One commentator has argued that there is a “robust” 
economy in Africa, an “economy of affection”, which rivals formal institutions 
(Hyden, 2006: 73).  
The second perspective in the literature contends that “Africans are 
incapable of forming effective social networks” and that “African societies suffer 
from a lack of networks owing to cultural incapacities and the historical 
disruptions of colonialism and rapid urbanization” (Meagher, 2005: 222). Others, 
who follow this approach, point to what they see as the “primordial” nature and 
“redistributive values characteristic of African informal economies” and social 
networks whose effect is to “undermine productive investment, contract 
enforcement and innovation, blocking economic development” (Meagher, 2005: 
223). 
The third perspective is that “Africans are culturally predisposed to form 
perverse networks based on clientism and corruption, which actively undermine 
rational economic institutions” (Meagher, 2005: 223). This is the “criminalisation 
of the state” thesis which argues that social capital in Africa “appears to display a 
marked affinity with the spirit of criminality” (Bayart, 1999: 34). These 
essentialist analyses in the literature have been criticised by some authors (Hart, 
1998; Meagher, 2005). It could be argued that among the traders that are the focus 
of this study the first perspective on social capital is much more applicable, as 
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traders rely on their social networks in an environment in crisis where the state 
has largely failed to provide for their social reproduction needs. Traders rely on 
these social networks for sourcing goods when they themselves cannot travel. 
When they can afford to travel to source goods, traders may rely on other traders 
within their social network circles to watch their stalls during their absence. As 
subsequent chapters will show, there is a latticework of social networks among the 
traders themselves, and between traders and various kin and other individuals 




The approach in this thesis is to see formal and informal economic activities as 
part of a continuum, with legal and highly regulated formal economic activities on 
one end and criminal economic activities on the other end. Informal, largely legal 
economic activities that form the bulk of this study lie somewhere along this 
continuum. In reality, the formal and the informal, the legal and the illegal are 
imbricated with one another. Individuals find themselves moving somewhere 
along this continuum, between the formal and the informal. Money and goods also 
move between the formal and the informal. These movements are known as 
“churning”. In moving between these various segments of a deeply segmented 
single economy, the informal traders rely on a multiplicity of social networks 
which eases the carrying out of informal economic activity. 
Informal economic activities are highly heterogeneous. They comprise a 
multiplicity of activities: from casual agricultural labour, to street trading, to other 
forms of casual and irregular employment in manufacturing, contract cleaning and 
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other segments of the economy. The focus of this dissertation is on the trading of 
goods at an informal market in urban Harare. The rise in informal economic 
activities not only in Zimbabwe but across much of the globe, including in the 
advanced industrial countries, is fundamentally linked to processes of economic 
restructuring. Zimbabwe went through such a process in the 1990s. This had a 
negative impact on the economy, and the situation worsened in subsequent years, 
largely due to economic mismanagement, corruption, ill-considered land 
invasions and the protracted political impasse. 
As the juggernaut of global restructuring has proceeded across the globe, 
and companies have either relocated or been shut down, large numbers of people 
have had to rely on informal economic activities for survival. Global processes 
also play an important role in the flow of commodities and how they end up on 
the informal market in Zimbabwe. With the rise of China and other Asian nations 
as economic forces to be reckoned with, there has been a growth in cheaper 
manufacturing, for example in the textiles and clothing industries and in 
electronics. Cheaply manufactured goods easily flow to the developing world and 
they are sold in a variety of formal and informal markets. For example, cheap 
clothes from China find their way through South Africa to informal markets in 
countries such as Zimbabwe where they are sold to the general population.  
Commodity chain analysis can illustrate the inequalities inherent in 
globalisation and the concentration of market power in this global flow. Cheaper 
quality goods from textiles to electronics are dumped onto developing world 
markets with deleterious impacts on local industries. Such negative impacts 
include factory closures and the consequent loss of jobs. As demonstrated in the 
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next chapter which, among other things, traces the trajectory of Zimbabwe‟s 
political economy, globalisation has its “winners” and “losers”. The Zimbabwean 
case shows how the deregulation of the economy led to the collapse of the 
productive sectors which resulted in massive unemployment in the country. With 
countries like China having a globally competitive advantage in the textiles and 
clothing industry‟s global production chain for instance, the local sectors 
collapsed as the local market was inundated by cheap Chinese products. This 
succinctly illustrates the unequal gains of globalisation and the inequalities 
inherent in global production chains with consequences such as closure of 
industries and the rise in unemployment in developing world countries with 
weaker manufacturing bases, such as Zimbabwe. 
Consequently, the unemployed - dispossessed of their jobs - were 
propelled into the informal segments of the economy, where employment is 
largely insecure and earnings unpredictable. These precarious jobs have no 
benefits such as pensions or medical aid which makes the conditions of those in 
this segment particularly burdensome. Restructuring also resulted in the scaling 
back of the Zimbabwean state, as shown in the next chapter, which denuded its 
capability to make meaningful interventions in the lives of individuals affected by 
















This chapter maps out the nature of the Zimbabwean crisis. It locates the early 
genesis of the crisis in the disastrous economic restructuring programme directed 
by international financial institutions from their citadels of power in the global 
North. The newly independent Zimbabwean state was heavily funded by 
international donor aid in the first decade. In that first decade international donor 
institutions played a considerable role in directing the trajectory of development, 
funding a variety of development projects in areas such as health care, education, 
infrastructure and agriculture. In the second decade of independence donor 
institutions were central in forcing the implementation of the structural adjustment 
programme. Economic restructuring was meant to recoup the money pumped into 
Zimbabwe by international financial institutions after independence. Some of the 
money owed, however, did date back to the days of the settler colonial 
government. The restructuring triggered economic collapse in Zimbabwe and set 
an inauspicious precedent for what has over the years come to be known as the 
Zimbabwean crisis.  
The Zimbabwean crisis has to be understood as being made up of a 
combination of events which fermented into a deadly concoction that left 
Zimbabwe limping under the burden of, among other things, hyperinflation (the 
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highest in the world in 2007/2008), an economy in free fall, a contracting 
productive sector (manufacturing and agriculture) and a highly impoverished local 
populace. Certainly, the crisis had its early origins in the economic restructuring, 
but there are also issues like the authoritarian tendencies of President Mugabe‟s 
regime, economic mismanagement and the protracted political impasse with an 
opposition, with legitimate claims to power, which exacerbated the situation in 
later years. 
A cholera outbreak at the end of 2008 in the country‟s urban centres, 
which hit the densely populated centres such as Harare the hardest, was a 
revelation of the decay of the health care system but also a stark reminder of the 
failure of the Zimbabwean state under President Mugabe‟s regime. For over a 
decade Zimbabwe has been lurching from crisis to crisis, whether it be social, 
political or economic, and these crises have developed into a deadly time bomb. 
Perhaps the cholera outbreak was the zenith of the crisis in that it revealed the 
gamut of problems in Zimbabwe: many of the hospitals did not have drugs for 
patients; the impoverished sick could not travel to the nearest hospitals simply 
because they had no money; some of them sought treatment in neighbouring 
countries, raising the ire of some neighbouring states which were already dealing 
with the influx of economic immigrants; the secretive regime denied the death toll 
being reported by foreign news agencies, many of which were banned from 
reporting within the country; and President Mugabe accused the west of a 
conspiracy to unseat his regime. 
 The chapter will map out the development of the Zimbabwean crisis up to 
the year 2008 and reveal its historical antecedents. As mentioned earlier, structural 
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adjustment in the 1990s was a turning point in the economic conditions of the 
country, whose fortunes were worsened by economic mismanagement, land 
invasions, political repression and a political impasse. It seems plausible that if 
Zimbabwe had dealt with issues like political intolerance, had rooted out 
corruption earlier on during independence and had carried out a better-sequenced 
land reform process the situation might have been totally different, even with the 
problems which were triggered by the structural adjustment programme. 
Essentially, the Zimbabwean state has been privatised for the benefit of the 
elite who stand to lose if a complete change in government is to take place. The 
Zimbabwean elite, many with government connections, continuously blocked the 
proposed unity government between the Zimbabwe African National Union, 
Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). A 
majority of members of the elite have continued to benefit from the chaos. One 
cannot help agreeing with the thesis that in Africa, “disorder” works and is a 
useful “political instrument.”18 
At the end of January 2009 the main opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai 
agreed to join a government of national unity, but it remains to be seen what 
tangible impact this will have on an economy that has been in nose-dive for more 
than a decade. There are still issues that have to be urgently confronted, including 
the need for real economic and democratic transformation and above all rooting 
out the corruption and economic mismanagement that have become endemic to 
the country. For example, economic mismanagement, especially meddling by the 
                                                 
18
 This thesis is developed in Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz (1999), Africa Works: 
Disorder as Political Instrument. 
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Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe fuelled the collapse of the local currency, which had 
become virtually useless by the end of 2008. 
 
3.2 The 1980s 
 
3.2.1 Mortgaging the future: successes and failures in the 1980s 
 
The 1980s are important in the history of Zimbabwe for a number of reasons. 
While there were successes in terms of economic and social development, these 
were largely underwritten by the World Bank and the IMF, and the debt accrued 
by the newly independent government came back to haunt the country in the 
1990s. Precedents for the tendency of the ZANU PF regime to be repressive were 
set during this period. For example, there was the massacre of what were seen as 
“dissident elements” in Matabeleland. The repressive tendencies and violence 
later came to the fore in the form of attacks on the opposition and other civil 
society groups and in the disastrous attacks on the urban informal economy 
(Operation Murambatsvina, of which more will be said in section 3.4.2). 
 Zimbabwe gained independence from the white settler regime in April 
1980 after a protracted liberation war. Like any other newly independent country, 
Zimbabwe had to grapple with issues of delivering education, health, jobs and 
infrastructure to the hitherto marginalised majority. As this section will show, the 
government of President Mugabe seems to have delivered reasonably well to the 
expectant population. It was, however, a very delicately balanced act. 
The country was “full of promise that the future would be one of economic 
prosperity, political freedom and a generally decent livelihood for all” (Mlambo, 
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2008: 9). Still, the Lancaster House Agreement which ended the war in 1979 and 
the Constitution that emerged from it were largely a compromise which in effect 
“gave settler capital a decade long period of consolidation, during which issues 
around the radical restructuring of the legacy of economic inequality were 
effectively put on hold” (Raftopoulos, 2005: x). Mandaza (1986: 42) notes that:  
Mugabe would have to begin the delicate task of nation-building in an 
atmosphere of intense suspicion and even hostility on the part of those he 
had defeated at home: against the covert threats of military, political and 
economic destabilization from South Africa; and with the pervasive threat 
of economic and political blackmail by the imperialist powers that had 
been the undertakers of the Lancaster House Agreement but were now 
seeking to keep the new state in line. 
 
Important in considering the Lancaster House agreement is that this was a 
settlement largely directed from the citadels of power in the global North. For 
example, there was the (still contentious) issue that extensive funding for the land 
redistribution programme would be provided to the Zimbabwe government by the 
former colonisers. The journalist Heidi Holland in her book Dinner With Mugabe 
suggests that the nebulous nature in which the Lancaster House conference dealt 
with the land issue may have been one of the causes of disagreements over the 
way forward in later years. A clearly written and signed agreement detailing the 
obligations of the signatories in future land reform never actually existed though 
the document did state that land redistribution could only take place after ten years 
(Holland, 2008). Up to today there is still much disagreement over the terms of 
the settlement, and the whole debacle has been replete with finger pointing from 
both sides of the divide. Inequitable land ownership patterns, one of the reasons 
the liberation struggle had been fought, remained very much intact in the first 
decade and for much of the second decade of independence (Sachikonye, 2002). 
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President Mugabe‟s regime, in the face of very robust political opposition 
and widespread popular opposition, would seize on the issue of land reform in 
2000 to force its way to subsequent election victories. If the land issue had been 
properly dealt with over the years, it is likely that President Mugabe, ever 
resourceful and tenacious, would have run out of political gambits. It could be 
argued that it was in the interests of both the local white farmers and the 
international community to aggressively pursue a much more rapid land reform 
process before it reached the fever pitch that it did in the year 2000. 
The post-independence government had inherited a relatively robust, and 
reasonably large and heterogeneous formal segment of the economy (see Table 
3.1). However, the “perseverance of economic stagnation” continued to plague the 
country and was the “single most important constraint Zimbabwe experienced in 
its political and social life since independence” (Bond, 1998: 150). As noted by 
Bond and Manyanya (2003: 28):  
The reasons for post-independence economic dynamism are complex, as 
they reflected in large part subjective issues such as white investor 
confidence (extremely negative until around 1984), an ongoing fall in the 
rate of the corporate profit, and the failure of the ZANU government to 
substantially alter wealth and income distribution to improve the buying 
power of the masses.  
 
 There was the “boom of 1979-1981”, and also 1985 and 1987-1990 in which 
there was significant real per capita GDP growth (Bond, 1998: 150). In the years 
1982-1984 and 1986-1987 real per capita GDP growth was in the negative (at -4 
per cent in 1984 and 1987). Regardless of this, Zimbabwe was one of the “top 
four more industrialized countries in sub-Saharan Africa; it possessed a more 
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diversified economy than most countries; and it had a better human resource base 
than most; and it had a middle-income status” (Sachikonye, 2002: 130).  
 
Table 3.1: GDP and employment by sector for selected years (GDP at 
constant prices)  
Sector Percent of GDP  Percent of Employment 
1980 1985 1990 2000  1980 1985 1990 2000 
Agriculture 14.0 17.6 14.8 18.4  32.4 26.3 24.3 26.3 
Mining 8.8 4.7 3.9 3.9  6.0 5.3 4.8 3.6 
Manufacturing 24.9 20.7 20.5 17.4  14.7 16.0 16.7 14.7 
Electricity 2.2 1.9 2.5 2.1  0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Construction 2.8 2.2 2.9 2.2  4.1 4.4 5.7 4.3 
Finance 6.3 7.6 8.4 11.0  1.2 1.5 1.5 2.8 
Distribution 14.0 14.1 15.2 16.9  6.9 7.7 7.9 8.4 
Transport 6.6 5.9 5.5 8.3  4.4 4.8 4.4 3.5 
Public Admin 9.0 6.8 5.7 3.3  7.5 8.6 8.0 4.7 
Education 5.2 6.1 5.9 7.2  3.4 8.1 8.9 11.3 
Health 2.2 1.6 1.5 1.0  1.5 1.9 2.0 2.3 
Domestic service 2.0 2.0 1.6 1.4  11.2 9.5 8.8 8.3 
Other services 5.4 3.5 3.6 5.1  4.3 5.3 6.1 9.0 
Source: Kanyenze (2004:108). 
 
 
For most of the 1980s “the majority of the domestic manufacturers were definitely 
not oriented to global markets, in terms of which they would have required cutting 
edge imported capital goods and advanced technology” (Bond and Manyanya, 
2003: 30). The weaknesses of this kind of insulated development would become 
much clearer with the advent of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme 
(ESAP) in the 1990s, which exposed the Zimbabwean economy to the global 
economy without putting in place the structural conditions which would have 
enabled it to survive and compete in such a context. 
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President Mugabe‟s ZANU PF had come to power with the “usual” 
fanfare: promises of social reform, job creation and wealth redistribution, 
promises that punctuated the rhetoric of most liberation movements not only in 
Africa but also in much of the developing world, as history has so poignantly 
shown. The 1980s did have some promising starts and there was a “steady 
consolidation of independence” with the new regime concentrating on both social 
and economic development (Sachikonye, 2002: 14). Table 3.1 reflects some of the 
“progress” of the 1980s.  
The 1980s in Zimbabwe can best be characterised as a period of very 
aggressive class formation under the patronage of the ruling elite (most of them 
liberation war leaders) and quite impressive social and economic development 
gains (Bond and Manyanya, 2003). Parallels of rapid class formation exist in most 
of sub-Saharan Africa. Most recently this has been seen in South Africa where, 
following the collapse of the apartheid regime in 1994, there has been an equally 
aggressive black bourgeoisie class formation under the rubric of black economic 
empowerment (BEE) and affirmative action. The process has been haunted by 
corruption and patronage.  
In Zimbabwe there was a historic improvement in broad social indicators 
like health, education and levels of literacy right across the board. In the first 
decade of independence the following were achieved: infant mortality went down 
from 86 to 49 per thousand live births; the immunisation rate went up from 25 per 
cent to 80 per cent; life expectancy rose from 56 to 62 years; there was a doubling 
of primary school enrolment (Bond and Manyanya, 2003: 35). However, the 
massive spending for social and economic development which improved these 
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indicators was bankrolled by the World Bank and the IMF, and in the process the 
post-independence government accumulated a massive debt, on top of the one 
inherited from the white settler government (which the Mugabe regime had been 
cajoled into not defaulting on).  
Most likely the post-independence government would not have received 
the large amounts of money it required for reconstruction if it had taken the route 
of defaulting on the debt inherited from the white settler regime. However, the 
government then was in a better position to actually negotiate debt forgiveness. It 
could have made the moral argument that a large part of this money had been used 
to fund upliftment for the minority in colonial Zimbabwe. 
This is not to say that the post-independence government did not benefit 
from funds that were provided by the international financial institutions. In fact, 
until the early 2000s much of the gains in the expansion of sectors like agriculture 
and manufacturing, which contributed tremendously to GDP and to employment 
(see Table 3.1), was on the back of government support. Most of this support the 
Zimbabwean government acquired in the form of donor aid before relations 
soured in light of the regime‟s intransigence concerning political and economic 
reform. Relations between Zimbabwe and the international community reached 
breaking point with the chaotic and violent land reform exercise which cemented 
the country‟s image as a pariah state.  
The 1980s were “years of restoration and hope” (Raftopoulos, 2004:4). 
The government “embarked on a vision of national reconciliation that, in 
economic terms, sought to combine a continuity of existing production structures 
with policies to improve the conditions of the majority of the population neglected 
 92 
 
during the colonial years” (Raftopoulos, 2004: 4). The “reconciliation policy of 
Zimbabwe‟s ruling party, constructed within a purported discourse of socialism, 
placed less emphasis on legitimized private accumulation than on the extended 
reach and interventionism of the state” (Raftopoulos, 2005: xi). The constituency 
of the previously oppressed Zimbabwean population expected a lot from 
government and the latter, using this interventionism, reasonably delivered for 
most of the 1980s in an environment of economic protectionism. However, it also 
became clear that “what was presented as the „logic‟ of nation-building most often 
had a highly partisan intent” (Saul, 2005: 133), and Mugabe would later prove 
that he was just (another) “authoritarian nationalist” (Saul, 2005: 132). 
 As far as land reform was concerned, the Zimbabwe government was very 
cautious and followed a policy based on the notion of willing-buyer, willing-
seller, which in a way slowed down the process (Moyo, 2000; Raftopoulos, 2004). 
By the end of the 1980s approximately three million hectares had been acquired 
for resettlement using this policy. Although the process was proceeding slowly, 
there were many positive developments which resulted in qualitative 
improvements in the lives of those who were resettled (Raftopoulos, 2004: 5). 
 As far as workers were concerned, the state passed several pieces of 
legislation to improve the conditions of workers (income levels and employment 
security), and in 1980 passed the Minimum Wages Act and the Employment Act. 
The year 1985 saw the passing of the Labour Relations Act which paved the way 
for workers to join trade unions. However, the fact that there was still a measure 
of control by the Minister of Labour showed “the new state‟s nervousness about 
conceding such power” (Raftopoulos, 2004: 4). There was “some protection for 
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workers in the 1980s” but the longer term trends in income and employment 
levels were largely negative (Raftopoulos, 2004: 4). From 1980-1982 there were 
wage increases in commerce, mining, and industry, but later on they were either 
static or declined. In sectors like agriculture and domestic employment, wages did 
increase. Between 1980 and 1990 employment growth levels hovered around an 
average of 1.72 per cent (Raftopoulos, 2004). 
 
3.2.2 An uneasy alliance and the beginnings of dissent and repression 
 
On the political frontier there was an “uneasy alliance‟ of two political parties, the 
Patriotic Front Zimbabwe African People‟s Union (PF ZAPU) led by Joshua 
Nkomo and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) led by Robert 
Mugabe (Raftopoulos, 2004: 5). At the same time, labour was very much under 
the control of the state, and the establishment of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade 
Unions (ZCTU) in 1981 was really an extension of an arm of the ruling party 
(Raftopoulos, 2004). This effectively meant that labour, which had been weak at 
independence, could not engage in meaningful political activity. Labour in 
Zimbabwe had not been one of the parties to the peace agreement between Ian 
Smith‟s regime and the nationalists. In essence labour was in the “shadows of the 
state” (Raftopoulos, 2001: 3). For much of the 1980s “the authority of the ruling 
party went largely unquestioned as the majority of organizations in the country 
fell into line behind the development project of the state” (Raftopoulos, 2004: 5).  
The situation in the 1980s was such that the “government also made 
moves to flood the space available to civil society” and most “student and 
intellectual groups, residents‟ associations, and women‟s organizations were 
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either created under ZANU PF‟s patronage, or soon came to function as 
refractions of the party‟s broad political policies” (Saul, 2005: 134). ZANU PF, 
now effectively a party-state, dominated politics, controlled much of the media, 
controlled and manipulated electoral processes and orchestrated violence against 
any dissenting voices (Raftopoulos, 2001). In electoral processes “ZANU PF 
manipulated unscrupulously both nationalist trappings and the regulatory regimes 
to sanction and deepen its control to all levels of the state” (Saul, 2005: 134).  
ZANU PF often articulated “the class contradictions of an unequal society 
in merely racial terms – ZANU‟S radical rhetoric thus intermittently disguising 
racist resentment (and ethnic chauvinism) rather than guiding a more profound 
transformation of colonial society in the interests of ordinary Zimbabweans” 
(Saul, 2005: 132). The violent dissident repression in the Matabeleland and 
Midlands regions in the mid 1980s, dubbed Gukurahundi,
19
 showed the uneasy 
nature of the ZANU-ZAPU “alliance” but also showed the lengths to which the 
ruling party would go to stamp out dissent. This was a precursor to the repression 
of political dissent in the late 1990s and for much of the 2000s.  
 The Gukurahundi violence in the Matabeleland region came to a halt in 
1987 with the Unity Agreement between ZANU and PF ZAPU (to form ZANU 
PF). However, some commentators view the process as more of a usurpation 
                                                 
19
 Gukurahundi actually referred to the North-Korean-trained 5
th
 Brigade deployed to quell the 
unrest caused by dissident attacks on civilians and white farmers. The term is now generally used 
to refer to the events during that time. The dissident attacks had their origins in the conflicts 
between former soldiers of the Zimbabwe People‟s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) and Zimbabwe 
African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), whose disbanded soldiers were in the guerrilla 
holding camps around Matabeleland and Midlands and in other parts of the country. Most of the 
dissidents were former cadres of ZIPRA. The unrest in the Matabeleland and Midlands provinces 
resulted in the massacre by the 5
th
 Brigade of thousands of people seen as dissidents and as 
supporters of the dissidents. The Catholic Commission for Peace and Justice in Zimbabwe 
(CCJPZ) and the Legal Resources Foundation (LRF) published a report titled Breaking the 
Silence, Building True Peace: A Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands, 
1980 to 1980 detailing the atrocities committed by the Brigade during that time. 
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which “effectively emasculated the major opposition party, PF ZAPU, and 
confirmed the regional subordination of Matabeleland” (Raftopoulos, 2005: xi). 
However, the dissent at that time was also a revelation of the fact that there was 
polarisation with no “durable basis amongst the existing social forces for the 
liberation movement‟s socialist ideology (Bond, 1998: 151). There still existed 
disparate groupings that had been brought together and perhaps co-opted into the 
post-independence socialist ideology with nothing to bond them. The liberation 
war had largely been fought in the rural area among the peasantry, and this class 
shared with the new ruling class nothing beyond reclaiming the land that had been 
appropriated by the white settlers (Bond, 1998). As is sharply noted by Fanon 
(2001 [1961]: 119), often after colonialism there is “lack of practical links” 
between the ruling/educated classes and “the mass of the people”. 
Also, in the late 1980s and the 1990s there was an increase in the powers 
of the executive, which withered away the powers of the legislature and had the 
“unintended consequence” of increasing the role of the judiciary in curbing 
executive excesses (Raftopoulos, 2004: 7). Authoritarianism in the form of the 
one-party state accelerated in the late 1980s, and the 1988 Willowgate scandal, in 
which government officials were implicated in a shady car scheme, and the 
subsequent executive pardoning of the culprits, was indicative of the decay and 
corruption within the ranks of the party-state (Raftopoulos, 2004; Saul, 2005). 
Such blatant disregard of the law and the refusal of the party-state to be 
accountable raised the ire of the general populace and of civic groupings, which 




 Dissent began to grow and Edgar Tekere‟s short-lived opposition party, 
the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM)
20
 was formed in the late 1980s. There was 
also opposition from a more vibrant and resurgent labour and student movement, 
both of which had a vision of autonomy and sought greater accountability from 
the state. At the end of the 1980s there were “serious fractures in the notion of 
national unity imposed by the ruling party” and the first decade ended with 
growing economic problems and the emergence of an “embryonic opposition 
movement” (Raftopoulos 2004: 8). It had become clear that the nationalist project 
had largely benefited (and continued to benefit) the ruling class and those with 
connections to it.  
As Zimbabwe waved goodbye to the first decade of independence, the 
omens were not propitious at all. The class compromise project that Mugabe had 
sought to craft was clearly tenuous and beginning to fracture. While the economy 
had done reasonably well, or at least had delivered some benefits, it had stayed 
stagnant and was shielded from the international global economy. The party-state 
had shown a dangerous proclivity towards corruption and violent repression of 
dissent, and clearly had no interest in opening up the political space or the media 
sphere. Much of the social and economic development had been bankrolled by the 
donor community and Zimbabwe had also inherited a massive debt from the 
regime of Ian Smith. That debt would have enormous repercussions on economic 
developments in the 1990s as the international financial institutions, gunning for 
economic liberalisation, used the debt as leverage for their own ends. 
                                                 
20
 That ZUM did relatively well in the 1990 elections was perhaps a sign that Zimbabweans were 
searching for political alternatives. Edgar Tekere, along with other ZANU-PF stalwarts such as 
Robert Mugabe, John Nkomo, Joshua Nkomo and Josiah Tongogara, was at the forefront of the 
liberation movement in Zimbabwe. Tekere would later pen his controversial autobiography titled 
Tekere: A Lifetime of Struggle. 
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3.3 The 1990s to the early 2000s 
 
3.3.1 The neo-liberal economic project of the 1990s 
 
Economic reform in the 1990s was largely driven by the vested interests of the 
global financial institutions and triggered a massive economic collapse, worsened 
in later years by other local factors. During this period the “informal economy 
came into its own” because of the deleterious impacts of ESAP, and it was during 
this time that “„backyard industries‟ sprouted everywhere and more workers found 
their livelihood in this sector. In the 1999-2000 fiscal year, the informal economy 
in Zimbabwe was estimated to be 59.4 per cent of GDP, the highest in Africa 
(Mlambo, 2008: 15). According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 
(IDMC, 2009), in 1980 the informal economy had been relatively small, 
accounting for less than 10 per cent of the labour force. In the years 1986-1987 it 
accounted for 20 per cent of the labour force, and in 1991 for 27 per cent. By 2004 
estimates were that the informal economy‟s contribution to the total labour force 
was well over 40 per cent (IDMC, 2009). Informal economic activities among the 
impoverished people in Zimbabwe in the 1990s were a response to the deleterious 
impacts of economic restructuring which had been directed by the World Bank 
and the IMF from their citadels of power in the global North.  
The 1990s clearly started in an environment in which omens did not augur 
well. Franz Fanon‟s prophetic words are an apt characterisation of the conditions 
in Zimbabwe in the 1990s:  
The party, instead of welcoming the expression of popular discontentment, 
instead of taking for its fundamental purpose the free flow of ideas from 
the people up to the government, forms a smoke screen, and forbids such 
ideas. The party leaders behave like common sergeant majors, frequently 
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reminding the people of the need for „silence in the ranks.‟ This party 
which used to call itself the servant of the people, which used to claim that 
it worked for full expression of the people‟s will, as soon as the colonial 
power puts the country into its control hastens to send the people back to 
their caves (Fanon, 2001 [1961]: 147). 
 
For much of the 1990s Zimbabwe descended into a very dangerous abyss, 
economically, politically and socially, and the situation would worsen beyond that 
period. The contours of that descent are traced below. 
 In the late 1980s the IMF and the World Bank had “refused to sign an 
agreement for an extension of the export revolving fund in 1987 until measures 
were taken to liberalise trade” (Kanyenze, 2004: 123). Consensus on the need for 
reform clearly existed but there were divisions as to the “form the reforms would 
take in order to boost depressed investment, streamline inefficient labour 
regulations and restructure the economy in order to achieve growth with equity, 
promote exports, and create employment” (Kanyenze, 2004: 123).  
 The finance ministry, under then finance minister Bernard Chidzero, 
which had been very secretive in formulating the seminal documents for the 
reform programme, revealed in its Framework for Economic Reform, 1991-1995, 
which was touted as a locally formulated document, their projections for the 
Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (Bond, 1998: 380). The Framework 
projected that the economy would grow annually by 5 per cent, that the budget 
deficit would “shrink to 5% of the GDP”, that investment from the private sector 
“would rapidly overtake government investment, doubling from the levels of the 
late 1980s”, that inflation would be down to 10 per cent by 1994, that there would 
be a growth in export sectors like mining, agriculture, and manufacturing and 
these “would grow steadily through to 1995”, that new direct investment would 
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also peak and “Zimbabwe would have better terms of trade in dealing with the 
world economy over the subsequent five years” (Bond, 1998: 380; Bond and 
Manyanya, 2003: 31-32). The ESAP targets at the outset were about the “need” to 
cut government spending, although this would greatly limit growth (Bond, 1998: 
381). At the same time the programme was “accomplished by mortgaging the 
future at a rate unparalleled in the country‟s history” (Bond, 1998: 382). 
  “In reality, ESAP failed miserably” (Bond and Manyanya, 2003: 32). The 
so-called accomplishments of the programme in the 1991-1997 period in which it 
was implemented were as follows: an estimated “18 000 government jobs were 
abolished and the civil service bill was reduced from 15.3% of the GDP in 1990 to 
11.35% in 1994”; there was a disassembling of the controls on foreign exchange; 
a significant curtailing of tariffs “except for some „import competitive tariffs‟”; an 
“extensive liberalization of foreign investment regulations; abolishing of controls 
on prices; elimination of “local zoning and trading restrictions”; and “labour 
markets were largely deregulated”, particularly regarding wage determination and 
employers‟ rights to hire and fire (Bond and Manyanya, 2003: 37). 
 Reality on the ground in terms of economic reform painted a very dark 
picture as some of the key economic indicators in Table 3.2 show. While GDP 
growth was 5 per cent in 1995 it averaged 1.2 per cent from 1991 to 1995; 
inflation averaging at 30 per cent (1991-1995) never reached the lofty goal of 10 
per cent (Bond and Manyanya, 2003: 32). During the ESAP era the budget deficit 
was at more than 10 per cent of GDP, at least double the targeted 5 per cent, and 
during the drought of 1994-1995 it was 13 per cent (Bond and Manyanya, 2003: 
37). The core questions are “did the government stay the course with the 
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treatment” and “if so, was it the wrong medicine?” (Bond and Manyanya, 2003: 
37). 
 While there may have been exogenous factors that had an impact on the 
reform process, like the 1992 and 1995 droughts, “tampering with the complex 
system of protective tariffs, duties and quotas created several problems that should 
have been foreseen” according to Bond and Manyanya (2003: 33). There was a 
surge in the “speculative imports of luxury goods, raw materials and machinery”, 
the trade deficit spiralled upwards in the early 1990s, and exports (including 
“manufactured exports” fell sharply.  
 The contribution of manufacturing to GDP fell and while there were 
increases in the contribution of sectors such as transport and communication, real 
estate, finance, education and agriculture these did not balance the “disappointing 
declines in volume outputs experienced in several manufacturing subsectors” and 
“de-industrialisation ravaged the textiles (-64%), metals (-35%), transport 
equipment (-31%) and clothing (-28%) subsectors” (Bond and Manyanya, 2003: 
35).  
 ESAP had called for a reduction of government expenditure, and this had 
an enormous impact on the standard of living. For example, by 1996 annual 
earnings for civil servants as a percentage of the level in 1980 fell by 65 per cent, 
and declines in earnings were also experienced by domestic workers (-62%), 
construction (-56%), teachers (-50%) and farm workers (-48%) (Bond and 
Manyanya, 2003: 35). That in subsequent years most workers could not afford the 
basket of basic commodities in the Consumer Council of Zimbabwe‟s basket 
suggests a steep decline in real wages. For example, by 2008 it was reported that 
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the salary of a doctor in the public health sector was the equivalent of less than 
US$1 per month, showing the dire economic situation in the country (Todd, Ray, 
Madzimbamuto and Sanders, 2009). 
 
Table 3.2: Key economic indicators, 1995-2003 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Real GDP (%) 0.2 9.7 1.4 0.8 -4.1 -6.8 -9.5 -14.7 -14.0 
Per person real 
(1990) GDP US$ 
235 220 180 90 55 42 32 28 26 
Inflation (%) 22.5 21.7 18.9 31.7 58.5 55.9 71.9 133.2 365 
Savings/GDP (%) 22.4 16.9 10.3 18.0 19.3 12.1 0.8 4.3 4.3 
Investment/GDP 
(%) 
25.3 17.4 18.8 22.3 17.1 13.5 10.3 8.9 8.5 
Budget 
Deficit/GDP (%) 
-12.2 -7.7 -8.2 -5.5 -7.7 -24.1 -8.2 -13.8  
External payment 
arrears US$m 
- - - - 109.0 471.1 762.7 1333.3 - 
Domestic debt 
Z$bn 
24.7 33.2 31.4 44.2 77.6 162.1 194.1 345.8 590.9 
Foreign US$m 4001 4141 4117 3841 3285 3164 3180 4503  
Export growth 
(%) 
13.8 12.6 -2.9 -20.6 -0.1 14.3 -28.5 -10.8 -5.3 
Balance of 
payments US$m 
44 4 -739 -283 9 -166 -197 -1182 -825 
Employment 
growth (%) 
-1.9 2.8 5.6 -0.1 -2.3 -5.9 -0.6 - - 
Source: Kanyenze: 2004: 133. 
 
 
 Table 3.2 shows the impact of reform on some of the key economic 
indicators for selected years up to 1997 when ESAP officially ended. The table 
also shows declines in the post-ESAP phase and into the twenty-first century. The 
lower wages that had been instituted by ESAP did not, in real terms, improve the 
job market, and thousands of school leavers could not find formal sector 
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employment. As retrenchments increased and the “social wage” fell, there was a 
soaring number of school dropouts (because of cost recovery programmes that put 
in place school fees), and girls suffered most (Bond and Manyanya, 2003: 35). 
There was also the onslaught of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, and the situation was 
exacerbated by a fall of “20% in real terms” of per capita expenditure on health 
care. This cut in expenditure resulted in the lower income groups being unable to 
afford health care since one of the instruments put in place under ESAP was a cost 
recovery mechanism which meant people had to pay for treatment and for drugs. 
People died because of unaffordable health care, and this produced what came to 
be known as the “ESAP deaths” (Mlambo, 2008: 15). 
As economic conditions worsened, the great trek of professionals to 
regional countries like South Africa and Botswana accelerated. For example, in 
1997 Zimbabwe‟s public health sector was only able to employ 28.7 per cent of 
its national requirements (Chikanda, 2004). It is estimated that 18 000 nurses have 
left since 1998 (Todd et al., 2009). Bread riots in 1993, dubbed the “IMF riots” hit 
the high-density suburbs and the city centre in Zimbabwe‟s capital, Harare, a 
revelation of discontent with the deteriorating standards of living (Bond and 
Manyanya, 2003: 37). The 1997 strike of private employees came on the heels of 
the 1996 public workers strike as the working class sought to voice their 
discontent with the impact of structural adjustment, not only on their lives but on 
their future prospects. Toward the end of the 1990s there was growing 
discontentment with the course the economy had taken, and frantic attempts were 




Attempts by the government to right the economy did not bear any fruits. 
For example, economic programmes like the 1998 Zimbabwe Programme for 
Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST) “failed to deliver on targets, 
let alone reduce poverty” (Mlambo, 2008: 17). As shown by the key economic 
indicators (Table 3.2) such programmes did not mange to raise the overall GDP, 
which was in the red. Indicators like inflation continued to worsen. At the same 
time overall debt continued to balloon as the government failed to meet its 
payment obligations. 
During the 1990s, especially with the implementation of ESAP, informal 
economic activities became much more widespread and came to play a central 
role in the livelihoods of the Zimbabwean populace. Marginalised people in 
Zimbabwe resorted to informal economic activities as a way of dealing with the 
economic crisis unleashed by ESAP (Brand, Mupedziswa and Gumbo, 1995). 
Even in the early post-independence period there had been a realisation that the 
formal economy could not keep pace with the number of people entering the job 
market. For example, the heavy subsidisation of education resulted in the system 
producing a large number of graduates into a constrained job market (Brand, 
1986). The Riddell Commission on incomes, prices and conditions of service had 
already recommended that a government study of informal economic activities in 
the country be undertaken so as to gather data on its size and on how it could be 
made viable with government and private sector support (Riddell, 1981).  
Early in the post-independence period the trend was that those who were 
less educated dominated informal economic activities in the country. These 
included activities like street trading in food and clothes, home-based industries 
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that manufactured home wares like metal dishes, kettles, pots and pans, and light 
industries that manufactured burglar bars, sliding gates and other such items. A 
study of informal economy workers in Magaba in Harare, for example, found that 
93 per cent of them had not gone beyond primary education (Brand, 1986). 
Interestingly, the data already pointed to participation by a considerable number 
of foreign nationals in informal economic activities – around 30 per cent in the 
Brand (1986) study. This resonates with southern African trends where cross-
national human movements, in search of better economic opportunities, have 
largely been to those countries with better-performing economies. (Zimbabwe had 
an economic “boom” just after independence.) 
With the advent of ESAP and the concomitant decrease in real wages, the 
retrenchment of people from both the public and private sectors and the declining 
economic situation, the numbers of the more educated participating in informal 
economic activities increased. For example, a study of informal traders in Harare 
showed that employed educated women supplemented their incomes by engaging 
in informal cross-border trading within the SADC region (Brand, Mupedziswa 
and Gumbo, 1995). It is important to recognise that this was not the first time that 
cross-border movement existed within southern Africa. Engaging in cross-border 
trade and migration has its antecedents.  
There has always been a history of migration within southern Africa in 
search of better economic opportunities. This dates back to the days of the 
Rhodesian Federation government and even before. Up until the 1980s, for 
example, there was a centrally organised migration of Malawians to the mines of 
South Africa (Andersson, 2006) and to the farms and mines of colonial Zimbabwe 
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(Christiansen and Kydd, 1983). There was also migration of other nationals from 
within the region to the gold mines, who contributed to the development of South 
Africa‟s so called “labour empire” (Crush, Jeeves, and Yudelman, 1991). There 
was a reincarnation of this migration, albeit in a different form, in the days of 
ESAP in Zimbabwe. 
There was an upwards spike in the number of women in transnational and 
cross-border trade who moved within the region, and the numbers of people 
involved in street trading also increased. The study by Brand, Mupedziswa and 
Gumbo (1995) revealed the predominance of women in cross-border and street 
trading in Harare as the country grappled with retrenchments. Increasingly, 
women engaged in supplementing the incomes of their spouses or took over as the 
main breadwinners from retrenched spouses (Brand, Gumbo and Mupedziswa 
1995). If economic restructuring was a mode of inserting African and other 
developing world economies into the global economy (Ferguson, 2006), then it 
was a dismal failure and it negatively affected the majority of the population in 
countries such as Zimbabwe. Those who were impoverished and dispossessed had 
to find alternative ways to eke out a living in an economy in crisis. 
During the period of economic collapse authorities specifically allowed the 
use of residential areas for “specified non-residential activities, as authorities were 
forced to accept the importance of the informal sector” (Mlambo, 2008: 16). 
However, the burgeoning sector would also be at the centre of conflict in future. 
According to Mlambo (2008: 16):  
informalisation of the economy and the legal concessions from 
government in terms of relaxing by-laws to facilitate easier entry into the 
sector, and production and distribution of goods and services inevitably 
brought with it the informalisation of operating and production 
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infrastructure, as unauthorized vending stalls and open-air „factories‟ 
sprang up everywhere, becoming the potential source of conflict with 




In the late 1990s and the 2000s the economy went through further general 
collapse, cementing the importance of informality during that time as increasing 
numbers of Zimbabweans were propelled into this sector so as to eke out a living 
during a period of unprecedented economic difficulties. 
 The generalized plunge of the Zimbabwean economy began on the 
morning of 14 November 1997 when the Zimbabwean dollar went down 74 per 
cent in value. There had already been bad omens preceding this – a stock 
exchange crash in August of the same year, rising interest rates in the period from 
November to December 1998, and several thousands of jobs lost in retrenchments 
during that year. 
 There were other events during the tumultuous period of September-
October 1997 which perhaps ignited the decline of the Zimbabwean economy. 
Firstly, President Mugabe finally conceded to the demands of the liberation war 
veterans and agreed to pay them Z$50 000 each as well as a Z$2 000 per month 
pension. It did not help that the World Bank immediately discontinued balance of 
payments support after that. Secondly, Mugabe made known government‟s 
intention to implement land reform under the Land Designation Act, and that 
1 500 mainly white-owned farms had been identified. In spite of government‟s 
intentions, the land designation exercise failed to take off: 
                                                 
21
 The Zimbabwean government turned a blind eye to the growth of the informal economy but 
would later destroy these ventures during Operation Murambatsvina. This exposes the 
contradictory relationship that the Zimbabwean government has had with informal entrepreneurs. 
It certain periods, when it suited the powerful elements, informal enterprise were allowed to grow 
without much regulation, and then when the same elements were seen as anti-government there 
was an attack on them. 
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The ambitious land designation exercise was not successfully brought to 
fruition via the Zimbabwean legal system: the courts, the World Bank and 
the IMF, the British government and other donors, the private media, and 
other pressure groups sided with white farmers and together effectively 
vetoed any forced sales in 1998. Instead, a „donor‟s conference‟ was held 
to work out a more gradual method of land transfer. It was only in 2000 
that the land designation process took on substance, once war veterans 
were mobilized … with Mugabe‟s blessing, to invade more than 1000 
white owned farms” (Bond and Manyanya, 2003: 40). 
 
There was already growing opposition to the ZANU PF government, and the 
constitutional referendum in 2000 resulted in the rejection of the regime‟s 
proposed Constitution by the populace. Even before that the party state had shown 
signs of attempting to re-assert its “sovereignty” – for example, the 1998 price 
freeze on staple goods, institution of tariffs on luxury goods and “several minor 
technical interventions to raise revenues, slow capital flight and deter share 
speculation” (Bond and Manyanya, 2003: 41). There was, however, growing 
pressure from international donors and there were calls for removal of price 
controls and relaxation of import tariffs, very central to the World Bank and IMF 
free-market mantra. The deal for loans from the World Bank collapsed in 1999 in 
an environment in which the export prices for Zimbabwe‟s raw materials had 
collapsed rapidly since 1997 and continued to do so well into the twenty-first 
century. “Export led growth was revealed as a fantasy” (Bond and Manyanya 
2003: 41).  
The decision by Mugabe to cease payments on loans generated an 
atmosphere of tension between his regime and the international financial 
community. His regime had over the past decade or so benefited from donor 
support, not to mention the billions borrowed for social and economic 
development on top of the debt inherited from the settler government. There had 
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been a tightening of monetary policy during ESAP, and the opening up of the 
economy had revealed its weaknesses. The decline of economic growth during the 
ESAP years had hampered the ability of the government to repay World Bank and 
IMF loans.  
When Zimbabwe had waved goodbye to the first decade of independence, 
foreign debt stood at US$3.27 billion and it would balloon to US$4.372 billion by 
2000 with government accounting for 76 per cent of that debt. In 1998 
“Zimbabwe spent an historically unprecedented 38% of export earnings on 
servicing foreign debt” and it became more and more clear that the foreign debt 
was simply too large to pay off, as pointed by the finance minister at the time, Dr 
Simba Makoni (Bond and Manyanya, 2003: 45). The falling out with the 
international community meant that the regime became isolated internationally, 
and at home Mugabe was increasingly facing challenges from an impoverished 
populace. The opposition was getting stronger, and the situation within the ranks 
of the ruling party itself was becoming openly fractious. 
 
3.3.2 From the late 1990s to the 2000s 
 
The unfolding of events in the 1990s and the 2000s is important in that it was 
during this period that there was general economic collapse and dissent became 
much more widespread. Also, in this period the ruling Mugabe regime became 
much more repressive and violent. This was reminiscent of the Gukurahundi 
massacres. There was widespread use of violence on the general population. The 
regime also got away with acts like the promulgation of repressive media 
legislation, and it became much more daring and sometimes even paranoid in its 
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attempts to coercively cling to power. Later on, in the 2000s, it would clamp 
down on the informal economy, dealing a double blow to a populace which in the 
1990s had been negatively affected by the restructuring exercise. Importantly, in 
the early and late 1990s, up until the “urban clean-up” operation, government had 
largely pursued a “hands-off” approach when it came to informal economic 
activities. Among those hardest hit by the clean-up operation were the informal 
traders whose activities had grown tremendously on the Mugabe regime‟s watch 
during the period of economic collapse. 
The most important political developments in this period were the growing 
linkages that developed between the ZCTU and the public sector workers in the 
1997 general strike and the 1998 mass stay-aways. The strikes “established the 
potential effectiveness of labour as a social movement signalling the escalating 
momentum for change in the country” (Raftopoulos, 2005: 10). With the 
escalation of the economic crisis the leadership of the ZCTU, led by Morgan 
Tsvangirai, “articulated the linkage between this crisis and the problems of 
governance” (Raftopoulos, 2004: 10). One scholar notes that “Zimbabwean 
politics since independence has been anchored in patronage and such politics can 
only thrive when there is a large public sector” (Masunungure, 2004: 188).  
The ZCTU was a linchpin in the formation of the National Constitutional 
Assembly (NCA), which sent out a clarion call for the necessity of constitutional 
reform. The NCA was also instrumental in forcing the government into taking 
constitutional reform seriously, which led to the setting up of the Constitutional 
Commission by government (Masunungure, 2004). The National Working 
People‟s Convention in February 1999, organised by the ZCTU, recommended 
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the formation of an opposition party under the auspices of labour (Raftopoulos, 
2004: 10). This led to the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change in 
September 1999. Labour in Zambia, for example, had similarly been very central 
in the formation of an opposition party.  
Dissent was also fuelled by the government‟s foray into the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) in search of new sources of income (Raftopoulos, 
2003). This deployment of the army into the DRC was an unconstitutional action 
in which Parliament and the politburo – the highest decision-making body of the 
party – were not consulted (Bond and Manyanya, 2003) The growing opposition 
movement, together with civic groups, exploited such government actions to 
expose the escalating crisis in Zimbabwe. The DRC expedition, together with the 
“plunging economy made political crisis management all the more difficult” 
(Bond and Manyanya, 2003: 70). The foray into the DRC also meant that the 
government could not provide a safety net for the population, which was already 
reeling from the economic crash, since it was diverting its already limited 
resources towards the war effort. 
Widespread corruption within the party-state itself, for example, in the 
irregular awarding of tenders for construction of a new Harare international 
airport, did not help matters for the Mugabe regime (Bond and Manyanya, 2003: 
73). There were also several very murky investment partnerships, for example, 
with Malaysia, which clearly benefited government officials, and an increase in 
“ubiquitous conspicuous consumption by government elites” (Bond and 
Manyanya, 2003: 73). In addition, there were also repeated efforts to muzzle the 
free press and to quell dissent through violent repression of University of 
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Zimbabwe students who often carried out strikes, and through attempts at 
demobilising labour which was clearly playing a central role in the strengthening 
of the opposition movement (Bond and Manyanya, 2003). The ruling party‟s 
legitimacy would not only be tested in 2000 and beyond, but would also suffer 
major setbacks. 
 
3.4 2000 and beyond 
 
3.4.1 The politics of repression 
 
The year 2000 is often marked as a watershed year in Zimbabwe in that it 
“constituted an important junction of political events” (Raftopoulos, 2004: 12). 
Government‟s draft Constitution, which gave enormous powers to the executive, 
was resoundingly rejected in a referendum; the “vote represented the first major 
defeat for the ruling party since independence, and the protest threatened to 
translate itself into an election defeat later in the year” (Raftopoulos, 2004: 12). In 
addition, the rejection of the draft Constitution “presented a major step towards 
imagining alternative futures” (Kagoro, 2005: 249). 
February 2000 saw the advent of the land occupations by the war veterans 
who became “Mugabe‟s shock troops”, by party youths, and by various other 
radical elements within the ZANU PF party (Bond and Manyanya, 2003: 77). 
These land occupations can be “read as a direct response to the referendum 
humiliation and as political codewording for revenge against white farmers on the 
one hand, and emotive delivery and vote-catcher on the other” (Bond and 
Manyanya, 2003: 76). In the mid 1980s the ZANU PF elites had been at the 
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forefront of land re-distribution and later on they had demobilised this land 
movement only to reconstitute it again in the he late 1990s, with war veterans at 
the forefront (Moyo, 2001). This illustrates how the ruling elites constantly 
change their (policy) positions to suit their interests at different historical 
conjunctures. The land invasions were orchestrated for the “disorganization and 
marginalization of commercial farm-worker communities” which had played a 
central role in the rejection of the draft Constitution (Saul, 2005: 142).  Land 
occupations also heralded the emergence of a new ideology: 
ZANU (PF) in 2000 promised the land, but at the price of an extreme and 
 violent political intolerance that severely undermined the long standing 
 popular aspirations for a „good‟ state, and labelled as enemies a range of 
 social groups that had once been included in the nationalist constituency. It 
 was not a revived pre-independence nationalism that lay behind the wave 
 of occupations in 2000, but a far narrower one (Alexander, 2003: 99). 
 
 
In later years, with the rise of the opposition, the urban populace was 
marginalised in the construction of a discourse that cast them as anti-struggle and 
as enemies of the state in supporting the opposition movement. Operation 
Murambatsvina in June 2005 could be read, as suggested by Hammer (2006), as 
an attempt to disorganise the urban population - the main supporters of the 
opposition movement - just like the land invasions were designed to disorganise 
the farm workers, seen as responsible for blocking the passing of the draft 
constitution.  
The tactics developed in the land occupations were refined and 
assiduously put to use in the June 2000 parliamentary elections. Election fraud 
was reported by local and international bodies that came into the country to 
monitor the elections. The end result, though, was telling of the direction in which 
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the political conditions in Zimbabwe were heading, with the opposition MDC 
winning 57 seats outright and ZANU PF winning 62 seats. Given that 2000 was a 
year in which the “worst election violence in Zimbabwe‟s history” was recorded 
and the legitimacy of the elections was in doubt, the opposition challenged several 
of the election results in the courts and was awarded a further four seats to almost 
equal ZANU PF‟s number of seats in Parliament (Raftopoulos, 2004: 13). 
Following the June 2000 parliamentary elections the ruling party 
continued to act with impunity in an attempt to forcibly control the trajectory of 
politics in the country, and persisted in targeting the opposition movement 
(Masunungure, 2004). The judiciary also faced assault. For example, several legal 
rulings in which the courts ordered the Commissioner of Police to remove the 
land occupiers went largely ignored. Historically “ZANU PF‟s record regarding 
respect for court rulings clearly demonstrates that it considers itself to be superior 
to the judiciary and to have the license to choose which decisions to comply with 
and which ones to ignore” (Goredema, 2005: 105). Further, as noted by one 
scholar “a power-hungry regime, that is not prepared to brook political opposition, 
has brought Zimbabwe to the brink of disaster by casting aside legality and 
constitutionality” (Feltoe, 2004: 221). 
After the 2000 elections, in which the MDC took control of most urban 
municipalities, ZANU PF obstructed the free functioning of those municipalities 
which fell under the control of the opposition. The most blatant act was the 
meddling in the city of Harare, in which the opposition mayor was dismissed 
under frivolous charges, following which the affairs of the city were put under a 
special (ZANU PF appointed) commission. This commission turned out to be 
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incompetent and corrupt but was forcibly retained despite an outcry not only from 
the opposition MDC and Harare residents, but even from within ZANU PF itself. 
The way in which ZANU PF has continued to undermine democratically elected 
local government structures has deepened the urban electorate‟s alienation from it 
(Raftopoulos, 2007a: 37). The illegitimate commission would be at the forefront 
of Operation Murambatsvina in Harare. 
Added to these attempts to stifle opposition elements was the fast-tracking 
through Parliament of the Broadcasting Services Act (No 3 of 2001) in an 
“attempt to control alternative opinions in the electronic media, particularly 
through the radio which is the dominant source of information for the rural 
population” (Raftopoulos, 2004: 14). In 2002 there was the passing of the Access 
to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), “designed to silence the 
critical media and increase the influence of the Minister of Information on 
mediated communication in the country” (Chuma, 2005: 134). In September 2003 
the Daily News and the Daily News on Sunday were shut down, and in May 2004 
the weekly Tribune followed suit.  
As far as the rule of law was concerned the situation was such that “law 
enforcement agencies have either actively collaborated in these lawless activities 
or were rendered powerless to act” (Feltoe, 2004: 222). Following the violence in 
the parliamentary elections, many of the perpetrators were granted amnesty which 
was an injustice against those who bore the brunt of this violence. This is not 
unusual in Zimbabwe where “epidemics of organized violence and torture” have 
“invariably … been followed by planned forgetting and silence, underpinned by 
laws granting indemnity and impunity” (Reeler, 2004: 226).  
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Another instance in which the precepts of justice were disregarded was the 
“blatantly political basis of land allocation” (Feltoe, 2004: 223) in the fast-
tracking land reform exercise since the “land invasions”. The government later 
showed its disregard for economic justice by carrying out Operation 
Murambatsvina which destroyed the informal economy in which the struggling 
Zimbabwean population eked out a living.  
 
3.4.2 Operation Murambatsvina and the increased securitisation of the 
state 
 
Some analysts argue that the urban clean-up exercise, Operation Murambatsvina – 
officially “Restore Order”, but actually meaning “to clean up the trash” – 
originated in the British colonial system in Rhodesia (Vambe, 2008). 
“Colonialism‟s methods of stripping Africans of their natural resources are well 
documented” (Vambe, 2008: 1), and set a dangerous precedent which found a 
modern-day reincarnation in the hands of the post-colonial state. When it carried 
out the clean-up operation, the Zimbabwean state hid behind the very thin veneer 
that it was trying to curb a rampant and uncontrolled defacing of the urban 
landscape in the form of, for example, unauthorised construction of structures, 
illegal informal trading and increased crime. It could be argued that the urban 
clean-up exercise can be understood within the context of the increased failure of 
institutions and the government‟s own paranoid attempts to cling to power. Moore 
(2008: 25) suggests that operation Murambatsvina should be seen as “an almost 
logical extension of the techniques of a party that has consistently failed to rule 
Zimbabwe through consent rather than force or its possibility”. 
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 ZANU PF won the parliamentary poll in March 2005 by securing a two-
thirds majority (78 seats of the 120 elected seats); MDC won 41 seats. ZANU PF 
then used the “post-election phase period to launch further attacks on opponents, 
both inside and outside the party, in a series of somewhat chaotic policy decisions, 
ostensibly in a bid to consolidate their power base” (Maroleng, 2005: 1). The 
post-election period also saw the increased “securitization of government and civil 
service” with Mugabe appointing security personnel to key strategic civil service 
posts (Maroleng, 2005: 1). There was also blatant “ethnic chauvinism” with 
Mugabe appointing to key posts his trusted lieutenants, the “Zezuru old guard” (of 
the influential Zezuru clan). 
During the period leading up to Operation Murambatsvina the “urban 
dwellers had become politically suspect in the eyes of the ruling ZANU PF elite” 
(Mlambo, 2008: 21), and they bore the major brunt of the urban clean-up 
operation. Clearly the case of Operation Murambatsvina was an attempt to control 
what was seen as an “unpatriotic” urban population. The operation also revealed 
that the post-colonial Zimbabwean state was in the “throes of economic, political 
and cultural crisis” (Vambe, 2008: 1). It was largely about the survival of the 
powerful elements in politics (Vambe, 2008). 
 On 19 May 2005 the City of Harare launched Operation Murambatsvina 
[OM] to clean up the capital. The Chairperson of the commission appointed to run 
the city made the following remarks in a speech at Harare Town House: 
The City of Harare wishes to advise the public that in its efforts to improve 
service delivery within the City, it will embark on Operation 
Murambatsvina, in conjunction with Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP). 
This is a programme to enforce by-laws to stop all forms of illegal activity. 
These violations of the by-laws in areas of vending, traffic control, illegal 
structures, touting/abuse of commuters by rank marshals, street-
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life/prostitution, vandalism of property infrastructure, stock theft and 
illegal cultivation, among others have led to the deterioration of standards, 
thus negatively affecting the image of the City. The attitude of the 
members of the public as well as some City officials has led to a point 
whereby Harare has lost its glow. We are determined to bring it back. 
Harare was renowned for its cleanliness, decency, peace, tranquil 
environment for business and leisure; therefore we would like to assure all 
residents that all these illegal activities will be a thing of the past. To 
intensify Operation Murambatsvina, an ongoing exercise, the City of 
Harare will work hand in glove with other enforcement units of the 
Government which include the ZRP to make sure that this exercise is 
realised. It is not a once-off exercise but a sustained one that will see the 
clean-up of Harare. The eradication of chaos that currently prevails in the 
City, the seat of government, home to all diplomatic missions, 
headquarters of major business and commercial activities requires the co-
operation of all authorities, business and individuals. The people of Harare 
must all appreciate the City is ours, it is our pride and belongs to us all: 
thereby let us all be responsible citizens…..Operation Murambatsvina is 
going to be a massive exercise in the CBD and the suburbs which will see 
the demolition of all illegal structures and removal of all activities at 
undesignated areas…” (The Herald, 24 May 2005, quoted in Zimbabwe 
Human Rights NGO Forum Report [ZHRF], 2005). 
 
Action Aid (2005) indicated that, based on its survey, nearly 1.2 million people 
had been affected by Operation Murambatsvina and that 70 per cent of these has 
lost shelter. A study carried out by Afrobarometre (2005) after the Action Aid 
study suggested that over 2.7 million people had been affected by the operation. 
Both studies concluded that the majority of people affected were urban dwellers 
who had been involved in informal trading, and that the operation had a 
tremendous impact on their income levels. 
One analyst at the Institute of Security Studies (ISS) in South Africa noted 
that the clean-up operation was “paradigmatic of the erratic nature of policy 
making and implementation in the country (reminiscent of the flawed 
implementation of the land reform programme)” and that it was “disturbing in the 
profound disregard for fundamental human rights of ordinary Zimbabweans, as 
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well as in its heavy handed and violent nature” (Maroleng, 2005: 1). The 
opposition MDC also made suggestions that the primary goal of the operation was 
political and that it was “designed to destroy the party‟s urban support base, 
relocate the people to the rural areas where they would be under the sway of 
ruling party-aligned chiefs, and forestall popular protests by the poor as the food 
crisis deepened” (Maroleng, 2005: 3). One commentator writing a “Letter from 
Zimbabwe” in the New Yorker noted that: 
The project … was a pretext for remaking Zimbabwe‟s political map. Two 
months before Operation Murambatsvina, the circle of security advisers 
who surround Zimbabwe‟s President, Robert Mugabe, had warned him 
that the United States and the European Union were planning to rally slum 
dwellers and small traders, the backbone of the pro-democracy opposition, 
into a „Ukraine-style revolution‟ (Hammer, 2006: 28). 
 
Another analyst suggests that the operation should be “read as symptomatic of 
various government anxieties about the loss of control of the urban population, 
irrespective of political affiliation (Harris, 2008: 40).  
The demolition of informal trading was done in tandem with the arrest of 
informal traders. The Guardian (24 May 2005) reported that over 9 400 small 
traders, informal entrepreneurs and flea market stall owners had been arrested in 
Harare as part of Operation Murambatsvina. The same article stated that the 
government accused stall owners of selling scarce commodities at inflated prices 
and of being involved in illegal foreign currency deals which were wrecking 
havoc on the economy. In 2006 a local newspaper, The Zimbabwe Independent 
(29 September 2006), reported that vendors from Mbare and Highfields high-
density suburbs, traditional opposition strongholds, had been threatened with 
withdrawal of trading licenses if they did not attend President Mugabe‟s 
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homecoming at the Harare International Airport. This shows the way in which the 
aftermath of the operation was heavily politicised and how the government sought 
to gain political control of the urban informal working class. Operation 
Murambatsvina demonstrated that “for the ruling party the emphasis of its strategy 
for the urban electorate rests largely on violence and control” (Raftopoulos, 
2007a: 37). 
Clamping down on informal economic activities and destroying informal 
stalls was ill-informed. The government did not pay due regard to the livelihoods 
of the populace in Zimbabwe, with economists estimating in 2005 that the 
informal economy may well have been generating in the region of 40 to 50 per 
cent of GDP and employing up to 60 per cent of the population (Maroleng, 2005: 
4). Operation Murambatsvina had a huge impact on earnings among those 
engaged in informal economic activities. The ZHRF estimated in a preliminary 
report in 2005 that losses may have been around US$700 million, or between 15 
and 20 per cent of GDP (ZHRF, 2005). 
In November 2006 the ZHRF (2006: 34) noted that: 
The wrecking of the informal sector will have detrimental effects at a time 
that the economy remains in serious difficulties. Apart from drastically 
increasing unemployment, the Operation will have knock-on effects on the 
formal economy including agriculture. 
 
The organisation went further to point out that the operation “must be seen as a 
deliberate destruction of the survival strategies to which Zimbabweans had to 
resort as a result of the economic decay deliberately wrought by a government 
determined to retain power irrespective of the costs imposed on others” (ZHRF, 
2006: 35). In a trenchant remark, the forum further put the issue into perspective: 
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The anti-developmental framework that has been put in place in 
Zimbabwe is the antithesis of international norms and commitments 
expected of an underdeveloped country. The interests of the few who are 
given the chance to exploit the highly distorted environment to accumulate 
wealth rapidly and entrench their control of major segments of the 
economy, are riding roughshod over the well being of the majority of 
Zimbabweans (ZHRF, 2006: 36). 
 
The operation also revealed the increased securitisation of the state in a number of 
ways, especially as it spread to most urban areas in the country to “encompass 
unapproved housing and illegal extensions to homes owned or rented by the poor, 
with armed police (together with the army) deployed to enforce eviction orders 
and government officials insisting that the victims return to their rural homes 
(Maroleng, 2005: 3). It is the “case that the unique organization and efficiency of 
the military in Zimbabwe make it the only institution capable of undertaking such 
a large-scale operation” (Maroleng, 2005: 3). Military officials were also said to 
be responsible for the brutalisation of the urban populace, who are seen as anti-
ZANU PF, and there were reports of property being confiscated and taken away 
for personal use by the members of the security establishment. 
Again, Zimbabwe‟s government did not pay attention to the calls by the 
international community to stop the illegal evictions and to rehabilitate and 
compensate those affected by the operation. On 20 June 2005, then United 
Nations (UN) secretary general Kofi Annan appointed Anna Kajumolo Tibaijuka, 
UN-Habitat‟s undersecretary and executive director, as a special envoy to head a 
fact-finding mission to Zimbabwe to evaluate the impact of Operation 
Murambatsvina. In the executive summary of the report released in New York on 
22 July 2005 it was noted that the operation had affected upwards of 2.4 million 
people. The report also made the following remarks which were quoted in the 
 121 
 
New African Magazine (2005: 22) which supported has been known to support 
President Mugabe‟s regime:  
Operation Restore Order took place at a time of persistent budget deficits, 
triple-digit inflation, critical food shortages and chronic shortages of 
foreign currency. It was implemented in a highly polarized political 
climate characterized by mistrust, fear and a lack of dialogue between 
government and local authorities, and between the former and the civil 
society. [The] operation, while purporting to target illegal dwellings and 
structures and to clamp down on illicit activities, was carried out in an 
indiscriminate and unjustified manner, with indifference to human 
suffering, and, in repeated cases, with disregard to several provisions of 
the national and international legal frameworks …. Operation Restore 
Order turned out to be a disastrous venture based on a set of colonial era 
laws and policies that were used as a tool of exclusion. There is an urgent 
need to suspend these outdated laws and to review them within the briefest 
time possible to ensure the sustainability of humanitarian response and to 
set the stage for meaningful physical reconstruction and restoration of 
livelihoods.  
 
In response to growing local and international pressure, the Zimbabwe 
government had sought to present the operation as part of a well-co-ordinated and 
well-planned exercise in “urban renewal”. On 9 July 2005 it launched Operation 
Garikayi/Hlalani Kuhle (Stay Well), in which it claimed that US300 million was 
earmarked for housing construction for the urban poor dislocated by the operation 
(Maroleng, 2005: 3). The UN special envoy reported that the government did not 
have the capacity to carry out this rehabilitation programme, and castigated the 
way in which local and international NGOs were being hampered from helping 
those who had been affected. In spite of its claims of a vision for displaced 
Zimbabwean citizens to “stay well”, the government‟s actions had enormous 
repercussions on several thousands of school-going children who were relocated 
to places far away from schools. Several thousands of people were moved to areas 
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where adequate health care was either inaccessible or non-existent, which 
especially affected those infected by HIV and AIDS (Maroleng, 2005). 
  An analyst wrote in 2005 that “even when faced with economic collapse, a 
deteriorating humanitarian situation and the increasing likelihood of social unrest, 
Zimbabwe‟s ruling elite continues to view the use of violence as a acceptable 
means in attaining its political objectives as was highlighted by Operation 
Murambatsvina” (Maroleng, 2005: 5). There has generally been a chaotic 
environment of personal self-aggrandisement among the “power elites”. The case 
of Operation Murambatsvina showed to the world the ends to which those with 
political power in Zimbabwe would go, no matter how unjust, in order to retain 
that power. The “process … provided the small group of crony businessmen, army 
officers and senior officials who support ZANU PF with enough rewards to retain 
their support and give them a vested interest in the continuation of the politics of 
disorder” (Maroleng, 2005: 5). 
The local elites with vested interests and those connected to the military 
establishment continue on the destructive and chaotic path which benefits them. A 
project officer at the Centre for Conflict Resolution in Cape Town commented in 
an article which appeared in the Cape Times on 3 June 2008 that “while the rest of 
Zimbabwe society is in crisis, those in the military and everyone connected to that 







3.5 The persistence of desperation and marginalisation in 
Zimbabwe 
 
Since operation Muramabatsvina, the situation in Zimbabwe has deteriorated even 
further in the political, social and economic realms. One analyst noted in 2007 that 
the Zimbabwean economy is the “fastest shrinking economy in the world outside 
of a war zone” (Raftopoulos, 2007b: 36). GDP per capita in 2006 was 47 per cent 
below the 1980 level and 53 per cent below the peak value of 1991 (Raftopoulos, 
2007b: 36). Estimates at the end of 2006 showed that the average minimum wages 
were “16.6% of the Poverty Datum Line, while the share of salaries in Gross 
Domestic Income declined from an average of 49% during the pre-Economic 
Structural Adjustment period 1985-1990, to 41.5% between 1991-1996, dropping 
a further 29.9% from 1997-2003” (Raftopoulos, 2007b: 36).  
Employment levels in the formal sector, the subject of much disagreement 
in Zimbabwe between the Central Statistical Office – a government body – and 
other independent bodies, went down from 1.4 million in 1998 to approximately 
950 000 by 2004. Estimations showed that in the three years since 2004 the 
situation worsened, and that 80 per cent of the Zimbabwean populace was defined 
as poor by the Central Statistical Office in 2007 (Raftopoulos, 2007b). For 
example, they could not afford most of basics in the basket of household goods as 
measured by the Consumer Council of Zimbabwe (CCZ). The “monthly wage of a 
commercial sector worker only covered about 10% of the Consumer Council of 
Zimbabwe‟s basket of household goods in June 2007” (Raftopoulos, 2007b: 36). 
In August 2007 actual inflation as estimated by independent experts was said to 
be at 15 000 per cent, while the government claimed that it was 7 600 per cent.  
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 The executive summary of the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries 
(CZI) 2008 manufacturing sector survey report (for the year ending December 
2007) concluded that “the workforce is not being paid a living wage. Transport 
costs in a number of cases were higher than the actual salaries earned by the staff” 
(CZI, 2008: 14). In the same report the CZI noted with concern that “most were 
not even earning a living wage, with low level employees earning an equivalent of 
about US$10-20 per month” at the interbank exchange rates at that time (CZI, 
2008:16). worsening food shortages and food inflation had resulted in most people 
absconding from work, and those who came to work did so to use company 
resources (phones, stationery) for their personal businesses. Most of the workers 
interviewed at the time were found to be struggling to pay school fees for their 
children (CZI, 2008). 
The situation was not helped by events earlier on in June 2007. The 
government launched Operation Reduce Prices, which worsened inflation and led 
to an upsurge in parallel black market activities for basic commodities 
(Sachikonye, 2007). Government sought to curb the increase of prices, which had 
gone up by over 300 per cent in just one week in June, and wanted business to 
reduce prices while the proposed prices were under examination by the National 
Incomes and Pricing Commission (NIPC) (Mtapuri, 2008: 50). In 2007 there was 
also increased confrontation between business and government, with the later 
arresting business leaders whose companies did not heed calls to reduce prices. 
Then Minister of Industry and International Trade Obert Mpofu argued that 
“escalating price increases were a political ploy engineered by detractors of the 
government to effect an illegal regime change against the ruling party … 
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following the failure of illegal sanctions. As a result, the government, he argued, 
could not stand idly by while the situation continued” (Mtapuri, 2008: 50).  
The government also made several other bizarre policy moves. For 
example, statutes were promulgated limiting quantities and the institution of 
import tax on those importing a wide range of basic agricultural goods which were 
(and continue to be) in shortage inside the country. These included sugar, 
margarine, vegetable oil and mielie meal. Such policy actions, together with price 
controls, resulted in commodities disappearing from supermarket shelves. Most of 
them ended up on the much more profitable parallel black market. In an piece 
headlined “Basic foodstuffs are now a hot commodity”, which appeared in the 
Mail and Guardian on 21 September 2007, a journalist interviewed Zimbabwean 
informal traders who pointed out that they sold most of the foodstuffs they 
brought in from neighbouring South Africa and Botswana on the black market 
which was thriving and had better chances of profitable returns (Banda, 2007: 24). 
At the flea market that is the subject of this study, traders were prohibited from 
selling foodstuffs by the management of the market. Some traders did report that 
they sold basic foodstuffs from home and some did occasionally bring these to the 
market but did not display them. These were hidden and clandestinely sold from 
bags. 
 Food shortages in Zimbabwe have become much more widespread, with 
estimates that 1.4 million people were facing hunger in August 2007 (Sachikonye, 
2007: 39). The situation has worsened in recent times. Water and power cuts, 
which have been ongoing, were affecting the economy, especially industry, with 
some enterprises operating at 30 per cent capacity (Sachikonye, 2007). Several 
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businesses have shut down. Indications showed that July 2008 inflation was at a 
record-shattering 231 million per cent (Financial Gazette, 22 January 2009). 
There has also been a partial “dollarisation” of the economy – which had been 
well under way informally – with the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe issuing 1 000 
licenses authorising certain shops and warehouses across the country to sell goods 
in foreign currency such as US dollars. This partial dollarisation of the economy 
has made the situation worse for those companies that failed to secure licenses.  
In the foreword of the CZI manufacturing sector survey report for 2007, 
one industry expert noted that “the manufacturing sector continues to bleed under 
a plethora of conflicting policy initiatives which are neither coherent nor long 
lasting” (Mafukidze, 2008: 8). In January 2009 a Zimbabwean business 
newspaper, reported that some “companies may fail to open after the traditional 
annual shutdown as a result of the hostile operating environment blighting the 
Zimbabwean economy” (Financial Gazette, 22 January, 2009). Some businesses 
that failed to secure licenses chose to break the law. The paper reported that many 
charged for goods and services in foreign currency, but that there “still remains a 
significant portion of the economy which is law abiding that is now teetering on 
the verge of collapse” (Financial Gazette, 22 January, 2009). 
The CZI had already warned that “Zimbabwe‟s manufacturing sector risks 
being swept aside if it does not regroup and strategise” in its manufacturing 
survey report (CZ1, 2007: 5). The report also noted with concern that investment 
in the manufacturing sector in real terms was continuing to go down and “firms 
are doing the bare minimum required to keep their plants running with little or no 
meaningful effort towards upgrading existing machines and technology” (CZI, 
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2007: 5). In general, the manufacturing sector, along with other sectors, has taken 
a heavy blow from the economic crisis and consequently there have been negative 
repercussions on the lives of working-class people, with the majority now eking 
out some sort of living by engaging in informal economic activities. People 
engaging in informal economic activities as a protective moat against the “tide” of 
economic collapse is not a new phenomenon. Obviously as the economy has 
worsened more and more people, even those lucky few who still have formal 
sector jobs, have had to find alternative means of survival as the value of the local 
currency has sunk even further in recent times. The country that was once the 




This chapter has traced the contours of Zimbabwe‟s socio-economic and political 
trajectory from independence up to recent times. The current crisis is best seen as 
having multiple origins. Among them are the uneasy alliance encapsulated in the 
Lancaster House Agreement at independence – especially with regard to land 
reform – the neo-liberalisation project in the 1990s, corruption, economic 
mismanagement, political repression, the chaotic land reform exercise and the 
intransigence of the ZANU PF elite vis-à-vis an inclusive government with the 
opposition. Also, one of the contentious issues in the settlement, land, was not 
tackled as vigorously as it should have been by both sides and it did not help that 
the government of the newly independent country could not move on the issue 
because of the parameters set in the Lancaster House Constitution. Land reform 
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remained a contentious issue up until the land invasions led by the war veterans, 
and still is today. 
The impact of the crisis in its totality has been the violent strain imposed 
on the lives of most ordinary Zimbabweans. Many of them, skilled and unskilled, 
who cannot migrate on a permanent basis, have resorted to engaging in informal 
economic activities in order to make a living. The lives of traders in the informal 
segment of the economy have not been made any easier with the government 
engaging in questionable and sometimes bizarre policy decisions and 
implementations, like the violent and unjust Operation Muramabatsvina, which 
had negative consequences for the majority of informal traders. The government 
has also fought regular battles with some of the traders. For instance, they were 
accused of being the cause of the economic downturn by engaging in illegal black 
market activities like the buying and selling of foreign currency and scarce basic 
commodities. 
Many employed and unemployed Zimbabweans have come to live very 
desperate and marginalised lives, and the cholera outbreak in 2008 was a stark 
reminder of that desperation and marginalisation. The argument in this 
dissertation is that, despite the economic collapse in Zimbabwe and the country 
being ostracised by the international community, the economic activities that 
traders engage in are connected to the region and to the globe in very innovative 
but at the same time desperate and unequal ways.  
While there were massive gains in a broad set of social indicators in the 
first decade of independence, the improvement in these indicators was funded by 
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borrowing from international financial institutions who would later insist on 
economic restructuring that would trigger the crisis in the country.  
Of course, it is important not to characterise all the problems that 
Zimbabwe has encountered as having their origins in the economic restructuring 
directed by the international financial institutions in the global North. In the case 
of Zimbabwe it was a mixture of external and local forces that led to the eruption 
of what has come to be commonly referred to as the “Zimbabwean crisis”. The 
local forces, whose contours have been traced in some sections of this chapter, 
plunged the country into an abyss following the implementation of the Economic 
Structural Adjustment Programme. At the end of January 2009 the main 
opposition leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, agreed to join the proposed government of 
national unity (GNU). It remains to be seen whether there will be considerable 
changes in the trajectory of policy (economic, social and political) and in the 
fortunes of the country, and above all whether there will be any considerable 
changes in the precarious lives of the local populace, some of whom are the 











The previous chapter located this study in the Zimbabwean crisis which is 
propelling increasing numbers of people into the informal segment of the 
economy. Firstly, this chapter briefly describes the flea market which is the focus 
of the study and contextualises it within informal economic activities and other 
markets in urban Harare and the broader Zimbabwean crisis. It is important to 
acknowledge that informal trading at the market is only one of a wide range of 
adaptive strategies that those facing tough economic conditions in Zimbabwe take 
up to survive. Secondly, the chapter identifies four types of traders based on the 
goods that they sell. Thirdly, there is a brief discussion of the socio-economic 
characteristics of the customers who frequent the market. Finally, the chapter 
reports on and analyses the socio-economic characteristics of traders based largely 
on data gathered from 70 “own account workers”.  
The work histories and operations of some traders demonstrate the 
linkages that exist between the formal and informal parts of a single economy. 
That some of the traders have operations in both sectors illustrates that the two are 
not two separate economies but are part of a single, deeply segmented economy 
(Webster, Benya et al., 2008) in which those in the informal part of the economy 
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are largely excluded from decent work.
22
 Traders‟ work histories also reveal their 
movement between the formal and informal (churning). Money and various other 
commodities also move between the formal and the informal parts of the 
economy.  
Traders are not isolated individuals. They are involved in a variety of 
social networks in carrying out informal economic activities. Social networks here 
refer to “informal forms of economic organization” (Meagher, 2006: 553). These 
“non-state forms of organization constitute what are referred to as … informal 
„economic networks‟” (Meagher, 2006: 559). That they are non-state forms of 
organisation is not coterminous with implying that they do not interact with the 
state (Meagher, 2005). Chapter 5 will go into greater detail on how traders often 
have to interact with state regulation, even if in an indirect manner. 
 The analysis of informal traders‟ socio-economic characteristics is 
grounded in the Zimbabwean crisis as a way of demonstrating the impact of the 
involution of the economy on, among other things, the experiences and 
circumstances of the traders and their way of life, and their reasons for engaging 
in informal businesses. Obviously issues like gender, educational status, family 
circumstances and the kind of assets (i.e. social assets, economic assets) 
necessarily mean that the impacts and responses to the economic involution are 
differential. Everyone has been affected in one way or another, largely in a 
negative manner, particularly as the Zimbabwean economy has worsened in more 
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 In its Decent Work Agenda the International Labour Organisation (2008) sets out four strategic 
objectives: (1) the attainment of full employment; (2) the entrenchment of workers’ rights, 
whether it be in the formal economy or the informal economy; (3) social protection aimed at 
bringing different levels of protection, including for those in the informal economy; and (4) the 
establishment of social dialogue as an institution for solving conflicts. The majority of traders 
interviewed fell outside these four strategic objectives. 
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recent times. Across the globe there has been a troubling trend towards the 
“privatization of previously socialized institutions associated with provisioning 
for social reproduction” (Bakker and Gill, 2003b: 19). This, as it applies to 
Zimbabwe, will also be analysed in this chapter. 
An analysis of the socio-economic characteristics of the traders reveals 
that their life experiences in most cases mirror the twists and turns taken by the 
Zimbabwean economy. Most of the traders expressed disillusionment and 
dissatisfaction with their lives. This does not mean, however, that traders have 
been helpless in the face of the economic collapse. The multiplicity of responses 
among the Zimbabwean populace in general, and the traders in particular, reveal a 
certain level of creative energy which debunks some of the stereotypical images, 
especially in the visual and print media, regionally and abroad, which portray 
Zimbabweans as helpless victims in the face of economic difficulties and political 
repression.
23
 One analyst remarks that, “the creativity, energy, inventiveness and 
entrepreneurship demonstrated in the informal economy is impressive” (Overa, 
2005: 1). 
This dissertation, however, seeks to emphasise that traders connect to the 
“global” through their activities. For example, some traders have been able to 
carve a niche in the buying and selling of second-hand clothes which have their 
origins in advanced capitalist countries. They acquire these from Mozambique and 
Zambia. Also, the DVD and video game traders connect to the globe through the 
Internet, where they download content from piracy websites and then sell this at 
                                                 
23
 SABC 3, in its weekly Special Assignment TV programme, has in the past screened several 
episodes in which images of Zimbabweans as helpless victims abound. Popular are images of 
Zimbabweans scaling the Beitbridge border fence into South Africa to escape economic collapse, 
images of urban dwellers being attacked by police and the military, and many others. Admittedly, 
many people are victims in the current crisis. 
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the market. Another global connector is the remittances that some traders receive 
from within and outside the continent in times of hardship, when their ventures 
may not be doing particularly well. 
 
4.2 The city of Harare 
 
The market that is the subject of this study is situated in Harare, the capital city of 
Zimbabwe which is located in the north east of the country (Figure 4.1).  
 
                             
 




Zimbabwe has a total area of 390 759 square kilometres and an estimated 
population of 13.12 million people (IOM, 2009). Adult HIV prevalence was 
estimated at 15.6 per cent in 2007 (UN, 2008). In 2001 HIV prevalence was 
estimated at 26.5 per cent, in 2003 at 23.2 per cent, and in 2005 at 19.4 (UN 
2008). These estimates show that HIV prevalence has been decreasing. The World 
Bank (2009) put the life expectancy of the population at 45.1 years in 2008, down 
from its peak level of 61.4 years in 1987.  
The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme did affect the health 
delivery system in the 1990s, as shown in the previous chapter, and this could be 
one of the contributing factors in the decline of the life expectancy. In recent years 
there has also been a massive exodus of health professionals to neighbouring 
countries and to other international destinations, and this has worsened health 
delivery, especially in the public sector (Gaidzanwa, 1999; Chikanda, 2004).  
In 2006 Harare had an estimated population of 2.6 million people, with 
some 1.8 million in its metropolitan area (USAID, cited in Muronda, 2008). Cities 
in the developing world are “beset by grave physical, financial, and management 
shortcomings that endanger the hopes, and even the health, of their swelling 
populations (Annez and Friendly, 1996: 12). Many of these problems have also 
beset Harare. In the recent past there have been power cuts, and residential areas 
have been known to go for weeks without power. Many of the traders interviewed 
in 2007 and 2008 mentioned that some of the high-density areas they lived in only 
had power for about two or three hours a day, and some no power at all. In 2007 
Harare was also infamous for its burst sewer pipes which contaminated water 
sources, and residents in both the high and low density suburbs complained that 
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they had intermittent water supply. A majority of traders interviewed confirmed 
that they faced these problems. Cities in the developing world are also beset by 
transport problems and urban dwellers face long commuting times to get to work 
(Annez and Friendly, 1996). In the case of Harare, it inherited problems arising 
from “the historical tragedy of locating African housing estates a considerable 
distance from workplaces” (Chikowore, 1993: 4) and this, as shown later, has 
negative impacts on traders in the present conjuncture. 
Harare is a “product of a settler colonial political economy” (Rakodi, 
1995: 8) which “emphasized differentiation, domination and accumulation” 
(Raftopoulos and Yoshikuni, 1999: 3). It was founded in September 1890 “when 
the Pioneer Column of White settlers organized by the British South Africa (BSA) 
Company terminated its march at the site of the present city” (Zinyama, 1993:8). 
The central business district (CBD) is laid out in “grid street pattern” and most 
residential areas are to the north, east and west (Figure 4.2).  
From its founding, Harare was a racially divided city with white 
residential areas to the north of the CBD and far away from the industrial areas 
(Zinyama, 1993). Black suburbs, where most of the black working class who 
provided cheap labour lived, tended to be located closer to the industrial areas. 
“As in formal apartheid towns, black people were forced by law to reside in 
underdeveloped conditions to the south and the west of the city … consistent with 
the direction of ill winds blowing though the industrial sites which lay between 
the black townships … and the CBD” (Bond, 1999: 187). The black suburbs are 





Source (Zinyama, 1993: 10) 
 
Figure 4.2: Land use patterns in Greater Harare 
 
The earliest development of a black residential area in Harare dates back to 1907 
when Mbare, the oldest township, was first occupied. Mbare was developed for all 
those blacks not living within the employers‟ premises and was deemed by 
colonial standards of the time, at 2.5 km south west of the town centre, far enough 
from white residences (Zinyama, 1993). Between 1907 and 1979 there developed, 





 The residential areas were located in areas where land 
for future expansion was limited. Consequently, future residential areas would be 
located further and further away from the city. 
The development in the 1970s of urban complexes like Chitungwiza, 25 
kilometres south of Harare, was a result of the colonial government‟s “decision to 
pursue forcefully policies similar to those of Apartheid South Africa” (Zinyama, 
1993: 26). Also, land for expansion of black residential areas was unavailable in 
the more established black areas. As a result, the black population was located in 
areas further from the CBD which had inadequate road networks. Some traders 
lived in townships far away from the market, such as Chitungwiza, and as a result 
faced regular transport problems.  
After 1980 the post-independence government was responsible for the 
development of other residential areas in collaboration with USAID and the 
World Bank (Zinyama, 1993). A variety of what were called “people‟s markets”, 
where commodities ranging from vegetables to clothes were sold, developed in 
some of these areas. These markets provided goods and services to those living 
there and in the surrounding areas. 
In the present conjuncture, because of congestion in some of these high-
density areas, there have been problems with providing adequate amenities and 
infrastructure. The congestion in cities like Harare can be understood in the 
context of urbanisation across much of the developing world, as shown in Table 
4.1. 
                                                 
24
 These black residential areas were Highfield (established 1935), Mabvuku (1952), Mufakose 
(1959), Rugare (mid 1950s), Dzivarasekwa (1961), Marimba Park (1961), Kambuzuma (1964), 
Tafara (1967), Glen Norah (1971), and Glen View (1979) (Zinyama, 1993). 
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Latin America and the Caribbean 74 78 1.7 
Asia 35 41 2.4 
Africa 34 39 3.2 
East Africa 22 23 3.7 
Middle Africa 33 41 4.1 
North Africa 46 52 2.6 
Southern Africa 48 57 1.0 
West Africa 37 44 3.7 
Source: Skinner, 2008. 
 
Over half of the population in southern Africa is urbanised. In Zimbabwe a 
declining agricultural base, social and political turmoil, and economic collapse 
have in the recent past pushed people into the urban areas. Some have been 
displaced beyond the country‟s borders into neighbouring countries such as 
Botswana and South Africa. In terms of housing in cities such as Harare, the 
supply does not meet demand. There are also issues with transport, as is the case 
in most African cities. The traders interviewed had difficulties with transport from 
the high-density areas, where a majority of them stayed, to the market. Some of 
the problems encountered by inhabitants of the city have historical origins and can 
be traced back to segregationist practices of the colonial regime, where the black 
population lived in congested, under-serviced areas while the white population 






4.3 Flea markets in Harare: an overview 
 
The eight existing flea markets in Harare have to be understood in the context of 
what has, for over a decade, been an economy in crisis. Before Operation 
Murambatsvina there had been an explosion of flea market activities in Harare, 
especially on the periphery of the CBD. In a 1998 study Mupedziswa and Gumbo 
(1998) suggest that the motivation to establish flea market operations in the 1990s 
may have been due to the impacts of structural adjustment. In their analysis, the 
authors divided the flea markets into three categories: those serving the high-
income groups, like the Sam Levy Flea Market in the Borrowdale residential area; 
those serving the middle class, such as the Union Avenue and Speke Avenue flea 
markets which were mainly located in the city centre; and those serving the lower-
income groups with very little disposable income, which were located at the 
periphery of the city. 
After Operation Murambatsvina the two city centre flea markets were 
permanently closed. These had been the only flea markets in the CBD. Some of 
the flea markets in the periphery were permanently shut down while others 
reopened. Six flea markets remain outside the CBD at present, and there are still 
two flea markets in two low-density residential areas. The closure of some flea 
markets put pressure on space as all the traders could not possibly be allocated 
stalls in the limited spots available.  
 In their study Mupedziswa and Gumbo (1998) indicate that flea markets 
provide a range of goods, from clothing and hair products to electronic gadgets. 
The authors link the growth of flea markets in Harare to the proliferation of cross-
border trading in the 1990s. Women cross-border traders approached the “city 
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fathers” and asked for the establishment of markets that were closer to the city, 
similar to the Mupedzanhamo clothing flea market in the Mbare suburb which 
was established in 1991 and which is still very popular with poor people even 
today (Mupedziswa and Gumbo, 1998). The attacks during Operation 
Murambatsvina show the contradictory nature of government policy towards flea 
market operations given that it was through the aegis of local government that flea 
markets were originally set up.  
 
4.4 The flea market: the case 
 
The market used as a case for this study is located in a small shopping area that is 
a site for middle-class – what is left of it – and upper-class consumption. Imported 
second-hand, high-end cars can frequently be spotted there, as can individuals in 
branded clothing eating in the few expensive restaurants that are still in business. 
Patrons can be seen in a few specialist shops dealing in bed linen, home décor 
accessories, high-end shoe repairs and expensive gifts. Most of the local 
Zimbabwean banks have branches in the area that service clientele from all walks 
of life. Some customers of these banks seem to prefer coming to the shopping area 
because they see it as less congested than Harare‟s CBD.  
It is a well-established flea market and most people from Harare and 
outside know it. In the present conjuncture the flea market serves a wide spectrum 
of people from the low income, to the high income, to the young, to the old. This 
market, like most markets throughout Africa, is a social as well as an 
economic space. Commercial exchanges occur but it is also where social and 
personal transactions are negotiated (see Cook, 2008): news is exchanged, gossip 
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is shared and heated discussions of contemporary local politics take place like 
other informal markets in Africa For example, a study of trading at an informal 
market in Senegal showed that relationships which went beyond economic 
exchange were nurtured between customers and traders, and amongst traders 
(Bass, 2000).   
 Traders selling new clothes and shoes and second-hand clothes can be 
found at this market, just like other flea markets in Harare. These goods attract 
lower, middle and high income buyers. Unlike other markets, the case used here 
has an established reputation for its range of arts and crafts which are popular with 
some tourists. DVDs and video games can be found at other flea markets in 
Harare but traders at this particular flea market are known for stocking the more 
recent material. This market also has a larger cohort of traders selling a variety of 
second-hand books, unlike other markets where sometimes there are only one or 
two traders who deal mostly in second-hand school textbooks.   
 The space that is used as a flea market is an unused parking lot owned by a 
white Zimbabwean who is presently living in the United States. Traders who have 
a recollection of early days when the flea market was established, around 1995, 
knew this and noted that the owner of the market does visit occasionally. This is 
another example of a global connector where money moves from the local to 
locations outside the country. The black male Zimbabwean in charge of the day-
to-day running of the market flatly refused to give any interviews and neither was 
he willing to enter into conversation about the owner of the market. A request for 
records about the turnover at the market and the numbers of traders was 
categorically refused. Some traders maintained that this was because he was 
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misappropriating funds and siphoning them off for his own personal use since the 
owner of the market is mainly absent. Other traders allege that, unknown to the 
owner of the market, some of markets stalls are not on the records. It is the money 
from these stalls that the manager misappropriates, they alleged. 
 In the middle of 2008 there were 150 open stalls at the market, based on an 
actual physical count. This was down from 180 at the beginning of 2007. The 
number of stalls sometimes went up to 200 in 2007, especially on Fridays and on 
weekends, especially on Saturday and during major public holidays. Traders 
indicated that as the economic situation worsened some people completely shut 
down their stalls, and this could account for the variation in the number of stalls 
operating on different days. Others said that some traders no longer opened their 
stalls on a daily basis because of the drop in business, so that they could save on 
rental money. These traders would only come on weekends or in some cases at the 
end of the month when people got their salaries. Between 2007 and the first half 
of 2008 traders paid on average an equivalent of ZAR25-30 per day for using the 
space from Monday to Friday, roughly ZAR50-60 on Saturday, depending on the 
movements of the Zimbabwean dollar, and about an equivalent of ZAR30-40 to 
use the space on Sundays.
25
 
 On a good day the majority of traders estimated that some 200 adult 
customers came through the market. Some put the estimate at 150 and others at 
100. Not all of them purchased something, according to the traders. There are 
those who just milled around the market, perhaps doing some “window 
                                                 
25
 These figures are based on estimates. Before its scrapping the Zimbabwean dollar had become 
virtually useless and unconvertible on the international currency markets. Estimates here are based 
on converting the Zimbabwean dollar equivalent to the rand in a distorted economy. The usual 
caveats of either over-reporting or under-reporting by traders apply. 
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shopping”. Some were looking to change their foreign currency or perhaps to 
“mop up” the currency that was available. Foreign currency dealers looked for 
notes to purchase, no matter how small. They bought these from traders who sold 
some of their goods for hard currency or from customers who wanted to change 
their money. Other people at the market were there to purchase illegal substances, 
the most popular being cannabis. While most traders were unwilling to identify 
those that sold illegal substances, they mentioned that it was an open secret that 
cannabis was available at the market. Traders also remarked that pornography 
(visual and print) could be purchased at the market if one looked hard enough. 
Other traders pointed out that there were also a few individuals peddling precious 
stones from Zimbabwe‟s eastern highlands where there has been a major diamond 
find which is being exploited by small-scale illegal miners who are said to sell to 
the political and business elite. 
 This study focuses on traders dealing in (1) clothes (broadly defined to 
include footwear, clothes for small children and other related accessories), those 
dealing in (2) second-hand books and magazines, those in the (3) African arts and 
crafts trade, and those dealing in (4) DVDs, and video games. These are the most 
widely available goods at the market, hence the focus in this study on the traders 
dealing in these commodities.  
There are days when traders who sell other goods (such as toiletries for 
men and women, bathroom mats, napkins for small children) can also be found at 
the market but many of these traders are transient and operate irregularly. One 
such female trader, in informal conversation on a Saturday morning in December 
2007, indicated that she was at the market to raise a bit of money to contribute 
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towards the passport application fees for a brother who wanted to go to South 
Africa to work odd jobs. This trader was selling women‟s hair products which she 
got from a sister working as a domestic worker in South Africa. The trader only 
traded for one other day and that was the last I saw of her at the market. 
At the market there are also regular ambulant hawkers selling cooked 
and/or uncooked mielies and various kinds of fruit in season. A young boy or girl 
selling “freezits,” flavoured drinks packaged in 250ml plastic packs and left to 
freeze, which are popular for cooling oneself in summer, also add to the hustle 
and bustle of the market. They sell to many of the traders and also to customers 
who frequent the market. Some of the food items sold by these hawkers are an 
important part of the diet of traders who cannot afford the expensive, more 
nutritious food. Hawkers also made stops at the stalls of their regular customers 
and joked with them or gave the traders important information concerning an 
obscure shop in town stocking some few basic commodities at reasonable prices. 
This shows how the market sometimes serves as a site for the exchange of crucial 
information. 
 It is important to acknowledge that trading at the market is one of a 
multiplicity of informal economic activities that Zimbabweans engage in, as a 
way of dealing with the economic collapse. Other informal economic activities 
include the buying and selling of foreign currency on the black market, selling 
scarce basic commodities imported from regional countries such as South Africa 
and Botswana and some intermittently hoarded from a few local supermarkets, 
street hawking of cooked foodstuffs, backyard welding and small furniture 
manufacturing industries, the buying and selling of diesel and petrol which was 
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scarce in the country, buying and selling a variety goods from across the border 
such as printers and computer consumables to local companies, and a variety of 
other activities. As asserted by Chimedza (2008: 89), the “informalised or 
„peripheral‟ economy supplies everything efficiently almost without fail”. In the 
case of Zimbabwe it is not so much peripheral but rather “the economy”. 
At the market some traders reported that some of their customers were 
people who were involved in the illegal informal mining of precious minerals 
which were sold to middle men in South Africa, Botswana and Zambia. The most 
talked-about mineral was diamonds.
26
 Before the “dollarisation” of the economy, 
which effectively made the Zimbabwean dollar obsolete, buying and selling 
foreign currency was a very popular way of making a living in Zimbabwe. In 
gossip circles around the flea market, some of the most powerful political figures 
in Zimbabwe were widely believed to be heading cartels dominating the trade in 
hard currency and diamonds. The economic crisis essentially made Zimbabwe a 
“nation of traders” as a majority of the populace bought and sold anything that it 





                                                 
26
 The Marange diamond fields in Eastern Zimbabwe have been the most talked about since the 
discovery of diamonds there in June 2006. Many influential politicians have been implicated in the 
buying and smuggling of diamonds illegally mined from the fields. In 2008, Human Rights Watch 
in its report titled Diamonds in the Rough: Human Rights Abuses in the Marange Diamond Fields 
of Zimbabwe reported on human rights abuses in the area which had since been taken over by the 
military. The intelligence infrastructure was also implicated in some of the atrocities in the area. 
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4.5 The traders: Profile 1 – precariousness and disillusionment 
in the Sunshine City
27
 (Tanaka’s story) 
 
Tanaka is 26 years old and is typical of many of the 70 traders interviewed at the 
market. He is married with one small child and he rents a back room in a Harare 
high-density suburb south west of the CBD for the equivalent of ZAR100, where 
he stays with his wife and child. These are his only dependents at the moment. He 
got information about the availability of a place to rent through his only sibling, a 
sister who is married and stays in another high-density suburb close to the one 
where Tanaka lives. Tanaka is fortunate that his landlord still accepts rent in 
Zimbabwe dollars. Some of his friends have not been so fortunate. Tanaka studied 
for O-Levels but failed the qualifying exam. His wife, who is 19 years old, hopes 
to sit for her O-Levels again once the distractions of raising a baby have passed. 
Tanaka worked two formal jobs, one as a loader and then as a supervisor, before 
deciding to open up a stall at the flea market using savings from his last 
supervisory job.  
Tanaka started off buying and selling sneakers from South Africa but he 
now gets his merchandise from neighbouring Botswana because its visa regime is 
less restrictive than that of South Africa. He buys sneakers for the equivalent of 
ZAR80 and sells them at the market for the equivalent of about ZAR160. Tanaka 
sometimes goes for several days or as much as two weeks without selling 
anything. His income is precarious and highly unpredictable, like that of most 
traders. Sometimes he makes the equivalent of just over ZAR320 in a single 
month, which is equivalent to two pairs of sneakers. His wife and child largely 
                                                 
27
 Harare was once referred to as the “Sunshine City”, not only because of the sunny climate for 
most of the year but its orderly structure. 
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depend on him. This has been compounded by the fact that his wife had to leave 
her job as a shop assistant to breastfeed their small child. They cannot afford a 
child minder. Tanaka complains constantly about the unavailability of basic 
commodities at affordable prices, and also about the terrible transport situation in 
Harare. 
He feels despondent about his position, and over the years he has resigned 
himself to the fact that he will always be a lodger. Affording property is now out 
of reach for most ordinary Zimbabweans. Recently his child fell ill with a rash. He 
does not have medical aid so he had to pay cash for the doctor, including what he 
feels was an exorbitant price for the medication. He is worried that if he falls 
seriously ill he will not be able to afford hospitalisation fees and he will be unable 
to work for his young family. He does not have an emergency fund to fall back on 
in case of such unforeseen events. Saving money has become very difficult in 
Zimbabwe‟s hyperinflationary environment, he says. 
Tanaka‟s first job was as a loader at a company manufacturing feed for 
animals. After the expiry of his contract Tanaka moved to a cooking oil 
manufacturing company. His job was in the packaging department. It was much 
the same as the previous job, and involved moving products from the line, 
packaging them and loading them onto trucks for delivery. He was later promoted 
to being a supervisor of the loaders and got a salary increase. On taking up his 
supervisory role he also began participating in worker‟s committee meetings. 
According to him these had very little influence at the company. For instance, 
people were sometimes dismissed arbitrarily without a hearing, and the workers‟ 
committee could do nothing about it. The promotion entitled him to take his tea in 
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the company kitchen; he brought his own lunch, unlike some other supervisory 
staff. Though he cannot remember how much he got paid at the factory, he 
maintains that it was reasonable enough at the time. He could afford most basics 
and even bought some food items for his parents, who have both since passed on. 
He also managed to accumulate some savings in the bank then. According to him, 
“things were not bad in Zimbabwe”.  
Disillusioned with the trajectory of his career and facing almost zero 
prospects of meaningful promotion because he lacked any qualifications, Tanaka 
resigned from his job in early 2002. The situation in Zimbabwe was worsening at 
the time. Tanaka invested his meagre savings from his formal job to set up a stall 
at one of the urban flea markets in Harare. He specialised in buying and selling 
sneakers, which he still does. Tanaka is ambivalent about whether it was a good 
idea to have invested his money in this particular business. His money is invested 
in his stock at the market. He feels, however, that it is much better to be his own 
boss as he can dictate “the pace of things”. Tanaka‟s life has not changed much. 
Like most traders he finds himself living day to day, “from hand to mouth”. 
Life is a constant struggle for Tanaka, and though he sometimes makes 
100 per cent profit if a customer does not haggle for a discount, which is very 
rare, he is not selling enough for the profit to make a huge impact on his life. He 
still rents the same room that he moved into as a bachelor. He notes that if he had 
not moved to the flea market he would not have been able to afford to pay lobola 
for his wife, and neither would he be able to look after his child. Though he does 
not sound totally convinced, he says life is “all right” because he can at least 
afford to buy some meat sometimes, which has become a luxury in Zimbabwe, 
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and he can have a beer at the end of the day at a nearby bottle store before he goes 
home, provided he has had “a good day at the market”.  
He feels that being able to dictate his own working hours is a positive 
thing. He is solely responsible for managing his stall at the flea market, though on 
some occasions he will leave a close friend at the market to look after the stall 
when he goes for a three-day trip to source goods. If he does not have much stock 
he shuts down operations for the time he is away on such a trip. On some days, 
which are far between, he gloats that he can make enough money to buy a few 
pints of beer for some of his friends that he went to school with and who went up 
to university but have no jobs at the moment. Tanaka is very contemptuous of 
civil servants, especially teachers, whom he feels wasted time by getting a higher 
education because they “earn peanuts.” However, Tanaka complains that his 
income has been much more irregular recently, and though it makes sense to ask 
customers to pay in foreign currency because of hyperinflation, most either cannot 
pay or do not want to pay for shoes in foreign currency.  
His income now varies between nothing to ZIM$450 000 and sometimes 
ZIM$900 000 per week, depending on his sales. ZIM$450 000 was equivalent to 
the price of one pair of shoes, and later to the price of two pairs. Sometimes this 
was all he would sell for a whole week. When I talked to Tanaka again later in 
2007 he complained that things were getting worse. Basic commodities were 
unavailable in the shops, and they were very expensive on the black market. Some 
of the peddlers of these commodities insisted on payment in either rand or the US 
dollar. Most traders now combine business trips to South Africa with shopping for 
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groceries, and it is common to send a friend, kin or a fellow trader with money to 
buy a few manageable groceries.  
Tanaka is worried that with “the way things are going” his business might 
collapse. While some of his friends have joined the Great Trek to South Africa, he 
feels that with his failed O-Level he will not be able to find a “good paying job”. 
He also feels that he has been his own boss and has not worked for anybody for a 
very long time, and so he will find it very difficult to adjust. He believes that 
moving to South Africa or Botswana is for those who have qualifications or who 
have relatives on the other side that can set them up in the first few days while 
they are looking for a job. He does not have any contacts with close relatives 
except for his sister who has an irregular job doing laundry for families in a low-
density northern suburb. At the market Tanaka has social networks with other 
traders. He sometimes looks after the stalls of his friends when they travel to 
source their goods and, together with these traders, they contribute to buying 
lunch which they share among themselves. 
Tanaka mourns the fact that inflation makes it difficult to save any money. 
The cost of everything from transport and fees is spiralling upward on a daily 
basis. He sums up this point by saying: “You cannot afford to be sick in 
Zimbabwe these days. Even if you have the money you might find that the doctor 
is not there or there is no medication at the pharmacies. That‟s if you can actually 
afford to get to the hospital.” Tanaka feels that his life hangs on the edge. His is a 
very precarious existence. The themes that emerge from his biography are 
common among many Zimbabweans and particularly among a broad spectrum of 
the traders at the market where he is based.  
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Like most Zimbabweans, traders like Tanaka are concerned about issues 
like their inability to accumulate savings in the current crisis, the fact that they do 
not have unemployment benefits, and their irregular and unpredictable incomes. 
Traders and most Zimbabweans, it seems, share a sense of disillusionment with 
the trajectory of their lives, particularly the chances of them amounting to 
somebody in the current economy. Like Tanaka, many Zimbabweans have no 
hopes of owning property. It is simply out of the reach of most people. Traders, 
like other urban dwellers, live in areas where it is difficult to travel to work. Water 
and sanitation are inadequate and many traders live in rented lodgings where they 
are at the mercy of landlords who may increase rents or may evict them at short 
notice. Zimbabweans who still have jobs earn wages which cannot assure them a 
secure existence. They live precarious lives, in precarious times. This 
precariousness is a key characteristic of the informal traders studied.  
Across the globe precarious work has become a major challenge 
(Kalleberg, 2008). Most of the literature on precariousness (Kalleberg, 2008; 
Webster, Benya et al., 2008) has tended to refer mainly to workers in formal 
employment. Precarious work creates “…insecurity for many people and has far 
reaching, pervasive consequences not only for the nature of work, workplaces, 
and people‟s experiences, but also for many non-work individual (e.g., stress, 
education) and social (e.g., family, community) outcomes, as well as for political 
instability” (Kalleberg, 2008: 2). Zimbabwe, which went through massive 
deindustrialisation in the late 1990s because of ESAP (Bond, 1998; Bond and 
Manyanya, 2003) and the recent economic collapse (Raftopoulos, 2007a; 
Sachikonye, 2007) shows similar pathways, like political instability and increased 
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insecurity. Across the globe the poor and the working class are increasingly 
becoming insecure because of economic restructuring and other crises. In 
Zimbabwe the social characteristics of traders reflect the crisis in the country. 
 
4.6 Social characteristics of traders (part 1) 
 
4.6.1 Age and family status 
 
The ages of the traders interviewed ranged from 19 years to 63 years. Although 
the majority of the traders interviewed were aged between 19 years and 35 years, 
there was a greater concentration of respondents in the early 20s to early 30s age 
group. Forty-six of the respondents were men and 24 of them women. Men were 
over-represented in the arts and crafts trade, in the second-hand book and 
magazine trade, and in the DVD and video games categories. Peberdy (2000), in a 
study on immigrant traders in the arts and crafts trade in South Africa, some of 
them from Zimbabwe, reported an over-representation of men in this trade. 
Generally, among those who reported themselves as own account workers, 
who are the subject of this thesis, men are over-represented. In contrast, using 
national data from a set of five developing countries, Chen, Vanek and Heintz 
(2006) argue that in the informal economy (in non-agricultural employment), 
women are more likely to be own account workers, domestic workers and unpaid 
workers in family businesses. On the other hand, men were more likely to be 
employers and wage workers. It is important to note that the data reported here is 
based on a sample that was purposively generated, so broad generalisations should 
be made with caution.  
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While this study uses a mainly qualitative case study method through 
purposive and snowballing sampling, which would make comparisons with 
national data analyses from other developing countries spurious, the method used 
here may reveal different dynamics in developing countries with moribund 
economies like Zimbabwe where most of the population has been and continues to 
be dispossessed and where males are often regarded, in “traditional African 
culture”, as the breadwinners. The males interviewed often use this breadwinner 
trope to explain their motivation to set up informal enterprises. These males saw 
themselves as the breadwinners, and saw it as their responsibility to take care of 
their spouses, siblings, children or other dependents. On the other hand, females 
who were single, divorced or unmarried also saw themselves as the breadwinners 
of their families. Those traders who “are doing it for themselves” – that is, those 
who do not work for anyone but themselves – are often highly regarded at the 
market. They themselves regard owning their own operations, no matter how 
modest they may be, as far better than being engaged as waged workers, formal or 
informal, in the current conditions in Zimbabwe. 
Of the 70 traders interviewed, 11 were in the arts and crafts trade, of which 
9 were male and 2 female; 37 traders were in the clothes and related trading 
business, of which 18 were male and 19 female; 10 traders were in the second-
hand book and magazine trading, of which 7 were male and 3 were female; and 12 
were in the DVD and video games trade, all of them male. All of the traders at the 
flea market in the arts and crafts, second-hand book and magazine trading, and 
DVD and video games trade were interviewed and all of them regarded 
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themselves as own account workers. They owned their operations and they 
predominantly provided the labour for the running of their stalls. 
 Of the female arts and crafts traders, one was married and the other 
widowed. Of the male traders, five were married and four were single. Of the 
female clothes traders, seven were married, ten were single and two were 
widowed. Of the male clothes traders, eight were married, nine were single and 
one was widowed. One female book and magazine trader gave her marital status 
as single and two as widowed. The male book and magazine traders were almost 
split in half, with three of them married and four single. Among the DVD and 
video games traders (all of them male), three were married and nine single. In the 
whole sample, eight females were married compared to 19 males, 11 females 
compared to 26 males were single, and five females were widowed compared to 
six males. Of the whole sample, 38.5 per cent (27 respondents) was married, 52.8 
per cent were single (37 respondents), and 8.5 per cent were widowed (six 
respondents).  
 An interesting issue is that of all those who indicated that they were single, 
over half did say that they had been involved in some kind of long-term 
relationship. They did not regard these relationships as marriage, though. For 
example, the females said that the men they had been involved with had never, 
strictly speaking, married them since they had never paid “something” to their 
families, although they had stayed together in some sort of “marriage-like” 
arrangement. Most of the males said, “We were just staying together”. Some said 
they would have married if the partners they were staying with had got pregnant. 
Some single male traders said that they were not married because they could not 
 155 
 
afford it in the current economic environment. They simply did not have the 
money for lobola, they said. For others, starting a family was simply unaffordable 
given their meagre earnings at the market.  
 As far as having children is concerned, just over half the sample (some 
51.4 percent) had children, which could in part be a reflection of the fact that 52.8 
per cent of the respondents were single. Of the total in the sample that had 
children, 69.9 per cent were male and 30.6 per cent female. Those who did not 
have children (whether male or female) tended to be single. Except for two (older) 
female traders, most of the traders had at least one child, sibling or a closely 
related family member (older mother, niece or nephew) dependent on them. Even 
the single traders had other extended family members who either depended on 
them most of the time or on some occasions, especially when there was an 
emergency. The latter were not necessarily staying in the same household as the 
trader. On some occasions it was these extended family members who would look 
after the stall when a trader had to make a trip or attend to urgent business. 
However, traders generally preferred to look after their stalls themselves. They 
felt they understood the dynamics of their own business much better than anybody 
else. 
 One male trader indicated there were “always demands” placed on him as 
the eldest male to provide for some extended family members, especially in times 
of emergency: “Sometimes I have to give money to relatives that I barely know. 
It‟s very frustrating.”28 Another male trader, CC, remarked that even though he 
was not married he had to look after a deceased sister‟s child who stayed with his 
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 Trader interview: Rick, Harare, November 2007. 
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widowed mother, whom he was also responsible for as she was old and did not 
work.  
The general pattern is that even where traders are single or have small 
families they almost always have other regular or intermittent obligations towards 
nieces, aunts, (aged) retired parents, or their own brothers or sisters who are either 
married or unmarried. These kinship networks may put a burden on their already 
stretched resources. It is important to acknowledge, however, that in some cases 
the traders would rely on some of their relatives to look after their stalls for short 
periods of time while they travelled to source goods. In cases where traders closed 
their stalls, a female trader with children might ask a relative to check on them 
while she was travelling. 
 
4.6.2 The family circumstances of informal traders 
 
The family circumstances of traders have a variety of impacts on the trajectory of 
trader‟s lives and also on their ability to weather the economic collapse in the 
country. A study by Burawoy, Krotov and Lytkina and his collaborators (2000: 
47) on the responses of the Russian citizenry to the collapse of the Soviet 
economy reports that sometimes citizens can rely on a range of “citizenship 
assets” – that is, “claims that can be made on the state for pensions, child support, 
public assistance, rent subsidies and so forth”.  
As indicated earlier, the state in Zimbabwe has become largely moribund 
and cannot provide many of the amenities that it provided in the era before 
structural adjustment and the unprecedented economic collapse and hyperinflation 
which has wiped out public sector pension funds. In the 1990s the government, 
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through its social dimensions of adjustment fund (SDA) did try to provide a safety 
net for those affected by the economic restructuring programme, but there were 
serious problems around an “inappropriate targeting strategy”, a funding crunch at 
the administrative level, and “a limited conception of the social effects of 
adjustment” (Chisvo and Munro, 1994: 25).  
Most of the affected population was simply not reached by the various 
food schemes, school fees programmes, and the employment and retraining 
programmes for retrenched people conceived under the SDA fund (Chisvo and 
Munro, 1994). With the worsening of the economy safety nets of any value 
simply disappeared. In the 2000s a widely circulated story was that it cost more in 
terms of travelling for a pensioner to go to cash a pension cheque from the public 
sector pension fund than the actual value of the pension. At the time of research, 
most public pension funds had stopped making payouts because they did not have 
the funds or simply because the payouts were so miniscule that they would not 
have made a difference. The state did not provide old age pension or 
unemployment benefits. In such circumstances the general population has had to 
depend on various social networks to make ends meet in the current climate. For 
instance, remittances from outside the country are very important for survival 
(Bracking and Sachikonye, 2006, 2008). 
There are a variety of “networks of relatives and friends to which 
individuals or households can appeal for help or to which they are obligated to” 
and these networks can be termed “social assets” (Bracking and Sachikonye, 
2006). Later sections will illustrate various instances of “social assets” in 
operation, like the pooling together of resources for food at the market and to fund 
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visa fees and travel expenses for one trader, who then purchases merchandise on 
the behalf of other traders.  
A study of Malawian long-term and short-term migrants to South Africa, 
for example, found that there was a dependence on social networks for travel 
money, accommodation and employment (Andersson, 2006). Migrants used some 
of these networks to courier money, goods and information back and forth 
between sending and receiving areas. There are several other instances in which 
social assets are utilised by traders, and these instances can be fully appreciated by 
considering the family circumstances of some of the traders in this study and how 
these have differential impacts on the nature of their lives (see also Profile 2 
below).  
 
4.7 The traders: Profile 2 – sketch of Jimmy Jimalo  
 
Jimmy Jimalo is a stocky, sinewy man of 37 and is a book and magazine trader. 
He was born and raised in Mbare and stays there in a two-roomed house which he 
“inherited” from his parents, who are both deceased. His mother passed away late 
in 1999, and his father was killed in a bus accident in 1995. He is the only son 
among all his siblings. His three sisters are all married and they stay with their 
husbands. He has worked as a street sweeper and as a garbage man for the Harare 
city council.  
He managed to get two O-Level passes, and got the job at the city council 
only because he had a C-grade pass in English. With the worsening of the 
economy in Zimbabwe in the late 1990s, Jimmy was retrenched and started selling 
mainly stolen school textbooks on the streets of Harare to make a living. Most of 
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his friends were already in the business and they introduced him to the trade. Most 
of the books they sold then came from schoolchildren. Then he could afford an 
“all right life” he says, and there was demand for cheap textbooks because most 
people were unable to afford new books from bookshops. Facing constant 
harassment from police, who were also targeting street kids, Jimmy decided to 
open a stall at the market.  
He complains that the journey to the market is now expensive because he 
needs to get a public taxi into town and then another one to the market. When he 
worked in town (in the CBD) he could just walk to and from home. Even now he 
still walks part of the way if he does not have enough money. He just gets a taxi 
from the market into the CBD and finishes the rest of the journey on foot. He is 
grateful that, unlike other traders, he at least has somewhere to stay that he can 
call his own. He does not have to worry about rent like other traders at the market. 
The profile described above illustrates a case of “inheritance assets” which 
traders can rely on and which can sometimes protect them in a period of economic 
collapse. Because of his family circumstances – for example, that he was the only 
male among his siblings and that his sisters lived with their husbands – this 
particular trader inherited a modest house, and does not have to worry about rental 
money. Unlike other traders, he does not have insecurities about whether his 
landlord will raise his rent or whether he will have to relocate at the end of the 
month. 
 In some cases traders have to rely on their parents for accommodation, and 
it is very common for young married men to live in backrooms on their parents‟ 
property and pay an average rent of the equivalent of ZAR100 for a room. The 
 160 
 
terms of payment are normally favourably set. Most traders pointed out that they 
did not find this unusual, especially where a man is married and has a family. 
“Under normal circumstances a married guy should be staying on his own with 
his family. If he chooses to stay on his parent‟s property there is no reason why he 
shouldn‟t pay rent. Things are tough these days. Some people rely on their back 
rooms to survive”, said one married male trader in his 30s.29 Young married male 
traders often point out that it is an advantage to have parents who are alive and 
who own property, no matter how modest. Traders agree that it is much easier for 
male siblings to live on their parents‟ property than it is for a married female to 
bring her husband to live on her parents‟ property.  
 Some of the financial constraints mentioned by traders can be traced to the 
period of ESAP (1991 to 1998). Traders mentioned a time in which parents lost 
jobs due to retrenchments or the complete closure of some companies. It was a 
time in which they had to adjust their expectations in life. Some traders could not 
continue with their schooling. Male traders, especially those in their 30s, indicated 
that it was expected of them for example to find jobs soon after they finished 
school, especially low-skilled jobs, and to bring an income to their families, 
especially in cases where both parents did not work themselves. “I had to find a 
job. I had been taken through school and even that was hard enough for my 
parents, especially with my father being the only one who worked. A lot of other 
people depended on him, including my grandparents in the rural areas”,30 said one 
trader. 
                                                 
29
 Trader Interview: Rickson, Harare, August 2007. 
30
 Trader interview: Simon, Harare, August 2007. 
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Another trader said that his father had six children in all, and there just was 
not enough money for the whole family, so it was up to him to go on and find 
something to do after his O-Levels. This included doing low-paying odd jobs, 
then a stint in South Africa as an illegal immigrant in which he managed to raise 
enough money to get a passport, and later on to buy some stock so that he could 
start his own stall selling men‟s clothes. In South Africa he was often helped by 
male friends with whom he grew up. These kith often found odd jobs for him to 
do, but he found that most of the jobs paid very little and he was not treated well 
because he was not qualified and his employers knew he did not have the “right 
papers”. An observation made by one analyst with reference to immigrant workers 
in advanced countries applies here: “Many immigrant workers too soon become 
aware that the pay and labour conditions in store for them … do not go far in 
promoting their economic goals” (Portes, 1997: 7). 
 Sometimes the family circumstances of traders may lock them into a 
vicious cycle of intergenerational poverty. The trader‟s parents may have been 
poor themselves and could not afford to provide him or her with a decent 
education. As a result some traders could only find low-paying jobs. A disgruntled 
male trader remarked: 
Well, we were a poor family. My father was poor. I am poor. If things 
don‟t change, my children will probably be poor. Things are tough right 
now in the country. It‟s us, the poorest, who are having the toughest time. 
If things go on like this I will not even be able to come to work. I struggle 
right now to put together bus fare to come here. I also need to look after 
my wife and two children. Some of the other guys at the market have 
friends and brothers in South Africa or Botswana who can help them out 
when things are tough. They send a bit of money sometimes. I don‟t. My 
life depends on whether I can sell something or not. I have not been able to 
save money for a long time. There are lot of other things I have to spend 
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my money on. With the way things are going I will run out of stock very 




Sometimes “social networks and a minimum of economic resources can be critical 
to sustain even a subsistence level of economic activity in the informal economy” 
(Heintz and Pollin, 2003: 4). The case of the trader above illustrates the 
importance of having favourable family circumstances like family networks which 
one can rely on in harsh times, even if it is on an irregular basis. Those individuals 
who do not possess some minimum of social networks may be curtailed from 
continuing to operate in the informal economy (Heintz and Pollin, 2003).  
Traders and Zimbabweans in general have to rely on social networks based 
on trust when it comes to receiving money sent by kin and friends from regional 
and international countries. Traders within some of these networks received 
money through informal channels which do not rely on the modern-day banking 
system. For example, kin working formal and informal jobs in countries such as 
South Africa or Botswana would give other traders whom they knew, who were 
on trips to source goods, money to give to other traders or to kin in Zimbabwe. 
The traders on such trips would physically courier the money back home, an 
illustration of how money transfer has become informalised.  
This “informalisation of the money transfer system” has been reported by 
Bracking and Sachikonye (2006: 32) in a study on remittances and the household 
economy, based on a survey in selected suburbs in Zimbabwe‟s two largest cities, 
Harare and Bulawayo. The study documents the importance of these remittances 
to survival, and indicates that “poor households who don‟t receive them are, of 
                                                 
31
 Trader interview: D, Harare, July 2007. 
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course, in a critical state” (Bracking and Schikonye, 2006: 32). The study 
concludes that the “informal economy has emerged as a critically important 
conduit for households in terms of their sending and receipt of remittances” 
(Bracking and Sachikonye, 2006: 39). This again is an indication of the ways in 
which money connects people in a globalised world, but more importantly it 
demonstrates how, even when there is capital flight, money from individuals 
flows in some way back into the country. 
 
4.8 Social characteristics of traders (part 2) 
 
4.8.1 Educational experiences 
 
Informal economic activities, of which flea market trading is one of many 
examples, have been popularly conceptualised as being largely taken up by those 
people who are outside the formal economy and who may lack substantial formal 
educational qualifications. Such assumptions abound in media images of 
immigrant informal traders in South Africa (Peberdy, 2000).   
The traders interviewed showed a different pattern. All of the traders 
interviewed, except for two older female traders (60 years and 63 years old) who 
had their primary school education in the then Rhodesia, went through secondary 
school and some had sat for their O-Level qualifying exams with varying 
outcomes. A variety of reasons, linked to family circumstances, were adduced by 
traders as contributing to their failure to either complete O-Level education or to 
go further. Most prominent among the reasons that traders mentioned was that 
their parents or older siblings who were paying for their education did not have 
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enough money for them to go on to A-Levels, even if they had “decent” O-Level 
passes. A female trader said: 
I got some good passes and I would have wanted to go to A-Level but we 
didn‟t have money. My father struggled to pay fees for my older brother, 
who failed his A-Levels. I am sure he didn‟t want a repeat of the same 
thing. Besides, he lost his job soon after my O-Levels. He got retrenched. 
Well, I got pregnant after that and I decided to get married. My husband is 
late now and it‟s too late for me to go back to school. Besides, I have a 
child to look after. I am the child‟s only parent.32  
 
None of the traders interviewed had a university qualification, though some did 
have a tertiary-level qualification. A 29-year-old male trader in the DVD and 
music CD trade had a tertiary -level diploma in information technology (IT) from 
a local technical college. Another, a very successful trader in the same business, 
had a tertiary-level qualification in electronics from what used to be a very highly 
rated institute of technology. Another male trader in the clothing business, with a 
tertiary-level qualification in clothes tailoring and design, had worked at a 
clothing manufacturing company as a tailor and lost his job when the company 
was shut down in the late 1990s. The owner relocated with a small staff 
complement to South Africa. This reflects how the business environment had 
simply become unviable in Zimbabwe.  
 The hairdressing qualification came out as very common and popular 
among the young single females, with 9 of the 11 single female traders either 
having completed the course or having done some of the coursework and 
harbouring intentions of completing it in future. It was common to see some of 
these female traders plaiting a customer and taking intermittent “breaks” to also 
                                                 
32
 Trader interview: Jane, Harare, April 2007. 
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attend to flea market customers. The standard fee for plaiting ranged from an 
equivalent of ZAR20 to ZAR50, depending on the style.  
 
4.8.2 Reasons for entering into informal trading and traders’ work 
histories 
 
Various arguments exist as to the reasons why people are propelled into informal 
economic activities. There is widespread recognition that “informal employment 
tends to expand during economic crises or downturns, suggesting that necessity – 
in addition to choice – drives informality” (Chen, Vanek and Heintz, 2006: 2133). 
Some writers argue that it is imperative to transcend both the conventional 
depictions of the motives of those in the informal economy as “necessity-driven” 
and the emergent “depiction of them as opportunity-driven.... Rather, their 
motives should be seen as both concurrently necessity and opportunity driven” 
(Williams, 2007: 239). The growth of informality has also been seen as a core 
feature of “contemporary economic growth” and the global economy (Williams, 
2007).   
Of the 70 traders interviewed for the study, 67 of them reported the 
economic situation in Zimbabwe as the main reason for going into informal 
trading. Others gave different reasons for entering into the flea market trade. One 
male trader (40 years old) in the DVD and video games business had seen the flea 
market as an opportunity to diversify and grow his business, using money earned 
from his formal small businesses. These formal businesses comprised two shops, 
registered years ago with the city council, where he started out renting the old 
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VHS video tapes, but with the change in technology he had gone into DVD 
rentals.  
In the past three years or so the flea market business had given him better 
returns than his two high-density DVD rental shops and he had invested more 
money in the flea market. Most recently, however, business at the flea market had 
taken a dip. There has been stiffer competition with some of the newer traders at 
the market. Most of his regulars are long-term clients he has been doing business 
with for upwards of almost four years. “They trust the quality of my DVDs and 
music,”33 he said. This case is an example of how traders operate both in the 
formal and informal parts of the economy, and demonstrates how goods and 
money move between the two. The case is a poignant illustration of the flaw of 
conceptualising the formal and the informal as two separate economies. Rather 
they should be seen as existing within a single deeply segmented economy. 
A 63-year-old female trader, Aunty Tilly, with one of the biggest arts and 
crafts shop at the market, also regarded by most traders as the most successful 
trader in that business, said she had started out over ten years ago when things 
were still fine in Zimbabwe. Then her husband had a “decent job”. She lived a 
“decent” life, especially with remittances from some of her children who were 
scattered abroad. This case illustrates how international (and regional) remittances 
have remained an important global connector despite the flight of capital from 
Zimbabwe. For this trader, the flea market was a way of tapping into the booming 
arts and crafts business, especially with the very good tourist flows into the 
country at the time, and also at some point the boom in the export of Zimbabwean 
                                                 
33
 Trader Interview: DV, Harare, August 2007. 
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arts and crafts pieces into some Nordic countries. In the past she had regularly 
supplied some of traders with connections to these destinations and did a fair 
amount of very good business. It is important at this juncture to indicate that the 
case of this particular trader is atypical of the majority of the traders at the market. 
Their lives are insecure and, unlike this trader, they do not have children living 
abroad who regularly remit money to them. 
Aunty D, a 60-year-old female trader, with a large shop dealing mainly in 
second-hand clothes, pointed out that when she started the market was a way of 
growing her business. She started out trading in second-hand clothes from 
Mozambique from her house, selling mainly to low-income, high-density 
working-class people where she lived. The opportunity to open the flea market 
stall came when a friend who had a clothes stall informed her that she had seen 
people “with money”, both black and white, buying second-hand clothes, said to 
be from Mauritius, at one of the stalls at the market. She decided to open a 
second-hand clothes stall and discovered she could actually charge customers at 
the market more than she charged some of her customers who bought clothes 
directly from her house. She exploited an opportunity which she heard of through 
a friend, showing the importance of being entrepreneurial and conscientious if one 
wants to succeed in the informal economy.  
While the literature has acknowledged the “entrepreneurial qualities” of 
those operating in the informal economy (De Soto, 1989; Cross, 2000; Browne, 
2004), the data reported here reveals economic necessity as the main reason for 
setting up informal economic ventures. Informal economy entrepreneurs who are 
driven primarily by economic necessity have been labelled “necessity 
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entrepreneurs” (Williams, 2007). There are also issues of “opportunity” and the 
choices that informal workers make. The approach followed is that “necessity” 
and “opportunity” run concurrently in the choices that own account workers make 
to enter into the informal economy. The traders interviewed for this study 
certainly chose to go into informal employment, and some of them even invested 
their own funds in starting up operations. They could have opted instead to join 
the “trek” to South Africa or to Botswana. The Centre for Development and 
Enterprise (2008), while acknowledging that the statistics on immigration are 
unreliable, notes that estimates of illegal Zimbabwean immigrants in South Africa 
are in the region of three million. Those at the market could have been part of this 
tide to South Africa, but for a variety of reasons opted to stay in Zimbabwe. 
On top of mentioning the economic situation as the main reason for setting 
up informal operations, some traders added that the informal economy was the 
only way they could make money (Profile 2). Often traders made statements like: 
“It‟s my job”34; “This is what I do”35; “What else could I do?”36 Some arts and 
crafts traders sometimes said: “I love art, man”37; “I have always had a passion for 
art since I was young”38; “It‟s what I could do. I used to love the arts and crafts 
classes in school”39; “I decided that I might as well do something that I like since I 
couldn‟t find a job after my O-Levels. I didn‟t do so well when I wrote my 
                                                 
34
 Trader interview: Ras D, Harare, September 2007. 
35
 Trader interview: Mos, Harare, Septemeber 2007. 
36
 Trader interview: Sonny, Harare, October 2007. 
37
 Trader interview: Charles, Harare, November 2007. 
38
 Trader interview: Ras Tindo, Harare, December 2007. 
39
 Trader interview: Ras Sam, Harare, December 2007. 
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exams”.40 While some traders expressed passion for their work, they 
acknowledged the economic necessity of earning an income. 
Traders deploy various forms of social and economic capital, especially in 
the early stages of setting their businesses (Profile 3). Traders also rely on various 
forms of capital to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of an economy in 
crisis. Creativity can be seen in how traders negotiate various barriers to their 
business at the local moment (like inefficient and corrupt bureaucracies at 
passport offices) or at the cross-border moment (where they face often face hostile 
and equally corrupt immigration officials).  
 
4.9 The traders: Profile 3 – “It’s my job.” (an arts and crafts 
trader explains his choices) 
 
“What else could I do, man? Back when I started in this business things were still 
all right. In the 1990s doing your own thing was often seen as the way to go. Most 
people were losing their jobs. Jobs for people like us were simply not there or 
were not paying enough. I mean, I only did O-Levels. I did pass English but I 
failed to pass most of the subjects including Maths…. So you know how we 
Rastas are often seen as the art people. I mean, look at the market here. Most of 
the guys selling art are Rastafarian.
41
 I decided it was something I could also do. 
It‟s my job now. I have been doing it for years now. Besides, some of these things 
are easy to make. You can learn quickly. I can even teach you. Art is art. 
                                                 
40
 Trader interview, Ras T1, Harare, December 2007. 
41
 The respondent here is referring to the fact that so-called Rastafarians are seen as the people 
who largely deal in arts and crafts. Strictly speaking, being Rastafarian is much more that just 
sporting a mop of dreadlocks, but at the market just having dreadlocks meant one could be called 
by this appellation. 
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Anything can be turned into art. I still make some of my sculptures but sometimes 
when I have something urgent that‟s needed I have to buy from someone else and 
re-sell. 
I used to see some of these guys making sculptures in our 
neighbourhood…. Actually when I started off I didn‟t think I would stay doing 
this for this long. We made some good money back then. Well, some of my 
friends did make a hell of a lot of money then. Sometimes we got screwed over by 
some of the white people. A lot of them used to get pieces from us and sell them 
for a lot more outside the country. Later even the black guys joined them. These 
guys just made money from buying from us and selling to other people. They had 
the contacts. We didn‟t. There is this guy. He is now based in South Africa. He 
made tons of cash through us, this guy. I have lost touch with him now. Things 
are good for him. I am told he has a shop there now.  
I decided to stay here. I mean, things were still all right then, man. We 
never knew things would change. There isn‟t money now, I tell you. Sometimes 
it‟s a struggle. Sometimes I regret not having left when I could. I am sure I could 
have managed back then. I could have managed to leave or something. I never got 
big orders. I mean, if I had done something big I would be somewhere now, I tell 
you.”42 
The reality is that the conditions for survival in Zimbabwe have become 
very difficult, both in the formal and informal economies. While some traders‟ 
fortunes may have been much better before the accelerated collapse of the 
economy, they have not fared well in the recent past nor is their condition getting 
                                                 
42
 Trader interview: Ras T2, Harare, January 2008. 
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any better now. The younger traders have no “radiant past” to speak of, like some 
of the few older traders who nostalgically speak of the days when “things were all 
right” and when jobs paid “decent” salaries. The present vicious environment, in 
which it is difficult to find employment, is all that they know. 
The work histories of the traders up to the point where they went into the 
informal operations reveal heterogeneity. Of the 46 male respondents interviewed, 
30 of them had held some kind of low-skilled, formal economy job. Some had 
been loaders at companies that manufactured basic commodities, and some had 
worked as general assistants in Internet shops, clothing shops and bookshops. One 
man had also worked as a security guard for a private security company. Just over 
half of those males interviewed, 16 respondents in total, had moved jobs at least 
twice within formal employment and then decided to move to the informal part of 
the economy. Again, this illustrates the point that there is a lot of movement of 
goods and people between formality and informality. 
Of the 24 females interviewed, 11 had had at least one formal job. This 
included working in registered salons, in shoe shops as assistants, as till operators 
and general supermarket assistants, and some as clerks in various kinds of small 
businesses operating in the city. Much of the work was low-skilled and low-paid, 
and some complained that as things had worsened in Zimbabwe there were 
instances when they could not even afford the bus fare to go to work. For some of 
them, this was one of the reasons they decided to go into the realm of the informal 
where they “could work for themselves” and be their “own bosses”.  
Traders remarked that they had found some of their jobs in the past 
through colleagues or through friends, and reported that some of these friends, 
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whom they went to school with, were also very important customers for them 
now. One trader said that he was motivated to start something of his own by some 
of his church members. Though questions on religious activity were not asked, 
traders said that Sunday was a day for rest, with some explicitly saying they went 
to church. It was also common to find male traders who reported that Sunday was 
a day for the “other church” which usually meant that they visited the pub on such 
days either to watch live local and international soccer broadcasts or just to drink. 
Another association among male traders included playing social soccer 
together on weekends. The majority of traders reported that if one of the traders at 
the market lost somebody close they would make a contribution which was 
collected at the market and presented to the bereaved trader. Amounts contributed 
varied from the equivalent of ZAR10 to ZAR50. It did not matter if they were not 
close to the bereaved trader. They felt bound by the fact that they shared the same 
working space.  
The examples above show the importance of having social networks in 
daily life at the market. Some of these networks play a central role in the decisions 
that individuals make on whether to or not to enter the informal economy.  
 
4.10 The traders: Profile 4 – pathway informality (the tailor’s 
story) 
 
The tailor, as we shall call him, earned a tertiary-level qualification in tailoring 
and design at a local technical college in the early 1990s. He is a thin man and 
often dresses in some of the outfits which he designs and tailors himself. There are 
certain advantages to having some of his skills, he asserts. He can wear “what he 
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wants” and he claims he wears “exclusive stuff” unavailable anywhere else at the 
market. Indeed, many of the styles of t-shirts and track pants that he wears are 
only available at his stall where he sells a mixture of some of his own tailored 
clothes and some from across the border in South Africa. He prefers track pants 
and t-shirts because, in his words, they are “laid back”. 
He is a regular smoker and often goes through two ten-packs of a local 
brand of cigarettes in a single day. Rumour has it that he also smokes cannabis, 
popularly called dobe or mbanje by most traders. After earning his tailoring and 
design qualification, he worked for a local manufacturing company. He often 
reminisces quite nostalgically about the “good old days in Zimbabwe” when 
things were “still fine”. The tailor even managed to purchase his own piece of 
land in one of the medium-density suburbs in Harare. The six-roomed house he 
began building in the early 2000s is still incomplete, though he lives in part of it 
with his wife. His two sons work odd jobs. One is in South Africa and the other in 
Botswana. He managed to complete part of the house using some of the severance 
money he got when the manufacturing company he worked for relocated. He also 
used part of the money to buy new parts for his sewing machine, which he uses 
even now. He has been trying to complete the building project but things have 
been “tough”. When he lost his job he had to quickly complete part of the house 
and move out of his rented house because he did not have a regular income. The 
loss of his job ruined his plans, he says. 
In the late 2000s, with things becoming even more difficult, he had started 
to make and sell track pants at the local market. It had been a common practice for 
most of the workers at the manufacturing company to “smuggle” material left 
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over from some of their jobs. He used some of the material he had gathered over 
the years to make clothing to start off his business. In 2004 he was contacted by 
one of his former colleagues, whom he had worked with years back. One of few 
local manufacturing companies still operating in Zimbabwe, but on an intermittent 
basis, opened up for a two-week job. It was a sudden order to supply a 
consignment of 150 satchels to the Zimbabwean army. It was easy work, he says, 
because the pieces had already been cut. They went through a day‟s “training” and 
then spent the rest of the two weeks doing the sewing. Part of the money he got 
from that job he used to get passports for his two sons. He had to pay what he 
calls “big money” to fast-track the passport application process. Part of the money 
was also used by his wife to get some merchandise from South Africa. 
In the early days he would go to the market mainly on weekends. He spent 
the rest of the week doing the sewing of mainly women‟s and men‟s tracksuits. 
He has experience in tailoring adult clothes from his previous job. At some point 
business had been good. He even managed to install satellite TV then, and he paid 
for the installation of piped municipal water on his property. He also bought a 
modest pump for his borehole. While his two sons are fine, he still has to look 
after some other relatives who are solely dependent on him. These are an uncle 
from his father‟s side, his wife and two children. He also looks after an old aunt 
on his mother‟s side. Most of the shops that supplied reasonably priced materials 
have since gone out of business. “You can‟t make money, let alone a profit in this 
environment”43, he says. “We will just wait and see. Maybe things will get better 
in the future”, he adds. He does not sound or look convinced, though. 
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 Trader interview: The Tailor, Harare, May 2007. 
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4.11 Social characteristics of traders (part 3) 
 
4.11.1 Informal employment and earning a living 
 
The tailor in the above profile is exceptional, with his partially completed six-
roomed house and satellite television. His circumstances point to the economic 
diversity of the traders. Some have done much better than others but the majority 
by far still “eke out a living” in Zimbabwe‟s collapsed economy. Even those who 
were successful in the past have fallen on hard times and revealed that their lives 
had taken a negative turn. 
Research difficulties on incomes in the informal economy are compounded 
by the fact that most workers in this sector have variable and unpredictable 
incomes, and for a variety of reasons may either have no monetary income at all 
or may have an intermittent income, with the economic environment being one of 
many important factors contributing to this variability. Participants may “want to 
respond in a way that makes them look as good as possible” (Donaldson and 
Grant-Vallone, 2002: 247). In the case of traders, they may either inflate earnings 
or deflate them for a variety of reasons. It is also common in the informal 
economy for traders to have other forms of social capital like “goodwill” from 
other traders – for example, the unpaid help they may get from other traders if 
they want to run their own errands. It is often difficult to put a value on some of 
these forms of capital. 
 It is also common to find in the informal economy workers who receive 
non-monetary forms of payment for their labour. Payment in kind could be in the 
form of food, clothing or shelter. There are workers in the informal economy who 
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are “unpaid family workers (in family businesses or on farms), who contribute 
their own labour and may or may not contribute their own capital (Chen, Vanek 
and Heintz, 2006). It is common to find women contributing their unpaid labour 
to such family enterprises (ILO, 2002a; Chen, Vanek and Heintz, 2006). There 
were and irregular operations at the market where close or distant relatives would 
attend to the stall. Sometimes the owner‟s daughter or son would be there. In such 
cases there were no wages paid. In an informal conversation one such female 
relative selling women‟s hair extensions said that she was staying with her aunt 
who looked after her and she did not expect payment. She also indicated that this 
was once-off. She would be leaving the following weekend for Botswana where 
she hoped to find a job as a domestic worker. Her aunt, who owned a small salon 
in the high-density areas would provide her with bus fare for the journey. 
The data reported on weekly incomes and earnings is based on self-
reporting by the traders themselves (Table 4.2). It is important to note that the 
sample is based on the snowballing method and therefore it is not possible to 
make claims that it is representative of the general population. Neither will I seek 
to generalise the conclusions to the whole population. The approach in this study 
aims towards a more nuanced and textured understanding of the informal 
economy among flea market traders. Information about the traders‟ incomes is 
supplemented by observations about the quality of their lives, their consumption 
patterns, and mapping how and what they spend their incomes on. 
The information presented is based on the researcher‟s own calculations, 
based on conversions from the local, now-defunct currency to the rand which is 
stable currency. The conversions are not based on the official Reserve Bank of 
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Zimbabwe (RBZ) exchange rates, as these would inflate the reported earnings. 
Rather the calculations are based on the unofficial exchange rates at the market 
where traders who sold their merchandise in local currency could buy the hard 
currency. Even these rates were distorted, making an accurate rendering of the 
income levels difficult. The incomes here are averaged out to cover the period of 
the research. By juxtaposing the data in Table 4.2 against the very difficult lives 
of most traders, one discovers that there is need for caution in interpreting the 
reported earnings.  
 
Table 4.2: Weekly earnings among traders based on self-reporting 
(converted to South African rand) 
 
Types of Goods 
ZAR0-500 ZAR500-1000 ZAR1000+ 
Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Arts and crafts 1 7 0 1 1 1 
Clothes, shoes, etc. 7 10 11 8 1 0 
Book and magazines 3 5 0 0 0 2 
DVDs, video games 0 3 0 5 0 4 
 
 
Data reported here is based on the earnings from the operations that traders have 
at the market not on other income opportunities. For example, it is common to 
find traders, both male and female, acting as middlemen in foreign currency 
transactions, where they may sell foreign currency notes with a slight mark-up and 
pocket the difference. Traders themselves often do not publicly regard these 
transactions as part of their income. Even if privately they do, they do not have 
similar attitudes towards such monetary gains as they do towards the profits they 
may make from selling their own merchandise. It is very common, for example, to 
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find male traders buying themselves a pint of beer or buying a bottle of whisky or 
vodka to share with other traders at the market with some of this money. This 
again demonstrates the social networking ethic among the traders. 
 Table 4.2 shows that just over half of the respondents (36) had incomes 
that ranged between ZAR0-500 a week, 25 respondents had incomes in the 
ZAR500-1000 range, and nine respondents had incomes in the over ZAR1000 
bracket. Many traders in the ZAR0-500 income bracket pointed out that they 
sometimes did not make any money at all in a given week. Sales were irregular 
and traders had to worry about transport money, money for food and other 
necessities. Traders in this bracket noted that if demands were made on their 
incomes other than their own personal needs and those of a spouse or children 
those got very difficult. For example, a sick relative might need money to see a 
doctor or for drugs. Traders also reported that on occasions when they could find 
basic commodities on the black market they would cost twice the price they would 
pay in South Africa. Obviously, other traders in other income brackets had almost 
similar pressure on their earnings, but they were able to deal much better with 
these demands because of their higher incomes. Important in interpreting these 
earnings is also the issue of food prices in an environment experiencing food 
shortages. For instance, between 2007 and 2008 the price of bread in South Africa 
ranged from 7 rand to 10 rand or even more depending on quality while 
consumers in Zimbabwe paid almost twice this amount when it was available. The 
reported incomes therefore have to be understood in a context of excessive 
profiteering not only in retail but, also in the transport and other sectors. 
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The quality of the traders‟ lives is an important indicator of the trends in 
their earnings. Traders, especially those reporting to be earning in the ZAR0-500 
and in the ZAR500-1000 range per week range, commented that they no longer 
ate meat regularly. One male trader said, “I have not had meat for over three 
months now. Just vegetables and sadza
44
 for supper. Meat, it‟s too expensive. 
Most butcheries are officially closed but they do business behind the doors with 
people who have money. Real money. Not Zim dollars”.45 Another trader whose 
income fell in the same range said, “I sometimes buy a bit of meat when I go to 
South Africa, especially if I am going to Messina because it‟s close by. That way 
it will still be fresh when I get to Harare. I do not have a fridge so I can‟t buy too 
much of it. Besides I can‟t be spending money for luxuries like that”.46 
 At the market it is very common to find traders skipping lunch. When they 
do have lunch it may be a mielie cob from an ambulant hawker or cooked or 
roasted nuts. Sometimes traders contribute money and buy food from nearby 
shops, such as bread and relish, but even then they complain that it is not enough 
since they share it among many people: “Well, we just share the little that we can 
buy. It‟s just enough to get through the day sometimes”.47 Traders would share 
such meals with other traders at the market with whom they were friends. The 
pooling of resources illustrates the ethic of networking among informal traders. 
Generally, pooling resources is one of the ways in which traders cut costs in a 
collapsing economy. Most traders lack the social protection mechanisms such as 
                                                 
44
 Staple food of Zimbabwe made from mielie meal and boiled to a thick porridge. Referred to as 
pap in South Africa. 
45
 Trader interview: Choice, Harare, March 2008. 
46
 Trader interview: SS, Harare, March 2008. 
47
 Trader interview: Mark, Harare, June 2007. 
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pensions, savings and health insurance that some in the formal private and public 
sectors have (Heintz and Pollin, 2003). It is imperative that traders cut down on 
costs so that they make some attempt to save money for unexpected future events 
like an illness in the family or emergency travel to a funeral at their rural home. 
Traders also reported that they no longer consumed “luxuries” like eggs, 
for example. One male trader said, “In the morning I will just have black tea and 
one or two slices of home-made bread. Maybe with jam and that‟s it. Sometimes I 
don‟t eat anything at the market. I will just come back and have supper here at 
home.”48 The pattern here is congruent with that existing among the working poor 
in many developing countries, especially own account operators, who make just 
enough for a “poverty-level standard of living” or a subsistence living (ILO, 
2004). The United Nations (2005) notes with grave concern that over a billion 
people worldwide live on less than US$1 per day. In its publication, World 
Employment Report 2004-05: Employment, Productivity and Poverty Reduction, 
the ILO (2005) points out that of the one billion people across the world who are 
struggling to survive on US$1 per day, over 500 million of them are working.  
The US$1 per day purveyed in the “development industry” is in most 
cases not enough to actually live on decently (Warah, 2009). Another statistic that 
is widely purveyed is that of the minimum wage. Some studies have concluded 
that often the minimum wage is not enough for survival in the developing world 
(ILO, 2004). Incomes among the working poor do not enable them to “deal with 
the economic risks and uncertainty they face” (Chen, Vanek and Heintz, 2006: 
2131). As indicated earlier, sometimes traders have to rely on making small 
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 Trader interview: Silas, Harare, November 2007. 
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amounts of money by, for example, acting as middlemen in some other 
transactions like forex deals. 
Another very common source of extra income among traders, especially 
clothes traders, is acquiring items from other traders and selling them to customers 
with a slight mark-up. When traders do not have a certain size of a t-shirts or pair 
of jeans at their table, they will often ask customers to take a seat while they look 
for the size: “You can sit down here. I will go to my other table and get a size for 
you. I am sure I have got it there,” traders often say. In a majority of cases the 
claims by traders of going to another table or stall belonging to them are false. 
Traders often get the clothing item in the size requested by a customer from a 
colleague‟s stall in another part of the market. Often traders quote their prices at a 
higher level than they actually want so as to leave a margin for bargaining. In a 
case where a trader acts as a middleman, they may even undercut a fellow trader‟s 
asking price after making a sale. A trader will claim to have given a discount to a 
customer when in most cases she or he has pocketed part of the money from the 
sale.  
That traders have to sometimes rely on other sources of income regardless 
of how small they may be is evidence of the problems that they have in earning 
enough to be able to protect themselves from the economic crisis. The section 







4.11.2 Insecurity and social reproduction 
 
In its decent work agenda, the ILO aims to make jobs more secure, both in the 
formal and informal sectors. Insecurity is a major problem that Zimbabweans in 
general and traders in particular face in their day-to-day lives and in their jobs. 
The hyperinflationary environment prior to the introduction of the US dollar and 
the South African rand as de facto currencies (at the end of 2008) was one of the 
most important factors in causing insecurity among traders. The online news 
website newzimbabwe.com points out that according to officials at the Central 
Statistical Office the inflation for July/August rose to a staggering 231 million per 
cent or more, from 11.2 million per cent in June 2008. This hyperinflationary 
environment meant that most traders were unable to save money, an additional 
factor making their lives extremely insecure. For instance, the traders did not have 
a secure “provident fund”, indicating that their work falls within the category that 
the ILO is trying to deal with in its decent work agenda. In other words, the 
traders have been excluded from decent work. 
Traders interviewed expressed concern about the fact that they could not 
save their money in the hyperinflationary environment (e.g., Tanaka‟s profile). A 
majority of respondents remarked that they could not withdraw their Zimbabwean 
dollar savings from the bank because of Reserve Bank regulations on cash 
withdrawals and also because of the cash shortages in the country. Indeed, 
Zimbabwe has had cash-shortage (Zimbabwean dollar) problems compounded by 
the hyperinflation in the period up to the end of 2008. Most banks had insufficient 
cash to meet demand. Since the end of 2008 the South African rand, the US dollar 
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and in some cases the Botswana pula have been the currency of exchange in most 
retail shops. However, this period is not covered by this study. 
None of the traders interviewed had any health care or medical aid plan. 
This is due to the common linkage between waged employment and employee 
health cover. In most cases the employer pays a larger portion for health care 
coverage, with the employee paying a lesser amount. This situation reflects how 
globally “social citizenship, secured and supported by governments, seems to be 
giving way to market citizenship, where citizens become responsible for helping 
themselves in a more privatized social order”, thus leading to the intensification of 
individual risk (Bakker and Gill, 2003b: 29). 
In the case of Zimbabwe, even those with medical aid face problems as 
medical funds have been unable to fund health care costs for members because of 
inflation. The level of contributions simply cannot cover the costs of the most 
basic medical expenses such as consultation fees. An official from a leading 
Zimbabwean medical aid expressed this concern, indicating that the problem was 
compounded by the fact that a large number of drugs had to be imported because 
they were not available locally:  
This has seen a serious erosion of benefits to our members to the extent 
that the relevance of medical aid societies is being questioned. Members 
are running out of drug benefits and are also facing sizeable shortfalls 
whenever they seek medical attention (Zimbabwe Independent, 20 March, 
2008).  
 
Traders have anxieties about falling ill and about the fact that most government 
hospitals, historically seen as providing much cheaper health care, have 
insufficient drugs or medical staff. Traders, especially cross-border traders, said 
that falling ill would curtail their ability to earn an income as they could not work 
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or travel to source their merchandise. While traders could sometimes rely on their 
colleagues to attend to their stalls in emergency situations, they normally 
preferred to do it on their own. Own account workers largely rely on themselves 
for labour and capital (ILO, 2002a; Chen, Vanek and Heintz, 2006).  
With reference to health care, most informal traders express their concern 
in the following way: “It‟s expensive to fall sick in Zimbabwe.”49 Many of these 
anxieties have been caused by the absence of a reliable health care infrastructure 
and the associated costs that beset traders when they fall seriously ill. One male 
trader said, “Most of the time there are no doctors at hospitals. The medicine is 
also expensive. You have to go to a private pharmacy to get medicine. It‟s 
expensive, man”.50 Other traders felt that if they fell ill it would affect their 
incomes: “How will I earn money if I am at home? I have to be here every day. It 
doesn‟t matter whether there is business or no business. I just have to come. 
Sometimes customers do not come. Sometimes a customer with good money 
might show up and I am not here”.51 Another trader said, “If I was to be sick I 
would have to go to the doctor. That means time, man. Time which I don‟t have. I 
need money to go there. Money which I might not have. It will mess up my plans, 
man”.52  
Indeed, traders live in very hard times. With the economy not creating any 
jobs and most public institutions having completely collapsed, it seems respite 
from their woes is nowhere in sight. In some cases, traders reported paying US$50 
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 Trader interview: Julia, Harare, February 2008.  
50
 Trader interview: Kudzai, Harare, June 2008. 
51
 Trader interview: Clarson, Harare, March 2007. 
52
 Trader interview: Gerald, Harare, May, 2008. 
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for consultation fees and even more for drugs when they or their children or 
spouse fell ill. They would normally have to dip into the money they had put aside 
to buy goods to sell, and this would normally derail their plans. A male trader 
said: 
The other time my daughter was ill. Do you know how much I had to pay 
for consultation fees at a private doctor? US$50. Some of the doctors are 
even charging up to US$100. The drugs cost me US$70. I had to use most 
of the money that I had been saving for a while. That month I couldn‟t 
even go to South Africa. I had to send one of the guys to get me few pairs 
of jeans and a few groceries. He got me the wrong sizes. They don‟t sell 





The experiences of traders demonstrate that they now live in an era in which there 
may be a “progressive detachment of individuals from social networks and 
supports while, at the same time, responsibility for systemic problems is being 
downloaded onto the individual (Brodie, 2003: 63). “Social citizenship” has been 
eroded and been replaced by “market citizenship” where citizens bear the costs of 
social reproduction (Bakker and Gill, 2003b). Zimbabwe faces systemic problems 
such as the collapse of the health sector, which is linked to an inefficient and 
corrupt political elite and general economic mismanagement. Poor working 
conditions and low remuneration have been the predominant push factors in the 
migration of health professionals which has negatively affected the delivery of 
health services (Chikanda, 2004).  
According to the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare (MoHCW), in 
Zimbabwe the nurse-patient ratio in 2004 was one nurse to 700 patients: in a 
country in which nurses have historically been the backbone of the health system 
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 Trader interview: K, March 2008, Harare. 
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this does not bode well for the delivery of health care, more so in areas that are 
economically disadvantaged like in rural areas (Chikanda, 2004). Though not 
common to all health institutions across the country, the MoHCW put the estimate 
for the doctor-patient ratio at 1:6000 in 2004 (Chikanda, 2004). The quality of 
health care in most public health institutions has been severely compromised. 
The views expressed by informal traders poignantly illustrate how the 
provision of essential services like health care has been “downloaded” onto 
individuals. In addition, traders express insecurities and anxieties about their 
capability for self-provisioning when it comes to health care and a variety of other 
amenities necessary for their survival. At the same time, traders fear that health 
problems may curtail their ability to be mobile and to stock up on their 
merchandise. This was of grave concern to cross-border traders. In a study 
covering Australia, South Africa and South Korea, a majority of factory workers 
expressed insecurities about whether they would have a job or not especially if 
their companies chose to relocate to cheaper sites of production (Webster, 
Lambert and Bezuindenhout, 2008). In this study traders expressed insecurities 
about whether they would have business on a given day, let alone customers who 
would actually make a purchase so that they have an income, no matter how 
meagre.  
With the spiralling increase in the cost of living in Zimbabwe, traders also 
have insecurities about accommodation. A Harare estate agent with expertise in 
the low-income and upper-lower-income housing market noted that most people 
could not afford to buy property, with those putting up their properties for sale 
demanding payment in foreign currency. As far as renting was concerned, the 
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official noted that it was quite common to charge rentals in hard currency, with a 
one-roomed back quarter in a very low-income residential area going for upwards 
of ZAR100 per month. This is in an environment where a majority of the 
populace do not earn hard currency.  
 A common sight in Harare at the end of the month is the large number of 
pick-up trucks ferrying an assortment of household furniture such as beds, 
wardrobes and tables across the city. It is almost always a sign that somebody is 
relocating. Often low-income earners, among them traders, relocate to areas that 
are further from their places of work, and this has enormous repercussions on their 
ability to carry on their business. One trader remarked, “At the end of the month 
most landlords will increase rent. They know people are desperate for 
accommodation, especially now that things are difficult. When you have no 
money you have no choice but to move”.54 Another female trader said, “Often 
when you move to cheaper accommodation it‟s far away from the flea market. It 
might be cheaper but it costs us more in terms of time we spend trying to get to 
work”.55 A male trader who had recently relocated expressed his concerns in 
terms of fears about staying in some areas: 
Often it‟s late when you leave work. Most people will also be trying to get 
home at that time. I sometimes get home at about nine or ten at night 
because I stay far and getting transport is difficult. It‟s very late at that 
hour and I am always afraid that I will be mugged, especially when I am 
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 Trader interview: Erica, Harare, May 2008. 
55
 Trader interview: Tendai, May 2008. 
56
 Trader Interview: Solo, Harare, May 2008. 
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 In recent times it has also been common for landlords to ask for the 
payment of rent in basic commodities like cooking oil, soap and other household 
groceries. A Consumer Council of Zimbabwe official said: 
The economic crisis has hit everyone hard. Those with assets like houses, 
no matter how modest, will try and use them to their advantage. It‟s 
common now for landlords to ask for rent payment in groceries. This 
means that tenants have to buy groceries for their own family and for the 
landlord‟s family. Often they can‟t afford the two. It‟s a tough choice.57  
 
A trader at the flea market reported that when he travelled to South Africa to buy 
merchandise and groceries, often he had to buy some food items for his landlord. 
The result is that traders sometimes end up cutting on their own needs to fulfil the 
demands put upon them by landlords. Some of the lucky few in the formal 
economy have given up their monetary wages in lieu of payment in the form of 
basic household groceries. In March 2008 a human resources officer at a 
prominent insurance company said that it was now company policy at his firm 
that they source groceries for employees: 
There is no use in paying employees in cash. Most groceries are far too 
expensive. We now pay employees in the form of groceries. Those 
employees in similar salary grades get the same groceries, with those in 




A social policy expert at a local University said: 
Some companies have been trying to cushion their employees form the 
crisis by buying basic commodities for them. Companies get lower prices 
because they buy in bulk. Some companies have resorted to importing 
basics for their employees. They know that salaries are simply not enough. 
They have to subsidise employees. They know employees have to survive. 
They have to commute to work and they also have to deal with constantly 
changing rents for instance.
59
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 Interview: CCZ official, Harare, April 2008. 
58
 Interview with HR Officer, Harare, March 2008. 
59
 Interview with policy expert, Harare, November 2007. 
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On top of ever-changing rental for accommodation, traders also voiced concerns 
about the public transport situation. According to the World Bank (2009: online), 
informal economy workers in the developing world face a panoply of problems, 
among them difficulties related to the poor transport infrastructure. This results in 
workers paying a considerable amount of money for transport, which affects their 
profit margins. The cross-border traders interviewed indicated that transport costs 
were a major issue for them, often affecting the amount of money they could save 
and spend on food. Sometimes traders manoeuvred around transport costs by 
using their social networks. For instance, they asked other traders going on a trip 
to South Africa or Botswana to get merchandise for them. An similar case, in 
which resources were pooled together to save money and to curb consumption 
expenses, albeit under different circumstances, has also been reported among 
Chinese immigrants in New York (Zhou, 1992). Most cross-border traders 
mentioned, however, that they preferred to shop for merchandise on their own 
when such opportunities existed. That way they could shop for a variety of styles, 
whether it be shoes, jeans, shirts and so on. 
A one-way ticket for the bus from Harare to Johannesburg (a popular 
destination for cross-border traders) costs in the range of ZAR250-500 depending 
on the operator. Often traders have to pay extra for their luggage, with some 
operators allowing approximately 30 kilos for free. Some operators will charge 
ZAR5 a kilo for anything above the 30 kilo limit. There are also bribes to be paid, 
especially on the Zimbabwean side, when trying to enter with goods on the return 
journey. Traders reported that they had to pay bribes ranging from ZAR100-500, 
depending on the amount of goods they were carrying.  
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All the traders selling shoes or clothes – except for one male who sold 
second-hand clothes which he bought from suppliers at another informal market at 
the periphery of the city centre, in one of the high-density suburbs – regarded 
themselves as cross-border traders. Most of those selling second-hand clothes had 
to travel to Mozambique or Zambia to get supplies. They felt that this was much 
cheaper, and they could buy in bulk and cut the number of times that they had to 
travel back and forth. Most of the cross-border traders dealing in new clothes 
reported that they had to cross the border once every two months. However, as the 
economy further worsened traders complained that goods sold slowly because 
people did not have much disposable income. A majority of the traders sold 
similar clothes which meant that competition was much stiffer. Traders had since 
resorted to crossing the border only once every three months or even five months. 
In between they would rely on their friends or colleagues to get any emergency 
items they needed so as to cut down on costs. That traders depended on each other 
for sourcing goods in such instances is a revelation of the importance of social 
networks in their operations. 
At the local level, traders also reported transport difficulties (aside from 
transport costs) within Harare, to and from the market. Some of these could be 
linked to colonial segregationist planning. Historically, as mentioned earlier, the 
high-density areas were under-serviced by the colonial regime. While the post-
independence government did do some work on road infrastructure, problems still 
persisted. These problems were further compounded by misappropriation of funds 
at local government level. With the growing post-independence urban flux, there 
was inadequate land for expansion in established high-density residential areas 
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(Colquhoun, 1993). New sites further and further away from the CBD had to be 
found, and traders lived in some of these areas. In most cases traders had to use 
two different taxis to get to the market, with one trip alone costing an equivalent 
of ZAR6-7. On average, traders had to spend an equivalent of ZAR25 or more on 
transport if they chose to take public transport all the way. Traders staying in areas 
like Mbare, one of the oldest high-density suburbs, walked part of the journey and 
then would take a connecting taxi to the market. Some of these traders said that on 
some occasions they got to the market late, which meant they sometimes missed 
out on crucial business. Also, in some cases they were tired from the walk but still 
had to put in a whole day‟s work since they largely relied on their own labour to 
operate their stalls. 
Some of the transport problems experienced by traders in 2007 and the 
first half of 2008, when fieldwork came to an end, were connected to the 
countrywide fuel shortages caused by the foreign currency crunch. As a result, 
government and private importers could not import sufficient fuel. The little fuel 
imported was sold at exorbitant black-market prices. Of course, bus operators who 
purchased fuel on the black market would pass on the cost to the consumers. In 
such cases a trip that would normally have cost an equivalent of ZAR6 would cost 
an equivalent of ZAR8-10. There were also transport costs incurred in cases 
where the trader had gone on a trip to source goods and now wanted to get the 
goods from home to the flea market. Operators would normally ask a trader to pay 
the equivalent of an adult passenger ticket for them to ferry the large bags in 
which traders carry their goods. 
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When travelling in and out of the country, but mostly on return trips, flea 
market traders are known to be targeted by immigration officials. Traders can be 
easily identified by the bulky bags they carry. Often traders complain that 
immigration officials believe that they have a lot of money because they carry a 
lot of merchandise. In most cases not all of this merchandise belongs to a single 
trader, because of the cost-cutting approach to buying trips discussed above. A 
cross-border trader captured this by saying: 
As traders we will contribute bus fare or money for the visa so that one or 
two traders can travel to South Africa to buy goods for all of us. It‟s a 
problem at the border when coming back. Sometimes we have to pay the 
guys on the Zimbabwean side of the border a lot of money for them not to 
confiscate our goods. Last time the guy wanted ZAR500 for the five large 
bags I had. I had to pay it because I could not leave goods belonging some 
of my friends at the market. They might end up thinking I spent their 
money on my goods. Well, the guys at the market did contribute some bit 




The issue of corruption at the border has also been discussed in the print media. 
For instance, Business Day reported in an article on 27 October 2009 that one of 
the biggest problems at the Beitbridge border post, shared by Zimbabwe and 
South Africa, was corruption among immigration officials. The same article 
indicated that the SADC region was infamous for red tape at its border posts, 
which affected movement of people and goods. 
Traders stated that in terms of mobility they also faced obstacles when 
travelling from South Africa in peak periods, such as during the Christmas 
holidays. This is when a lot of Zimbabweans working in South Africa travel back 
home for the festive season. In most cases both traders and non-traders would be 
carrying a lot of goods such as clothes, foodstuffs, furniture, and in some cases 
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 Trader interview: CB, Harare, January 2008. 
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even containers with fuel. Cross-border transport operators would take advantage 
of this situation to maximise profits by charging higher tariffs. A frustrated female 
cross-border trader articulated this problem: 
Towards the end of last year I failed to get on to the bus even though I had 
paid for my bus ticket. These guys said I had too much luggage and my 
stuff would take up too much space for other people who also wanted to 
go home for the holidays. They didn‟t even refund me. All they wanted 





Traders, as shown above, face a multiplicity of problems locally and also when 




This chapter described the flea market in the context of other markets in urban 
Harare. Most of the chapter analysed the lives of traders, largely using socio-
economic data gathered through interviews. The majority of traders live 
vulnerable and insecure lives. Incomes are unpredictable, and they have to live 
with the constant knowledge that they may not earn anything for periods of a 
week or even longer. 
 Traders did not have social protection mechanisms they could fall back on 
in times of illness involving either themselves or their dependents. They could not 
rely on the state for social protection in an era where, locally and globally, the cost 
of social reproduction has largely been “downloaded” onto the individual. 
Unemployment and pension benefits were non-existent. In addition, in a 
hyperinflationary environment it was virtually impossible to save any money, 
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 Trader interview: Charity, Harare, March 2008. 
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meaning that traders could not protect themselves against the vicissitudes of an 
economy in tailspin. 
While there were a few traders who made substantial amounts of money, 
the majority of traders struggled to make a living. They could not afford a basic 
meal at the market, for example, and would pool together resources to purchase a 
meagre meal to share among themselves. 
In addition to these problems, the following chapter will demonstrate the 
range of difficulties traders who deal in clothing and shoes, DVDs and video 
games experience locally and when they travel to other southern African countries 






















The Case of Clothes and Shoe Traders and the DVD and 





The previous chapter reported on and analysed socio-economic data based on the 
accounts of 70 own account workers. There was also a brief discussion of the 
concepts of social networks and social capital as they relate to the lives of 
informal traders. This chapter and the succeeding one cover the local and 
regional
62
 sourcing of goods by the four types of traders who are the subject of 
this study. These two chapters will consider in more detail, among other things, 
the utility and applicability of the notion of social networks in understanding how 
traders “get the goods” to the flea market for the purpose of trading. The analysis 
is split over two chapters so as to focus on goods that are largely sourced locally 
in one chapter and those that are mainly sourced from outside the country in a 
different chapter. In the process the similarities and differences of the particular 
cases emerge. 
The social network concept is the central analytical pin of these particular 
chapters. Social networks are a source of social capital. In sourcing goods traders 
depend on social networks, and in the process produce social capital. This chapter 
will focus on the sourcing of goods by those traders who sell clothes and shoes, 
and those who sell DVDs and video games. These goods are largely sourced 
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 Regional here refers to the southern African region – SADC. 
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outside the country. Though the content that DVD and video game traders sell is 
largely downloaded from the Internet in Zimbabwe, it is developed outside the 
country. 
In Chapter 4 it was argued that while the lives of the traders are steeped in 
the realm of informal forms of economic organisation, it does not necessarily 
mean that there is a complete absence of state regulation. Nevertheless, at the 
local level there is minimal engagement with the local state. For example, at the 
market, there were no visits from council health officials and traders did not 
require any licenses to trade. Since it is a privately owned space most of the day-
to-day operations at the market were managed by the manager of the market with 
the help of two assistants. Management made sure that traders kept their stalls 
clean and paid their daily rentals. Every morning traders cleaned the spaces that 
constituted their stalls. The public aisles and walkways around the market were 
cleaned by staff employed by management.  
There was no engagement with local civic groups. For instance, the 
Combined Harare Residents Association has been very active in advocating the 
rights of residents and informal traders in the city and in reporting the excesses of 
government in dealing with informal traders. It has been very vocal in the 
struggles for space among traders in areas such as the Mupedzanhamo informal 
market in Mbare, which serves low-income groups. The traders interviewed had 
never heard of the activities of CHRA, nor had they participated in any of their 
meetings. The Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy Associations (ZCIEA), 
which consists of informal economy associations throughout Zimbabwe, has also 
been active in negotiating with local municipalities in some cities on the behalf of 
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its members, especially in terms of trading spaces and regulations. While based in 
Harare, not a single trader interviewed at the flea market was a member or had 
ever heard of this organisation. This may reflect the fact that the flea market was 
privately managed and therefore there was very little interference from the state, 
which affects traders at flea markets such as Mupedzanhamo. A CHRA official is 
response to a question on issues of membership and the reach of their activities 
said: 
Our advocacy is for all those who live in the city of Harare and obviously 
there are others who need us more than others. Some people are affected 
by various council activities more than others obviously. Even though 
informal traders in some locations have not heard of us we focus on 
variety of issues which affect them as residents of the city. For instance, 
the issue of council rates affects most people in Harare and trust me, we 
are working behind the scenes and publicly to push the council to charge 
reasonable rates given the economic situation right now. Even if 
somebody is renting they are ultimately affected in terms of rent they are 





Traders reported that once a year they were required to submit criminal record 
clearance certificates from the Criminal and Investigations Department (CID) to 
the management of the market, but they were unaware of the reasons for this. One 
of the management assistants at the market said that they did this to make sure that 
there were no criminal elements operating at the market. No trader had ever 
submitted a police clearance certificate with a criminal record according to the 
assistant, but he did maintain that any traders found to have recent criminal 
records would lose their stalls at the market.  
The operations of cross-border traders, especially in processes of sourcing 
goods, significantly intersect with the workings of the national state. For example, 
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 Interview: CHRA official, Harare, 24 February 2009. 
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the state plays a central role in issuing passports and regulating the importation of 
a variety of goods, including those traded at the flea market by some traders. Most 
of the traders who sell DVDs and video games have almost no engagement with 
the state, unlike the clothes and shoe traders. Traders reported that while the 
police often frequented the flea market to “stake out” traders who allegedly sold 
illegal substances,
64
 none of the traders selling pirated movies had ever been 
accosted or apprehended. Because of its scaling back either as a result of historical 
processes such as ESAP, or because of the general contraction of capacity due to 
the inability of the state to pay adequate salaries and consequent resignations, the 
Zimbabwean state does not monitor or regulate those aspects of public life that 
would normally require some form of state presence. In the recent past the police 
have been mainly used as instruments of oppression to repress all forms of 
popular dissent. 
Different types of traders incur different types of costs in terms of their 
operations. While cross-border traders had to rely on certain social networks in 
order to acquire passports or other travel documents and in manoeuvring the 
border, especially when it comes to bringing goods into the country, these are 
challenges that DVD and video games traders rarely had to grapple with in the 
course of doing business. Social networks for the DVD and video game traders 
were for totally different purposes, such as for acquiring pirated copies. Issues 
such as the level of engagement with the state, costs incurred in sourcing goods, 
and whether or not travelling is required to source goods will be analysed in 
relation to the two types of traders who are the focus of this particular chapter. 
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 No trader at the market had any recollection of anybody ever having been arrested at the market 
for selling illegal substances. 
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A country like Zimbabwe falls neatly into the category of developing 
states considered by some theorists of globalisation, like Castells (1998), to be 
“black holes”. However, traders in Zimbabwe are in fact connected to the 
networked global economy, especially through their sourcing of goods, albeit in 
their own way. These different connections can be conceptualised as an 
“alternative globalisation” or “globalisation from below”. Indeed, the participation 
of African countries in globalisation has “certainly not been a matter simply of 
„joining the world economy‟; perversely, it has instead been a matter of highly 
selective and spatially encapsulated forms of global connection combined with 
widespread disconnection and exclusion” (Ferguson, 2006: 14).   
The advent of economic crises on the African continent, with their early 
genesis in global structural adjustment, restructured and globalised the nature of 
certain forms of economic activities like transborder trading (Meagher, 2003). For 
instance, with the advent of economic restructuring a lot of cheap textiles and 
clothing flowed into African countries as borders opened following increased 
deregulation. This had severe negative impacts on local manufacturing in many 
parts of the developing world such as sub-Saharan Africa.  
The evidence shows that in the last 40 to 50 years there have been 
considerable global shifts in the textiles and clothing industry, with production 
moving from the United States and Europe to the global South. For instance, over 
the last two decades China has emerged as a key nation in this industry, and in 
2008 accounted for 20 per cent of the global textiles industry and 27 per cent of 
the clothing industry (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2008). With the involution of the 
Zimbabwean economy, the local populace began to engage in activities such as 
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cross-border trading as a way of making a living outside of the formal economy 
(Mupedziswa and Gumbo, 1998). Some of this informal trading involves the 
buying and selling of clothes originally manufactured in China, though traders 
sourced these goods in Johannesburg. Social networks are crucial in 
understanding these informal economic activities especially the sourcing of goods. 
 
5.2 Sourcing clothes and shoes (part one) 
 
5.2.1 The South African connection 
 
Clothes and shoe traders source their goods from countries within the southern 
African region – South Africa, Zambia, Botswana and Mozambique (see Table 
5.1) with strong connections to Zimbabwe. Some of these connections can be 
traced back to the colonial period. For instance, there was considerable movement 
of people from within the region to work on South African goldmines (Crush, 
Jeeves and Yudelman, 1991), and from places like Malawi to work as agricultural 
labour on farms in colonial Zimbabwe (then Southern Rhodesia) (Sanderson, 
1961).  
 In the contemporary era the flow of commodities and people still follow 
some of these long-established regional trends. For example, over 300 trucks 
arrive at the Beitbridge border post between Zimbabwe and South Africa every 
single day (Business Day, 27 October 2009), showing the importance of some of 
these traditional routes even in the present conjuncture. Some of these trucks are 
bound for Zambia and Botswana and some are come from other countries in the 
southern African region. In the present conjuncture there has also been increased 
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illegal and legal migration of people from Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi to 
South Africa. Most of these people are economic migrants even though some, 
including Zimbabweans, seek asylum citing political reasons. 
 
Table 5.1: Sources of clothes and shoes  
 
Country of Source 
Number of Traders 
New Goods Used Goods 
South Africa 20 0 
Zambia 8 1 
Botswana 6 0 
Mozambique 0 2 
 
 Asylum applications by Zimbabweans increased after 2004 and 
“cumulatively” approached 44 000 at the end of 2007 (Polzer, 2008). According 
to the Department of Home Affairs in South Africa, in 2000 alone, 17 667 
applications for asylum were made by Zimbabweans, although only 271 were 
approved and 1 628 rejected (cited by Polzer, 2008). The number of deportations 
of Zimbabweans in the 2000s also increased, perhaps reflecting increased 
outbound migration as economic conditions inside the country worsened. In 2002 
38 118 Zimbabweans were deported, in 2003 deportations increased to 55 753, 
and in 2004 increased again to 72 112 (Polzer, 2008). 
An estimated three million Zimbabweans are living in the diaspora, with 
South Africa being the main destination of these migrants (IOM, 2009). In its 
May 2009 Migration Policy Brief, the Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in 
South Africa (CoRMSA) together with the Forced Migration Studies Programme 
(FMSP) at the University of the Witwatersrand stated that there is a maximum of 
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1.5 million Zimbabweans living in South Africa and remarked that it was 
unknown how many of these are “undocumented” (CoRMSA and FMSP, 2009).  
 South Africa, as the economic powerhouse in the region, seems to be the 
main source of goods such as new clothes (see Table 5.1) and shoes, though 
traders reported that they could also get their goods in Botswana and Zambia. All 
of them maintained that if it was up to them they would only go to South Africa to 
get merchandise. Traders reported that prices were much lower in South Africa 
than in other countries in the region, and they claimed that they could get a greater 
variety of styles there. For instance, a pair of shoes could be ZAR10-20 cheaper in 
South Africa. Traders also said that they could combine the purchase of items for 
sale at their stalls with the purchase of basic commodities for their own personal 
consumption.  
Traders found such basic commodities as cooking oil, bathing and 
washing soap, sugar, flour and mielie meal cheaper by some 10-15 per cent in 
South Africa. They indicated that retail outlets in countries like Botswana or 
Zambia got most of the basic goods they stocked from South Africa and put a 
mark-up so it was much cheaper to get them from their original source. Some 
traders also remarked that in some cases there was a wider range of brands of the 
same products available in South Africa than in other countries such as Botswana 
and Zambia. However, traders indicated that they were sometimes forced to travel 
to Zambia or Botswana because they did not require visas, while the South Africa 
visa process was costly and time-consuming.
65
  
                                                 
65
 On 3 April 2009 the South African Department of Home Affairs “announced its intention to 
grant Zimbabweans in South Africa a twelve-month „special dispensation permit‟ on the basis of 
the 2002 Immigration Act, section 31 (2) (b). This permit grants the right to live and legally work 
in the country. As complementary measures, a moratorium on deportations and a 90-day free visa 
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 Even though South Africa is where most of the traders buy the goods they 
sell at the flea market, the original source of most of these clothes is China. Two 
of the most popular sources of new clothes and shoes in South Africa, as reported 
by traders, are China City and Dragon City in Johannesburg. The China City 
wholesale complex is located behind Ellis Park Stadium. There are some 150 
shops in the complex. Though there are a few shops selling cooked food operated 
by the Chinese and some South African Indians, most of shops stock products 
such as clothing, textiles, electronics, leatherwear and general goods. Some shops 
also sell Chinese tea, rice, cooking sauces and other products to Chinese clientele 
and to others from South Africa and southern Africa. 
Most shops at China City are owned by immigrants from China. In 1994 it 
was estimated that that the Chinese community in South Africa numbered 20 000 
and this increased to between 100 000 and 200 000 by 2007 (Wilhelm, 2006). 
According to shop owners, China City supplies goods to street traders in the local 
informal economy and also to small traders in the formal economy. Some of the 
shop owners who purchase goods there are Chinese with businesses in downtown 
Johannesburg or in rural areas of the country. Small traders from both the formal 
and informal segments of the economy from countries such as Zimbabwe, Zambia 
and Botswana also get their stock there. A father and son team operating a shop at 
China City indicated that most of the clothes and shoes that they sold in their shop 
were sourced from China. An uncle there was responsible for sending these goods 
to them. This illustrates the importance of kinship networks that are maintained 
despite vast differences in geographical location. The owners also indicated that at 
                                                                                                                                     
for Zimbabweans entering South Africa have been implemented from May 2009” (CorMSA and 
FMSP, 2009: 2). The 90-day free visa is what traders now use. 
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the end of the year one of them personally travelled to China to see extended 
family members back home, and on the return trip would bring in goods.  
Dragon City, situated at the corner of Main Reef Road and Park Road in 
Fordsburg, Johannesburg, is another popular source of clothes and shoes for 
traders, with some 400 wholesale shops that sell to customers in South Africa and 
from the southern African region. Customers include Pakistanis, Indians and 
Nigerians who have shops in and outside Johannesburg. The complex, much like 
China City, is a melting pot of a number of nationalities. You will meet Nigerians 
speaking in their pidgin English, and Zimbabweans speaking Shona, Ndebele and 
English. The Chinese speak Cantonese, and other nationalities communicate in 
their home languages. 
Dragon City is also very popular with the Chinese community in South 
Africa. Many of them purchase Chinese groceries from the few shops dealing in 
these commodities. Some shops also sell Chinese newspapers and magazines, 
which enable Chinese nationals to keep up with events back home. They maintain 
the connections to their homeland despite being far away from home. 
While there were shop owners at both China City and Dragon City who 
said they themselves imported the goods they sold, most goods are actually 
imported by specialist import companies in South Africa owned by the Chinese 
(Mail and Guardian, 9 January 2006). Most of these arrive in containers at the 
Durban port, though it has been reported that some shipments travel through 
Zimbabwe and Mozambique to escape “stricter” port authorities at the Durban 
port (Mail and Guardian, 10 December 2007). By trimming import taxes from 
their costs, and perhaps even smuggling goods without paying customs and excise 
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duty, the retailers in places such as Dragon City sell commodities at much cheaper 
prices and are only profitable by moving larger volumes. A pair of male adult 
shoes at Dragon City sells for as low as ZAR50 in some shops. Prices are almost 
the same in China City. In China City a belt for a male adult can be bought for 
ZAR20. Duvets can be purchased for ZAR50 at both the China City and Dragon 
City markets. Most owners depend on selling high volumes to remain profitable. 
Shopping complexes such as China City and Dragon City have been described as 
“an economic web of China meets Africa”, which oils the informal economy 
(Wilhelm, 2007: 360)    
Chinese shopping complexes like Dragon City in Fordsburg have in the 
past attracted the attention of the authorities, who believe that they are the 
epicentre of criminal activities such as money laundering, drug peddling and 
human trafficking (The Star, 16 August 2005). For instance, in August 2005 the 
Dragon City complex was raided by the Scorpions and officials from the South 
African Revenue Service (SARS) and the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI) searching for drugs, illegal immigrants, counterfeit goods and import and 
export documents (The Star, 16 August 2005).  
Despite these issues Chinese-manufactured goods, whether counterfeit or 
original, dominate the globe. Many of the Zimbabwean traders interviewed travel 
to South Africa to source these goods. They constitute the large cohort of African 
cross-border shoppers who, according to the Strategic Business Partnerships for 
Growth in Africa (SBP), spent over ZAR12 billion in South Africa in 2005 – the 
largest proportion of foreign direct investment (SBP, 2006). Though in an unequal 
manner, they are still part of the global commodity chain that ultimately supplies 
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these goods to South Africa and then Zimbabwe, where they are purchased at 
local flea markets. 
 
5.2.2 Travel documents and the visa regime 
 
Before traders can travel to countries in the region to source goods they have to go 
through processes that involve interactions with the Zimbabwean state. In order to 
bring goods into Zimbabwe for sale, cross-border traders have to grapple with the 
various instruments of governance, both at the local and the national level and 
also across national borders. Governance here refers to: 
ideas that justify or legitimate political power and influence, institutions 
through which influence is stabilized and reproduced, and patterns of 
incentives and sanctions to ensure compliance with rules, regulations, 
standards and procedures. Governance entails both public and private 
forms of power, institutions of state and civil society, and it operates either 
within particular localities, or across national boundaries in regional or 
global frameworks (Bakker and Gill, 2003a: 5). 
 
For travel to South Africa, Botswana or any other country to be possible, it is 
imperative that traders have travel documents in their possession, whether it be a 
valid passport or an emergency travel document (ETD). It is in the process of 
acquiring these documents that trader‟s lives intersect with the workings of the 
state. Traders encounter various obstacles like an inefficient and corrupt 
bureaucracy, sometimes hostile and unhelpful public sector officials, and an 
inefficient public transport system – all very common in the developing world. 
Many Zimbabweans have historically applied for the visitor‟s visa, which 
stipulates that they should not engage in formal or informal employment. Many 
traders illegally engaged in casual employment such as working as temporary 
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shop assistants, domestic workers or casual help in informal small businesses 
during their periods of sojourn in South Africa. Some visits may last as much as 
the maximum 30 days allowed under the visitor‟s permit, which is a considerable 
amount of time for one to carry out their business.  
Many of the traders complained they had to deal with very hostile officials 
at the South African embassy when they tried to acquire the travel visa; many of 
these officials were local Zimbabweans who the traders said did not seem to have 
any sympathy for their fellow Zimbabweans. “These people at the embassy know 
that things are tough in the country”66, said one male trader in early 2008. “They 
do not care at all, they don‟t help you when you want information, they are rude 
and sometime they will lose your documents and ask you to submit another set of 
documents. It wastes time”67, added a female trader.  
Traders travelling through the region normally depend on public transport. 
Some of these companies are well known for plying the local routes and have in 
recent years taken up the cross-border routes, which allows them to earn foreign 
currency.
68
 They operate routes to countries such as South Africa, Botswana, 
Zambia and Mozambique. Traders who sourced their goods from Botswana and 
Zambia remarked that they sometimes used haulage trucks because these were 
cheaper than buses. For instance, they would pay ZAR200 for a trip from Harare 
to Gaborone, which would normally cost ZAR250-300 by bus.  
 It is by tracking the processes that traders have to go through that we can 
fully appreciate some of the obstacles that they have to contend with.  
                                                 
66
 Trader interview: Corlet, Harare, March 2008. 
67
 Trader interview: Mv, Harare, March 2008. 
68
 At the time of research a majority of local route operators could not charge in foreign currency 
as the now-defunct Zimbabwean dollar was still legal tender. 
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5.3 The traders: Profile 5 – Mavis’ story 
 
At 4:45 a.m. on a summer morning in December 2008, Mavis (35 years old) 
wakes up to start her day. She has to queue up at the passport office to get an 
ETD. She washes in the bathroom which also doubles as the toilet. The house 
where she stays, located in the Glen View high-density suburb to the south west 
of the Harare CBD, has the older-style bathrooms which have a toilet bowl built 
into the floor of the bathroom with a shower hanging above and the cistern for 
flushing the toilet on the side. Because of the regular water and power cuts all 
over Harare, she does not use the shower now. She has to fill containers with 
water whenever there is water. Most of the time water is connected in the very 
early hours of the morning, sometimes as early as 2 a.m. Mavis will often leave 
one of the kitchen taps turned on slightly so that she can hear the trickle of water 
when it has been turned on. She will often wake up and spend 20 minutes filling 
up the containers while her children are sleeping. She believes that she is fortunate 
because she is a widow with two children so she does not require as much water 
as a larger family would. 
By 5:15 a.m. Mavis is standing on the side of the road which is just a 
three-minute walk from where she stays. Most of the time she can hear a taxi tout 
in the distance shouting, “City, City”, meaning that the taxi is going to the CBD. 
She boards the taxi and pays her fare, which is the equivalent of about ZAR6. 
With one more person picked up further down the road, all the seats on the taxi 
are taken up and it heads to town. Mavis gets off at one of the drop-off points at 
5:35 a.m. Her older daughter, who is in Grade 6, must have woken up and boiled 
water for porridge either on the fire or on the stove if there is power. She will 
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bathe herself and her younger brother who is at crèche and the two of them, after 
having some porridge, will pack their lunch boxes (often peanut butter or 
marmalade sandwiches and diluted juice). The two of them will walk together, 
with Mavis‟ daughter leaving her younger brother at a day care centre 15 minutes‟ 
walk down the road, and then she will proceed to her own primary school. 
When she arrives in the CBD, Mavis walks across town heading to the 
passport office which is almost a 20 minute walk from where she drops off. By 
the time she gets there Mavis is sweating profusely and there is already a queue of 
those wanting to make applications, snaking along the fence at the passport office. 
The collections line moves faster than usual when the passport office officially 
opens at 8 a.m. and Mavis is in front of the queue. She did an EDT application for 
US$70 over a week ago, and she is one of the lucky few who get their document 
on the day: only after some haggling with the officer on the other side and a 
ZAR50 “greasing of the palms” (this is called a “cut” in local parlance). Mavis 
cannot afford the US$670 that the government charges for an adult passport. She 
is hoping that the prices will come down soon, but for now she has to make do 
with an ETD. Mavis complains that passport officers often demand a cut to fast-
track the processing of travel documents. Even when the documents have been 
processed, sometimes the officers will simply hold on to them and claim they are 
not ready yet. “All they want is a cut,”69 Mavis says. “If you give them a cut your 
documents will mysteriously appear from somewhere or the processing will be 
fast-tracked as you wait”, she adds.  
                                                 
69
 Trader interview: Mavis, December 2008. 
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The South African Embassy does accept EDTs for a visitor‟s visa 
application, which is the only one that Mavis qualifies for at the moment. She will 
do the application in the next few days after she has been able to get travellers 
cheques at one of the local banks. Even if she had the travellers cheques today, it 
is already too late. It is of no use trying to get to the South African embassy as 
there will be long queues there as usual. Also, the South African embassy does not 
accept applications after noon. She is happy that she at least has an ETD. Mavis 
starts walking back to the CBD to get a taxi to the flea market. There, she will set 
up her stall where she mainly sells women‟s clothes, especially tops and jeans. It 
will be another long day, as usual. 
Mavis wakes up at pretty much the same time the day after getting her 
ETD and follows a similar routine to go to town. When she arrives, she walks to 
the branch of the local bank, and by 6 a.m. she joins the queue with other women 
her age and a motley group of younger men and women. The women that Mavis 
knows, their relationships having developed from meeting in queues such as this, 
let her slip into the line closer to the front. She already has her ZAR2 000 in cash, 
which she will give to the cashier at the bank in exchange for travellers cheques. 
On top of that, she has to pay a nominal processing fee in Zimbabwean dollars. 
By the time the bank opens at 8 a.m. there is, like everywhere else in Zimbabwe 
where such essential services are offered, a very long queue. There has been a 
huge demand for travellers cheques, especially with the requirement that those 
visiting South Africa on the visitor‟s visa should show proof of having at least 
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ZAR2 000 in a South African bank account or in travellers cheques.
70
 Most 
Zimbabwean cross-border traders have problems opening bank accounts in South 
Africa because of the banks‟ strict requirements, so getting travellers cheques is 
simpler. 
When it is Mavis‟ turn to be served she hands over her hard-earned 
ZAR2 000 to the teller plus the Zimbabwean dollar processing fee. She gets a 
receipt and then has to wait outside until she is called in to get her cheques. As she 
sits outside with other women, a security officer comes out of the branch to 
announce that the branch has accepted payment for all the travellers‟ cheques 
available on the day and those still in the queue for paying will have to come back 
the following day. At 11 a.m. Mavis finally gets her travellers‟ cheques. She goes 
to the nearest copy shop to make copies of the travellers‟ cheques. She will submit 
the copies to the embassy the following day when she makes the application for 
her visa. After making the copies she briskly walks to the nearest pick-up point to 
take a taxi to the flea market. She is running late. One of her regular customers 
promised to come by with samples of jeans and tops that she wants Mavis to get 
for her (the customer‟s) children on her next trip. 
Following the same routine again on the third morning, Mavis heads for 
the CBD. She walks to another taxi terminus and takes a taxi to Belgravia, which 
is in the Northern Suburbs of Harare. This is where the plush South African 
embassy compound is located. At 6:30 a.m. Mavis arrives at the busy intersection 
where the embassy is located. I am already at the embassy, having been dropped 
                                                 
70
 This requirement sometimes made it difficult for traders to make “urgent” trips to South Africa 
if they did not have a visa already. The process of getting the South African visa was time-
consuming. In such cases traders tended to opt for Botswana. 
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off earlier by a friend, and I see Mavis as she briskly walks towards the gate. 
Mavis joins the long queue which is moving slowly. At the gate there is a security 
guard from a private security company, and he controls who goes in and comes 
out. There is another queue inside the compound where those let in at the gate 
have to queue up again to submit their documents. At 8 a.m. the visa section 
opens. 
I wait outside as Mavis is let in. I have no business in there so the security 
guard cannot let me in. At the gate many other people, young and old, male and 
female, are trying to get in. Some shout insults at the guard when they feel they 
have been refused entry for no reason. A young man offers the guard some “bit of 
money”, using a local slang expression, to be let in. The guard uses his two-way 
radio to talk to another guard on the other side of the compound where there is an 
entrance for those using vehicles. He talks in some code and eventually directs the 
young man there. A few minutes later I spot the young man in the distance 
walking up to join the queue inside the compound. I suspect that some money has 
changed hands. Many of those still outside the embassy compound confirm that 
they sometimes have to pay to get in. When Mavis gets back she complains about 
the rude staff who served her, but she is happy that she was allowed to submit her 
passport and supporting documents. It normally means one will get a visa. She 
now has to wait for at least seven working days, though it may be much longer. 
After waiting for seven working days Mavis collects her passport from the 
South African embassy with a visitor‟s visa in it and heads off to the Road Port 
cross-border bus terminus in Zimbabwe. There are many operators at the terminus 
who ply the cross-border routes, especially the Zimbabwe-South Africa route 
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which seems to be the most popular judging by the over 20 bus companies there. 
Mavis will take off on the afternoon bus which departs for South Africa at about 1 
p.m. The journey, which costs
71
 her an equivalent of ZAR300 one way, will take 
her just over 16 hours depending on the delays at the border. She will probably 
arrive at Park Station bus terminus in Johannesburg the following morning.  
When she disembarks Mavis, like some traders, will immediately buy a 
ticket for the return journey. Most traders prefer not to stay overnight in South 
Africa so that they can save money on accommodation. Traders like Mavis would 
rather get back to Zimbabwe as soon as possible because, while they can leave 
other traders looking after their stalls, they always feel that they themselves would 
do a better job. They know their customers better than the other traders. In the 
case of Mavis, there is also the case of her two young children, who will have 
spent the night alone, though she did ask a neighbour to check in on them.  
Unlike Mavis, other traders may leave young children in the care of close 
relatives or other traders they are close to at the market
72
 and will collect them on 
their return to Harare. This was the case among some traders who preferred to stay 
a few days in South Africa on some of the shopping trips so that they would have 
enough time to shop for their merchandise. In such cases traders will normally 
split the accommodation expenses among themselves, depending on how many of 
them they are. Traders travelling together will also share expenses for food. 
At one local hotel in the CBD, popular with Zimbabweans, the fees for 
accommodation ranged from ZAR300 for a single room to ZAR400 per night for 
                                                 
71
 The cost of a one-way ticket to South Africa varies depending on the bus operator.  
72
 Some traders stated that in the current economic situation they it would be “burdensome” to 
leave children in the care of relatives. Some traders felt that their children were “well trained” and 
they could take care of themselves in their parents‟ absence. 
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a double room. Traders are well known for booking a single room and then 
sneaking in one or two colleagues later in the night and then splitting the 
expenses. At another hotel close to the Park Station bus terminus a guest had to 
pay ZAR150. Most of the rooms were designated for sharing. Traders who 
frequented this hotel noted that they used it because it was within walking 
distance to the terminus. They complained that it was very uncomfortable and 
sometimes they had to share rooms with strangers, even if they had been promised 
that there would be nobody else occupying the room. In such cases they worried 
constantly about their own safety.  
Traders like Mavis opting not to stay overnight will normally spend the 
day they arrive going around in malls like China City, and in small shops 
downtown where they purchase jeans, tops and accessories like belts. Depending 
on the quantities they want to purchase they may also spend some time bargaining 
on the prices. They will also search for personal clothing items or, in the case of 
traders like Mavis, for clothing for their children at home. Traders normally 
purchase clothing items for themselves that are different from those they get for 
resale. The routine may be punctuated by a trip to some food wholesaler to 
purchase basic commodities for personal consumption or for somebody in 
Zimbabwe who might have facilitated the acquisition of travellers‟ cheques. At 
the end of a long day traders like Mavis will get a public taxi or hire a private taxi 
to have their goods transported to Park Station. A private taxi to Park Station may 
cost upwards of ZAR100 depending on where they are coming from. It is only 
when they have settled down on the bus back to Zimbabwe that some of them will 
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have their first substantive meal, a take-away purchased from the one of the many 
fast food outlets at the Park Station bus terminus.  
Mavis‟ case reveals many of the obstacles that traders face in their 
encounters with the state. Much of the time they have to navigate both formal and 
informal channels, and in most cases the formal and the informal are imbricated 
with one another. Sometimes there may be no clear-cut distinction as to where the 
formal and the informal begin and end. The official (in a formal position) on the 
day that Mavis picks up her ETD uses his formal position to get an informal 
“reward” (bribe) from Mavis. On the morning that Mavis visits the passport 
offices she is anxious to get to South Africa as soon as possible to get 
merchandise before the festive season gets into full swing. It is during these 
periods that traders maintain they sell the most so they cannot afford to have low 
stock levels. In addition, after many months of scrounging and saving, Mavis is 
eager to get a small fridge for her house and to get a few festive “goodies” for her 
two children. 
 The public sector officials Mavis has to deal with have not escaped the 
ravages of the economy. In comparison to private sector wages, the wages in the 
public sector remained very stagnant. Many traders claimed that the personnel at 
the passport offices blatantly sought bribes. One trader raised this concern in early 
2007: “Many of these guys earn very little. It‟s only by asking for bribes that that 
can make a living. They will offer to fast-track the processing of the passport 
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within a few days or to get you an ETD within a day. There are normally very 
long queues for passports
73
 and these guys know we are very desperate.”74 
 Traders, as will be revealed later, have various encounters in which 
monetary demands will be made upon them, and at various levels they will have 
to “fork out” their hard-earned money either to have some service provided to 
them or to get an official behind a desk somewhere, be it at the border post or at a 
government office, to turn a blind eye as far as strict application of the rules is 
concerned. While traders complain that public sector officials, like immigration 
and customs officials and passport officers, take advantage of them, traders also at 
times sought to take advantage of the desperate situation of some of these officials 
by inducing them to take bribes.  
 
5.4 Sourcing clothes and shoes (part two) 
 
5.4.1 The South African visa regime and implications for traders 
 
While SADC has taken steps to reform the regulations for the movement of 
people, which would be expected for a bloc of countries that are economically 
integrated, institutional barriers remain. A treaty with the European Union (EU) 
allows ease of movement within the bloc, and this has been complemented by 
strong institutions which competently facilitate these movements. Traders 
reported that they found the South African visa process very taxing and time-
consuming 
                                                 
73
 At some point passport fees were as low as the equivalent of ZAR25 for an ordinary adult 
passport (at the black market exchange rate), and snaking lines could be seen early in the morning 
outside the Harare passport offices. 
74
 Trader interview: Nelson, Harare, June 2008. 
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Traders‟ lives are replete with challenges. With the collapse of the 
economy and most public services in Zimbabwe and the acceleration of migration 
to South Africa and other countries, the passport offices, the banks where 
travellers cheques can be acquired, and embassies such as the South African 
embassy have come under pressure. Here they compete with other traders who 
also engage in informal trading outside the country. 
At the same time, economic conditions have created an environment 
rampant with corruption where the “gatekeepers” at the local level are on the 
look-out for ways to make money off the desperate population who want to be 
served by them. Traders are targeted by embassy stuff, themselves under pressure 
from the deluge of applications. Some of these officers may solicit bribes and this 
increases the costs that traders incur. Also, traders, like other Zimbabweans, are 
targeted at the Zimbabwe-South Africa border, notorious for corruption, by 
immigration officials who may want bribes for them to be let through, even in 
cases where the traders have all the travel documents required. Even though they 
may have authentic visas, immigration officials have been known to allege that 
some visas are counterfeit and to confiscate documents as a way of inducing the 
traders to pay a bribe. 
 In an environment which has become largely informalised, individuals and 
groups begin to rely on social networks to access the services they need. In the 
case of Mavis, for example, the women she has established relationships with over 
a long time allow her to jump the queue. There are several other instances in 
which traders rely on these networks. For example, when getting travellers 
cheques, traders maintained that sometimes it was important to know somebody at 
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the bank who could put aside cheques for them. This would save them time in that 
they did not have to spend a great portion of the day queuing up outside banks.  
Traders related how they sometimes reciprocated these “favours” by 
getting the tellers at the bank basic commodities like cooking oil, even if the teller 
might not have asked for such items. In some cases an expectant female teller 
might ask a trader to purchase disposable napkins as a way of returning a favour 
for facilitating access to travellers‟ cheques. In such cases it was always expected 
that the trader pay for these items. On trips to South Africa some female traders 
might buy a bottle of cooking oil, a bar of washing soap or some washing powder 
for another female trader back in Zimbabwe who was watching over her stall 
during her absence. At the time of research there were also a few local agencies 
specialising in applying for the South African visitor‟s visa on the behalf of 
clients. Traders remarked that in case of an emergency some of the staff working 
there could “fast-track” the processing of a visa such that it came out within a day 
where it would normally take a whole week to process. Such contacts may ask 
that a trader bring them a few “basics” at the trader‟s discretion. This shows the 
importance of reciprocity in “oiling the wheels” of the social networks that traders 
rely on in doing business. 
 The profile of Mavis illustrates the growing “interpenetration of formal 
and informal forms of organization” in which there is a blurring of the boundaries 
between the formal and the informal (Meagher, 2005: 217). For instance, at 
several junctures, those that I have termed “gatekeepers” will sometimes require 
that a trader pays them to do something that they, as public officials, are officially 
employed to do. Some security guards who control access to certain spaces, like 
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gates into embassies, use their power to extort bribes from members of the public, 
including traders. Corrupt immigration officials may solicit bribes to stamp 
passports or to process permits.  
 Informal ways of organising play an important role in allowing access to 
those social services that a “scaled back state” – or in the case of Zimbabwe, a 
“weak” and bankrupt state – is unable to provide for its citizens. Collapsed states 
are breeding grounds for corruption and manipulation which, according to some 
authors (Bayart, 1999; Hyden, 2006), are “normalised” in much of Africa. 
Countries such as Zimbabwe, Somalia and those in the Great Lakes Region have 
been cited by some analysts as examples of “state failure”75 (Dorussen, 2005), 
making them fertile ground for informal forms of economic, political and social 
organisation. This informality can be rampant at the borders where traders pass 







                                                 
75
 Boas and Jennings (2005) consider the notion of a failed state to be mere rhetoric used in 
international development and policy circles. They argue that the notion of “failed” is loaded with 
the “assumptions that every state can be evaluated on the basis of a prototype of an advanced 
state” and that “against the backdrop of the prototypical state, the notion of „failed states‟ and 
„state failure‟ is shorthand for those states undergoing severe political, economic and humanitarian 
crises…” (Boas and Jennings, 2005: 387). They further assert that the concept of „“state failure‟ – 
predicated as it is on the existence of the prototypical state – is built on a faulty assumption of 
uniformity in state organisation, structure and behaviour. To say that something „fails‟ or „is 
failing‟ is a normative judgement that is only meaningful in comparison to something else; in this 
case, that something else is the existence of a Westernised, „healthy‟ state that, unfortunately, has 
little relevance to most of the states in question because it has simply never existed there” (Boas 
and Jennings, 2005: 388). 
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5.4.2 Travelling to the source 
 
Traders reported that when they did travel they would leave colleagues and 
friends whom they worked with looking after their stalls. They had formed social 
ties with those who were spatially near them in terms of the location of their stalls. 
Still, traders felt that they understood their own businesses better and would 
rather, as far as possible, be the ones who attended to their own stalls. Perhaps 
showing issues of distrust and also competition for customers, some traders 
remarked that they could not always “trust” that a colleague who sold the same 
goods as themselves did a “good job” in their absence. They alleged that in such a 
case a trader might “steer” customers towards their own stalls. Still, that traders 
relied on each other to watch stalls is evidence of the importance of social capital. 
According to Fernandez Kelly (1995: 219) the notion of social capital is best 
understood not as a “quantifiable feature” but more as “the characteristics of 
resources available to various social groups”. Mavis‟ profile demonstrates that 
traders have access to certain resources by virtue of their work as informal traders. 
 As indicated earlier most traders tended to make journeys that did not last 
too long. For example, traders departed Harare on a Tuesday afternoon and 
arrived in South Africa on Wednesday in the morning. They then spent the whole 
day on Wednesday shopping. They departed for Harare the same day in the 
evening and arrived back the following day (Thursday). Delays at the border, like 
too much traffic going in either direction or whether immigration officials on the 
South African or Zimbabwean side were on “go slow” or not, affected the time of 
arrival. Traders indicated that they followed this taxing routine to save on money 
for accommodation. The traders also reported that spending too long in South 
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Africa could mean a loss on crucial business if customers came by and their stalls 
were not well stocked.  
Traders‟ access to certain kinds of social capital is affected by variables 
such as social class, race and gender (Fernandez Kelly, 1995). When they travel 
and opt to stay overnight in South Africa they share accommodation with others 
of the same gender. Traders also share food with those of the same gender when 
travelling and at the market. Female informal traders normally left their female 
friends in charge of their stalls at the flea market when they themselves were not 
available. All the male traders and female traders dealing in new clothes and shoes 
reported going to source their goods in regional countries at least once every two 
months. Of the three women traders exclusively selling second-hand clothes, two 
sourced goods from Mozambique and one from Zambia. They all stated that they 
bought their goods in bulk, which meant that they did not have to make frequent 
trips. One of the traders stated that she visited Zambia every two months, while 
the other two synchronised their trips so that they could travel to Mozambique 
once every three months. 
The accounts of informal traders like Mavis illustrate that they have very 
taxing and tiring routines. Single parents may be anxious about the safety of their 
children, who they leave at home from time to time even though they may ask 
neighbours or other traders to check up on them. However, some other traders 
who were single mothers reported that they did from time to time leave their 
children with relatives when they needed to travel. Female traders also reported 
that in some cases it was common for them to leave their children with another 
female colleague they trusted at the flea market. A trader who co-operates with 
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another trader may expect the favour to be reciprocated in some way in the future. 
One analyst maintains that urban dwellers, like the traders who are the subject of 
this study, “develop their own rationality and logic of behaviour” in their 
struggles for survival on a day-to-day basis (Lourenco-Lindell, 2001: 31). For 
example, sometimes Mavis had to collect one of her colleague‟s children from a 
nearby crèche and leave the child at the colleague‟s sister‟s house at the end of the 
day. This same colleague looked after Mavis‟ stall when Mavis herself travelled to 
South Africa. This account shows the importance of relations of trust and 
reciprocity in the lives of traders, and how traders rely on these relationships when 
they travel out of the country to source goods.  
 
5.4.3 Going back home: the illegal and the legal at the border 
 
At the border traders, who may be carrying bulky bags, are an easy target for 
immigration officials who solicit bribes. Traders will usually rely on social ties 
that they have cultivated over long periods so that they can take their goods across 
the border. For example, it is very common to find several individuals at the South 
Africa-Zimbabwe border who facilitate the movement of goods for traders to the 
Zimbabwean side.  
These people are normally Zimbabwean and South African males in their 
30s and 40s, who sometimes operate in gangs. They are commonly referred to as 
guma gumas in local parlance, which loosely translated means “hustlers”. Some of 
these guma gumas were known for smuggling people without documents across 
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the border into South Africa from Zimbabwe.
76
 Some of these guma gumas had 
strong connections with South African and Zimbabwean immigration officials at 
the Beitbridge border post. These smugglers use small vehicles for carrying 
smuggled goods into Zimbabwe and charge a range of prices depending on how 
heavy the goods are. 
 In late September 2007 one trader who sold jeans, t-shirts and shirts for 
men reported that he was charged ZAR200 for three bags which in total weighed 
80 kgs for them to be smuggled to the Zimbabwean side. For him this was a 
cheaper option than paying duty (see discussion below). Five male traders who 
sold men‟s clothes reported that before September 2007 they went through the 
normal channels and saw no particular need of using smugglers because most of 
the time they paid duty ranging between ZAR50-100 in Zimbabwean dollars to 
get their goods through customs. Three of them reported that since September 
2007 they always used a smuggler when they travelled to South Africa to source 
goods because of new statutes (Statutory Instrument Number 158 of 2007
77
) 
which stipulated that they pay a component of the duty in foreign currency.  
Two of the five male traders, who sourced goods from Zambia and 
Botswana, reported that in their experience the customs officials on the 
Zimbabwe-Zambia border and the Zimbabwe-Botswana border were “reasonable 
people” who could be negotiated with, so that even after the advent of the 
Statutory Instrument they were charged reasonable customs and excise fees. 
Female traders dealing in clothes felt that smuggling was a risky thing if you got 
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 It is likely that since the waiving of visas the business of those smuggling people into South 
Africa has taken a dip. 
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 Referred to in the Government Gazette as The Customs and Excise (Designation of Luxury 
Items (Amendment) Notice, 2007 (No. 1). 
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caught and that it was for men. The general feeling among traders was that most 
of them smuggled goods in some way, although they would not always admit this. 
It was the only way to cut costs, according to the traders. 
Statutory Instrument Number 158 of 2007, which came into full operation 
on 7 September 2007, resulted in the designation of a number of items that were 
sold at the flea market by clothes and shoe traders as luxury items. For example, 
tariff number 6203.4200 pertaining to men‟s or boy‟s trousers of cotton stipulated 
that the “general rate of duty” would be 60 per cent of the value of the goods 
charged in Zimbabwe dollars plus a component charged at a rate of US$10/kg 
payable in US dollars.  
Taking the example of the trader above who chose to have his goods 
smuggled, he would have to pay, in terms of the statutory instrument, at least 
US$800 (roughly ZAR5 600 at 2007 exchange rates)
78
 for the three bags for 
which a smuggler charged him only ZAR200. The same statutory instrument also 
gazetted that footwear made of leather or synthetics would attract 60 per cent duty 
paid in local currency plus US$5 per pair of shoes (tariff number 6405.1000). 
Putting aside for the moment the Zimbabwean dollar component, a trader carrying 
a bag with 30 pairs of shoes would have to pay at least US$150 to customs 
officials at the border. This demonstrates the attractiveness of using illicit means 
to get goods across the border, especially when a trader is carrying bulky and 
conspicuous bags. Traders used illegal tactics so that that they could cut down on 
their costs. High costs would lower their profit margins at the market back home. 
These costs include, as stated earlier, the customs and excise charges and the cost 
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 The US-rand exchange rate averaged around ZAR7 to the US dollar at the time. 
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of travel and accommodation. There may also be bribes to be paid, especially 
where immigration officials can easily identify traders and hence target them. 
One female trader reported that she got around the problem of carrying 
bulky bags by packing her goods into smaller bags which would not attract 
attention. However, another male trader pointed out that he preferred to carry one 
or two bulky bags so that he could easily keep track of them. According to this 
particular trader a smaller bag, unlike a bulky bag, could be easily snatched away 
at the border or at the numerous drop-off points that cross-border buses stopped at 
during the long journey. 
 The three male traders who admitted to using smugglers indicated that 
another reason they opted for them was because of the time factor. They noted 
they did not have time to wait at the official border post for their goods to be 
unloaded and then wait for the tedious examination of the contents of their bags. 
Furthermore, these traders would rather not risk having their goods confiscated 
because the process of trying to get them back was difficult. Often, items have 
been known to go missing from the storage rooms belonging to the Zimbabwe 
Revenue Authority (ZIMRA). In an informal discussion on a bus trip from 
Johannesburg to Harare, two male traders based in Harare indicated that it was a 
double expense having to go back to the Beitbridge border post to collect the 
goods that had been seized by the border authorities. According to them, traders 
would rather take their chances with the smugglers, who have been known to do 
an efficient job and have experience in the business. In 2007, one such male 
smuggler at the Beitbridge border post reported that he had been in business for 
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over five years. He claimed that on a good day he could make ZAR1000 for 
facilitating the smuggling of goods. 
 Immigration officials also cashed in on the crisis by cultivating 
associations with drivers from certain bus companies. It was quite normal for 
traders to prefer using particular bus companies because drivers from these 
companies were more connected than others. However, these connections came at 
a price. For instance, on a return journey from South Africa it is quite common for 
travellers on public transport to be asked to each make a contribution of, say, 
ZAR10-20. On a bus carrying 60 passengers, the total amount collected could 
range from ZAR600-1200. This money would normally be given to an attending 
customs official at the border post to carry out a perfunctory examination of goods 
in the trailer that is pulled by the bus; most operators ferry goods this way. Some 
bus operators have occasionally resorted to ferrying goods on separate, smaller 
trucks which reach Zimbabwe before the bus with passengers. Drivers from these 
bus companies reported that they had resorted to doing this in order to minimise 
delays at the border and also because the bus took a shorter time to reach 
Zimbabwe when not pulling a trailer. 
 Certain bus drivers have also been known to have connections which can 
facilitate crossing the border, even where one does not have a valid visa or where 
one may have over-stayed in South Africa. In such cases immigration officials on 
the South African side were willing to overlook the over-stay or to use a back-
dated stamp which would not reflect a breach of immigration rules. However, all 
this required money, and immigration officials normally expected to be paid by 
the drivers for rendering such services even if it was at a future date. Such 
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relationships were normally directly with the bus drivers who are the ones who 
travel regularly and who were most likely to have an interest in maintaining good 
relations. A passenger would usually have to pay, on top of the bus fare, the 
equivalent of a “normal” one-way bus ticket (ZAR200-300) which is, as with 
most informal transactions, negotiable. 
 It is quite common on the return journey to find passengers, who may 
include cross-border traders, handing over their travel documents to drivers once 
they arrive at the South African side of the border. These drivers facilitate the exit 
of passengers without leaving blemishes on the passports which may hamper 
future travel.  
All the above examples demonstrate the importance of trust and social 
networks and other informal social relations. Traders trust these drivers and the 
drivers in turn have established social networks and relationships with traders and 
immigration officials which benefit all the parties involved. For instance, traders 
at the time complained that regulations changed far too regularly and that when 
such changes did take place they sometimes did not get information about them 
which disadvantaged them at the border, hence the motivation to “beat” the 
system. 
Truck drivers moving within the region are also very important for 
facilitating the movement of traders and their goods. While new clothes came 
mainly from countries like South Africa and in some cases Botswana and Zambia, 
the three traders who exclusively sold second-hand clothes sourced them from 
Zambia
79
 (one trader) and Mozambique (two traders). More recently, South 
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The account by Karen Tranberg Hansen (2000) on second-hand clothes in Zambia remains the 
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Africa‟s economy has been flooded by new clothes imports from China. Countries 
such as Mozambique and Zambia are well-known destinations for second-hand 
clothes. Hansen (2000) has shown how the deregulated economy of Zambia 
facilitated the easy flow of second-hand clothes, referred to as salaula, into that 
country. 
As indicated earlier, the movement of goods such as new and second-hand 
clothes within the region is also facilitated by the movement of haulage trucks in 
the southern African region. Traders mentioned the importance of haulage trucks 
in transporting their goods. Another trader who regularly travels the Zimbabwe-
Mozambique route revealed that while the journey using a haulage truck took 
much longer because the driver sometimes stopped on the way to rest, there were 
certain advantages. For instance, one could get more goods across the border if 
they used a haulage truck because it was unlikely that a truck driver would be 
asked to unload bulky goods at the border and so bags could always be hidden on 
the truck. Another male trader who frequents the Zimbabwe-Zambia route said: 
These trucks are convenient in that they are not searched at the border and 
the truck drivers also charge less than the long-distance buses. I mean, if 
you use a bus you have to pay more for the ticket. Some operators will 
charge you for luggage. When you get to the border there will be customs 
to pay and you run the risk that your goods may be confiscated if you 
don‟t have enough money to pay whatever they may charge you. It‟s better 
off to try and get your goods across on some of these trucks. The journey 
is long but at least you pay less. If you want to carry a lot of things then 
you definitely have to find a truck that‟s passing through Zimbabwe. 
When you deal in second-hand clothes like me you have to buy in bulk. 
When you buy more you are also in a better position to negotiate the price 




                                                                                                                                     
to global South countries like Zambia. In Zimbabwe during the 1990s there was an increase in the 
flow of cheap imports and second-hand clothes, with severe negative impacts on local textiles and 
manufacturing. 
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Trader interview: Donaldson, Harare, July 2007. 
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Traders also mentioned that haulage trucks were convenient if they wanted to 
carry goods like bags of mielie meal, sugar, or bottles of oil, particularly in large 
quantities, when they carried these for friends and relatives back home. They said 
that on haulage trucks they could hide their goods among the load on the truck and 
did not have to pay customs and excise duty on them. Traders could also evade 
some of the regulations on the import and export of certain commodities. 
In August 2007 the government promulgated Statutory Instrument 137 of 
2007, the Control of Goods (Import and Export) (Agriculture) Regulations, in 
terms of the Control of Goods Act [Chapter 14:05], which saw it as “necessary 
and expedient to control the imports and exports from Zimbabwe of certain 
goods”. This statute was mainly for what were broadly termed “agricultural 
products”. Traders indicated that they were sometimes targeted by customs 
officials if they were carrying quantities of basic commodities like mielie meal, 
cooking oil, sugar and other basics which they themselves felt were reasonable 
quantities for personal consumption. In September the Customs and Excise 
(Designation of Luxury Items) (Amendment) Notice, 2007 (No. 1) came into 
effect – the Statutory Instrument Number 158 which was discussed above. Some 
traders felt that this constant changing of regulations made them susceptible to 
being taken advantage of by immigration officials who knew that traders did not 
know the intricacies of the regulations: 
Sometimes we don‟t even know that things have changed at the border. 
These guys sometimes take advantage of us. They know we don‟t know 
what‟s happening. Sometimes they even make miscalculations. You end 
paying much more than you need to. I don‟t even think that these guys 
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 Traders interview: Cisse, Harare, March 2008. 
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This confirms the argument of one analyst that bureaucratic procedures may 
actually force individuals into the informal realm of operation so as to escape the 
costs and complicated procedures of operating formally (De Soto, 2000). In the 
case of Zimbabwe, these are the sometimes complex and constantly changing 
customs and excise regulations instituted by revenue authorities in an economic 
crisis where revenues were declining. 
 One researcher at a local policy institute in Zimbabwe argued that the 
government was taking advantage of the desperation of traders by taxing them. He 
said:  
The government is broke and it is bound to take advantage of cross-border 
traders. Traders work with foreign currency a lot of the time. Most of the 
companies have either closed down or have scaled down their operations. 
This means that they are not bringing in that much revenue to the state in 
the form of taxes. Those in formal employment are not paying that much 
in taxes and the situation has been worsened by the fact that the 
Zimbabwean dollar is almost next to worthless.”82  
 
The same analyst added, “They definitely have to tax those in the informal 
economy at the border. It‟s a contradiction given that just recently we saw the 
government cracking down
83
 on informal traders and now they want revenue from 
these very same people whose operations they destroyed.” As demonstrated in 
earlier sections of this chapter, traders faced difficulties at the local level and also 
when travelling in the region to source goods originating from “global” 
production sites. 
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 Interview with a researcher at a local policy institute, Harare, August 2007. 
83
 Reference to the clean-up operation in major most cities dubbed Operation Murambatsvina. 
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5.4.4 Global and southern African connections in sourcing clothes and 
shoes 
 
New clothes and shoes sold by traders at the flea market travel a truly global 
journey from where they are manufactured in East Asian hubs to South Africa. 
Indeed, the issue of illegal Chinese imports into South Africa has been a challenge 
facing labour, as this has been accelerating the contraction of the textile industry 
in the country. The opening up of borders has also accelerated job losses in the 
textile industry as local South African companies cannot cope with the deluge of 
cheap Chinese imports. Business Day reported on 29 August 2009 that South 
Africa was increasing the “threshold tariff” on clothing from China from 40 to 45 
per cent so as to protect the declining local textile industry. As stated earlier, 
shops owners in China City and Dragon City in Johannesburg sell goods to 
informal traders from other southern African countries, showing the regional 
connections in this type of trade. 
 Research by Peberdy and Crush (1998), carried out for the Southern 
African Migration Project (SAMP), showed the popularity of Johannesburg as the 
leading destination for non-South African migrants involved in trading in the 
informal economy in South Africa itself and for those looking for goods to trade 
in other parts of Africa. Johannesburg was a very popular source of goods 
amongst the 37 clothes and shoe traders interviewed – twenty of them indicated 
that they sourced goods in Johannesburg. Of the 37 clothes and shoe traders 
interviewed, 34 sold new clothes or shoes. Of those 34 traders, four exclusively 
sold shoes, five traders had stalls with a mixture of shoes and clothes, and the rest 
(25) exclusively sold women‟s clothes or men‟s clothes or children‟s clothes. 
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Three traders, who were all women, exclusively sold second-hand clothes from 
either Zambia or Mozambique. These two counties are very important sources of 
second-hand clothes from the advanced industrialised countries, and these clothes 
connect the Zimbabwean “local” to the “global”.  
Traders reported that places such as China City and other smaller shops in 
the Johannesburg CBD were convenient places for purchasing commodities 
because of their proximity to the Park Station bus terminus and also because many 
of the Chinese and Pakistani store owners there were used to doing business with 
cross-border traders. Nigerian shop owners in downtown Johannesburg also said 
that they sold goods to Zimbabwean traders. They reported that they acquired 
their goods in places like Guangzhou in southern China, again an illustration of 
the way in which Chinese manufactured goods are “connecting the globe”. 
Fluctuations in the value of the US dollar, for example, on the global markets 
were reflected in the change of prices at China City during the 2007 and 2008 
period. Back in Zimbabwe, traders at the flea market would keep track of these 
changes – poring over newspapers every morning much like stock traders – 
because it affected the price they paid for clothes and shoes. A female trader said: 
Well, I have to know at how much the rand is trading against the US 
dollar. Whenever the value of the rand goes down in South Africa it means 
we will end up paying more. Most of the Chinese shops that I buy from get 





Another female trader said: 
In the days leading up to my journey to South Africa I will often follow 
the exchange rates. It‟s very important for me to know what‟s happening 
so that I can negotiate prices. Here in Zimbabwe you will sometimes get 
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 Trader interview: Jessica, Harare, March 2008. 
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customers who may be willing to buy in either US dollars or rand. I have 
to make a calculation whether I have to accept US dollars or rand, because 
sometimes you will accept US dollars and when you get to South Africa 
you get less rand than you will have budgeted for. Sometimes in the shops 
where we buy, the Chinese guys there will tell you that their costs have 
also gone up because they are paying more to get these things here. You 
have to know what‟s going on.85 
 
The issues discussed above illustrate the different ways in which the activities of 
seemly marginalised, unconnected informal traders in Zimbabwe are in fact 
connected to events that that are occurring on the global stage, although in a 
different, unequal manner. These accounts disprove arguments about Africa as a 
disconnected “black hole”.  
Traders, as the accounts above demonstrate, have been able to take 
advantage of economic processes like integration within SADC, which has to 
some extent eased the flow of human and non-human traffic. Some of this traffic 
moves legally and some of it is illegal.  
Research at the SAMP has indicated that since the collapse of apartheid in 
South Africa there has been an unprecedented increase in the movement of goods 
and people within the region, which has been facilitated to a great extent by the 
increased official trade among the SADC countries (Peberdy and Crush, 1998). 
There has also been an increase in illegal immigrants to South Africa, resulting in 
deportations. In 1999 some 123 961 illegal immigrants from Mozambique were 
deported, up from 71 279 in 1994, and 42 769 illegal immigrants from Zimbabwe 
were deported in 1999, up from 12 931 in 1994 (Waller, 2006). In the 2008-2009 
period some 300 000 Zimbabweans were deported from South Africa (CoRMSA 
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Trader interview: Lolo, Harare, March 2008. 
 234 
 
and FMSP, 2009). Some of these immigrants were fleeing economic crises in their 
countries of origin, and even hunger caused by grain shortages back home. 
Official trade in grain also occurs in SADC, which means that food moves 
throughout the region. For instance, “While overall trade between SADC 
countries is low, their trade in food follows a definitive pattern. The five SACU
86
 
countries tend to import over 70 per cent of their food requirements from South 
Africa, while the other countries intermittently import large amounts of grain (and 
larger amounts of dairy products and other minor foods) from South Africa and 
the rest of the world” (Moyo, 2008: 75). In terms of haulage traffic it has been 
reported, as indicated earlier, that some 300 trucks arrive at the Beitbridge border 
post between Zimbabwe and South Africa every single day (Business Day, 12 
October 2009).  
Over time, traders have developed relationships with some of the haulage 
truck drivers who operate in the southern African region. They keep some of these 
truck drivers‟ mobile numbers and call them on return journeys to find out if they 
are heading to or passing through Zimbabwe. A study by Muzvidziwa (2005) 
reported the importance of various kinds of transactional relationships between 
truck drivers and some of the female cross-border traders. Some of these 
relationships involved the exchange of sexual favours for free transportation of 
goods and for free accommodation. Most drivers of haulage trucks sleep in 
compartments on their trucks. In the research by Muzvidziwa (2005), some 
women were found to perform cooking duties for the drivers. 
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 SACU is the Southern African Customs Union which is made up of Botswana, Lesotho, 
Namibia, Swaziland and South Africa. 
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In contrast, the sample of women traders interviewed for this research did 
not report any such associations with haulage truck drivers. They did mention that 
on some occasions they used haulage trucks on return journeys, especially in peak 
periods like November and December. During these months transport from South 
Africa is either expensive or difficult to find because of increased demand due to 
the high number of Zimbabwean immigrants travelling home for the end-of-year 
holidays. The bus ticket price varies by operator, with those operators who have 
newer, more luxurious coaches changing the higher end ZAR400 per return trip 
while others charge ZAR300 and the operators with less luxurious older-model 
coaches charging ZAR200 in normal periods. The ticket price increases by 
between ZAR50-100 among the different operators during peak periods. 
Sometimes operators keep the price of the ticket the same but increase the price of 
ferrying luggage. For instance, one bus operator is known for increasing the price 
charged on luggage from ZAR2 per kilo to ZAR5 per kilo during peak periods. In 
addition to the price of the tickets, traders considered issues like leg room on the 
coach, whether the operator had a trailer for goods, and the time a bus departed for 
Harare when making a booking to travel. 
 The fact that women traders in the sample did not report some form of 
(sexual) transactional associations with haulage truck drivers does not rule out 
their existence. Some of the women traders saw haulage trucks as men‟s transport. 
For these women haulage trucks were “uncomfortable” and they felt that they 
were too cramped for a journey that took over 16 hours. The feeling among 
women traders was that most truck drivers preferred to have men as passengers 
 236 
 
because men could help out if the truck driver had mechanical problems or a 
punctured tyre.  
The issue of relationships between haulage truck drivers and women cross-
border traders also came up in interviews with some male traders, who maintained 
that they would never let their wives engage in cross-border trading. One male 
shoe trader said: 
Most of these women claim to be selling goods when they go to South 
Africa. It‟s all lies. They are selling themselves. Many women here at the 
market have boyfriends in South Africa who give them money. A lot of 
women also have boyfriends who are truck drivers. Some of these women 
simply go to South Africa too many times. Where do they get the money? 
I am sure they are not selling that much stuff. I go to South Africa after 
two months. Then you see women who sell just the same stuff that other 
women are selling going to South Africa every two weeks.
87
 I don‟t think 
they are making that much money to be able to afford so many trips. They 
go there with their truck driver boyfriends who give them money, free 





On the other hand, a single female cross-border trader felt that it was because of 
her marital status that she could travel to South Africa. She said: 
I have a friend who is married and even though they have financial 
challenges her husband won‟t permit her to go to South Africa to look for 
casual employment or to sell things. She says her husband always tells her 
stories of how women go to South Africa and become sex workers when 
they are there. I am free to travel because I am not married. I can travel as 




The dynamics of operations among the DVD and video game traders, as will be 
seen below, are different to the dynamics found among the clothes and shoe 
traders. Rarely do the operations of the DVD and video game traders intersect 
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 No women trader at the market reported making trips that often. 
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 Trader interview: Shame, Harare, August 2007. 
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 Trader interview: Chiwoniso, Harare, December 2007. 
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with the workings of the state. These traders did not incur transport costs for 
travelling to South Africa and while they occasionally travelled to South Africa or 
to Botswana to buy basic commodities for personal use, passports were not crucial 
for them to able to carry out their day-to-day operations at the market.  
 
5.5 Sourcing DVDs and video games (part one) 
 
5.5.1 Piracy across the globe 
 
The activities of traders dealing in DVDs and video games at the flea market 
illustrate what we earlier termed alternative globalisation or “globalisation from 
below”. These traders have been able to carve a niche area for themselves, and 
they provide their customers with the latest films and video game as they are 
released across the globe. In the case of some films, their “release” at the flea 
market may even “beat” the official theatre and DVD releases. The activities of 
most DVD and video game traders have very minimal and sometimes no 
interaction at all with the operations of the state. For example, most of the DVD 
and video game traders did not have to travel to South Africa or to Botswana to 
source digital copies of the DVDs and video games that they sold at the market. 
Thus they did not come into contact with customs or immigration officials. 
An 11 January 2002 report on a South African news website 
(www.iol.co.za) indicated that “Far Eastern piracy cartels are flooding South 
Africa with pirated videos, music CDs, DVDs” even before they are officially 
released (Sewsunker, 2002). At the time experts signalled that over 70 per cent of 
Sony Playstation video games in circulation in South Africa were illegal pirated 
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copies (Sewsunker 2002). The same report asserted that the intensive pace at 
which digital technology had improved over the years made it extremely easy to 
produce reasonably good quality videos and DVDs. While there were a few 
instances in which the Zimbabwe Music Corporation (ZMC) would send 
undercover agents to the flea market to check if there were traders selling pirated 
materials, they targeted local music DVD recordings. It is illegal to sell pirated 
local music and locally produced visual content in Zimbabwe, and offenders can 
be fined US$100 or be sentenced to do community service. The law in Zimbabwe 
is silent regarding piracy of foreign movies like the ones sold at the flea market 
examined in this study. None of the traders interviewed sold any local music 
although they did say that in the CBD there were individuals who sold pirated 
“local music”. They remarked that there was no business for that type of music at 
the market.  
According to a 2006 report (the most comprehensive to date) by the 
International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) – a body which 
according to its website represents some “1400 record companies in 72 countries 
and affiliated industry associations in 44 countries” (www.ifpi.org) – some 37 per 
cent or 1.5 billion of all CDs purchased legally (or otherwise) worldwide in 2005 
were pirated copies (IFPI, 2006). The IFPI also estimated that, based on pirate 
prices, the global traffic of pirated products was worth about US$4.5 billion in 
2005. In a 2006 study a leading analyst argued that illegal file sharing, enhanced 
by world-wide use of advanced technologies, harmed the music industry and 
negatively affected CD sales globally (Liebowitz, 2006). In its 2006 piracy report, 
the IFPI (2006: 5) cites research showing that “most CDs purchased illegally were 
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bought from the traditional commercial piracy sources, such as markets, street 
sellers and „car boot‟ sales”.  
The movie industry has not escaped this increase in the growth of piracy 
across the globe. Research commissioned by the Motion Picture Association 
(MPA) found that major US motion picture studios lost US$6.1 billion to piracy 
in 2005 (MPA, 2005). The same research noted that world-wide the motion 
picture industry (including foreign and domestic producers, distributors and many 
others) lost some US$18.2 billion due to piracy. The MPA identified “hard goods 
piracy” and “Internet piracy” as the most threatening forms of piracy to the 
industry.  
Hard goods piracy is defined as “obtaining movies by either purchasing or 
acquiring an illegally produced VHS/DVD/VCD
90
 through a commercial source, 
or making illegal copies for oneself or receiving from a personal source (friend or 
family) an illegal copy of a legitimate VHS/DVD/VCD” (MPA, 2005: 5). Internet 
piracy is “obtaining movies by either downloading them from the Internet without 
paying or acquiring hard copies of illegally downloaded movies from friends or 
family” (MPA, 2005: 5). The case of the DVD and video game traders at the flea 
market in Harare is definitely part of this global trend in the increase of piracy, 
albeit on a smaller scale. Piracy rates
91
 in 2005 were found to be highest in 
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 Russia and Hungary (MPA, 2005). Combined world-wide industry losses 
were reported as highest in China, France and Mexico. 
Research has concluded that the “typical worldwide pirate is 16-24 years 
old, male and lives in an urban area (MPA, 2005: 11). All the DVD and video 
game traders interviewed at the market were male; however, the majority of the 
12 DVD and videos game traders at the market were 23-30 years old. Seven 
traders exclusively sold DVD, three traders exclusively sold video games, and two 
traders sold both. All of them either sold pirated DVDs and/or video games, 
although on some occasions an original video game could be found. A video game 
trader displaying an original copy said that this was from his home collection, and 
that he was not interested in the game any more as he had acquired much more 
“advanced” game releases. There were no original DVDs displayed and sold at the 
market, though some traders did pass off DVD copies with high-quality sleeves as 
original and would sell them for much more than the rest, sometimes as much as 
ZAR50. 
 
5.5.2 The dynamics of DVD piracy 
 
Besides selling Internet downloads at the market, traders also had social networks 
with some Chinese nationals who facilitated access to pirated movies. The 
Chinese nationals stayed in Zimbabwe but made regular visits to their home 
country and on return trips would bring traders copies of movies. Such pirated 
DVDs often had ten popular movies with a similar theme on one disc. The movies 
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could be violent thrillers, horror films or romantic comedies. This example shows 
how traders can sometimes be globally connected. 
Traders sometimes acquired original copies of video games or “cult 
movies” through friends and kin overseas in places like the USA, the UK and 
Australia. Traders reported that the originals that they acquired in this way would 
normally be for their own personal use and they did not make copies to sell at the 
market, largely because these were special interest pieces which did not have a 
wider market. These would, for example, be documentaries or, in the case of one 
40-year-old male trader, “classic movies” released as far back as the 1950s. These 
connections with kin and friends are another instance of global connectors in an 
economy in crisis. 
Traders did not have to physically make journeys to acquire the goods that 
they sold. Their trade was made easier by the Internet. In other words, they were 
logged onto the information highway facilitated by modern technologies. This 
disproves arguments that those in the global South are disconnected from the so-
called network society. That these traders did not travel also meant lower costs for 
them. Also, they did not interact much with the state. Unlike the clothes and shoe 
traders, who had to pay customs and excise duty as well as to pay for transport 
and travel documents, the DVD traders did not have those costs. 
 At two stalls there were traders who sold or offered to acquire 
pornographic material. This was clandestinely done given the nature of the 
material. Pornographic DVDs were not displayed at any stall. Those traders 
selling such material reported that they only sold to their “regulars” and they did 
not provide such services to anybody that they were not familiar with or who was 
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not introduced to them by one of the regulars. These two traders also indicated 
that they could easily get pornographic films from the Internet. 
Once the traders had an illegal copy of a particular movie, they made 
several other copies to sell. Even in the case of video games, where a trader might 
acquire an original copy and sell it to a customer, they made several other copies 
for sell to those unable to afford the original, and they also kept back-up copies 
for themselves. All those who sold video games indicated that, other than getting 
copies illegally downloaded from the Internet in Zimbabwe, on some occasions 
they did get copies from suppliers in South Africa and they made further copies 
for sale at the market. Both the clothes and shoe traders and the DVD and video 
game traders engaged in some kind of illegal activities, but of a different nature. 
For the clothes and shoe traders it was the smuggling of goods across the border 
in contravention of customs and excise regulations. DVD and video game traders 
made and sold copies in contravention of international intellectual property law. 
They were also recipients of high-quality but fake DVDs and video games from 
Chinese nationals. 
 South Africa is one of the few countries on the continent which 
occasionally has simultaneous releases of the latest movies with the USA and 
other global North countries. In some cases, like that of the film X-Men Origins: 
Wolverine, directed by South African director Gavin Hood, it was released a day 
earlier in South Africa than in theatres across the United States. An unfinished 
version of the film illegally made it on to the Internet, highlighting the problems 
of piracy in the film industry. That South Africa it is the main conduit of movie 
distribution throughout the southern African region makes it a very fertile ground 
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for piracy. When movies finally make it on to DVD in South Africa, the starting 
price is normally above ZAR150 for new releases. Traders often complained 
about the very high prices of DVD movies in South Africa. For them it would be 
impossible to sell the original DVD movies at a reasonable profit: 
We sometimes have customers who come here and they want original 
DVDs. Even if I was to sell these there are only so many people I could 
possibly sell them to. The market simply isn‟t there at the moment and I 
can‟t afford to stock up on original DVDs. Most of our customers want 
reasonably priced, high-quality movies and they want us to have the copies 
of the latest movies. I know for a fact that we have movies here on DVD 
when they are still showing in theatres in South Africa. Most of the time 
we are weeks ahead of the cinema releases. It is only by selling fake copies 




In April 2007 a DVD was sold at the flea market for roughly the equivalent of 
ZAR20, with the newer releases sometimes selling for the equivalent of ZAR25-
30. Most customers at the market negotiated on the price and traders never sold 
something for the exact price which they first quoted a customer. The blank DVD 
onto which the movie was copied cost a trader at the time an equivalent of ZAR8. 
The DVD case and the printing of colour sleeves cost roughly the equivalent of 
ZAR5, though traders could cut this cost by just doing black and white covers. To 
produce the actual complete DVD would cost a trader the equivalent of ZAR13 
and the DVD would be sold at the flea market for the equivalent of roughly 
ZAR20. This a profit of ZAR7, assuming that there was no price negotiation, 
which was rare. Most traders ended up selling a DVD for the equivalent of 
ZAR18-19 (a profit of ZAR5-6), and the newer releases would sell for the 
equivalent of ZAR22-23. 
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The process of getting the end product that is sold at the market involves 
several steps, the first of which is acquiring the first (high-quality) digital copy. 
Almost all the movies at the market were acquired from „Taurai (Profile 6). 
Access to a reliable broadband Internet connection is imperative for one to be able 
to download movies. The faster the broadband connection, the faster the movies 
can be downloaded and the sooner they are available for traders so that they can 
make copies to sell at their stalls. Some of the traders created very solid 
reputations for their ability to make new films available before they were in wide 
circulation at the flea market. The Internet, as shown in the profile of Taurai 
below, has been the main driver in connecting the Zimbabwean “local” to the 
“global” in the current conjuncture. 
 
5.6 The traders: Profile 6 – From the digital copy to the hard 
copy (Taurai’s story) 
 
Taurai is a 25-year-old male university drop-out who does website and database 
design at a small indigenous IT company. On the side, he supplies movies 
downloaded illegally from the Internet to the traders at the market. Most of the 
movies come in a compressed DVix format. This format allows for faster 
downloading and more movies can be stored on a storage device. It is the 
responsibility of the traders themselves to convert these into the more widely used 
DVD format which can play on most commercially available home DVD players. 
 According to Taurai, a variety of illegal websites are available on the 
Internet, and this is where people like him download illegally acquired copies of 
movies. Taurai stated that some of the movies posted on the Internet were 
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sometimes shot by hand-held cameras during preliminary screenings. Some of 
them are actual copies which through leaks in film studios find their way onto the 
Internet. Taurai has the advantage of having a high-speed broadband Internet 
connection at work, which allows him to download multiple movies at the same 
time while he does his own work. At the end of the day he normally leaves his 
desktop machine at work downloading several movies during the night. On some 
occasions glitches do occur in the downloading process, for example, when there 
were electricity cuts in Harare. Such power cuts shut down the whole 
downloading process, much to Taurai‟s chagrin. 
 After downloading the copies Taurai physically delivers them to his 
“friends” at the flea market who, according to him, are the most reliable in terms 
of payment. None of them was ever willing to divulge how much money 
exchanged hands for these illegally acquired digital copies but it seemed that 
everybody was reasonably happy with whatever arrangement they had. One of 
Taurai‟s customers, a successful trader at the market who also owned a DVD 
rental store, normally spends the whole night making DVD copies. The process of 
making copies requires that one has a DVD burner (optical disk recorder). This 
could either be a stand-alone unit or it may be part of a desktop or laptop 
computer. One also has to have the software that can convert the DVix format to a 
DVD-player-compatible format.  
 After converting the digital copy into DVD format, the process of burning 
the actual DVD then takes place. Most DVD movies are burned on to either DVD-
R or DVD+R which can hold the expanded DVD format and can store up to six 
times more data than normal compact discs. At one trader‟s house there was a 
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small “lab” with a desktop computer, a stand-alone DVD burner, and a colour 
printer and photocopying machine for the reproduction of DVD sleeves. 
According to the trader, he stayed up into the early hours of the morning, 
especially on Thursdays (to prepare for Friday) and Fridays (to prepare for the two 
weekend days) to burn the latest films he had acquired during in the week. Being 
a one-man operation, it was obviously hard work for this particular trader, who 
sometimes went to sleep around 3 or 4 a.m., only to wake up at 7 a.m. to get to the 
market for the trading day. 
 The burning process is only one of several stages of making a pirated 
copy. There is the labelling of the non-playing side of the actual DVD which is 
done on the computer. Then there is the reproduction of DVD sleeves which is 
done on a printer or photocopying machine. It is cost-effective to print out one or 
two sleeves and then the rest are photocopied normally in black and white to save 
on ink. The burned DVDs have to be packed into their cases and the sleeves have 
to be slipped into transparent covers that are part of the DVD case. Two traders at 
the market had reproduction machines that they claimed could reproduce up to ten 
DVD copies every hour. The smaller traders had to rely on normal recorders 
which they said took longer to make copies. This affected their ability to have 
large stocks of the more recent movies.  
 Those without photocopying machines incurred additional costs because 
they relied on copy shops to make copies of DVD sleeves. They could not afford 
to label their DVDs and would sometimes have to label the disc using a pen, 
which affected the aesthetic qualities of the end product. Traders indicated that 
better-looking sleeves would attract more customers. Sometimes traders displayed 
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empty DVD cases with colour sleeves to a attract customers but gave customers 
cases in black and white when a purchase was made.  
Traders who were not so well-connected and who did not have direct 
access to the first digital copies waited until copies of something they wanted 
were available at the market. Then they asked a friend or somebody unknown to 
the other traders to purchase a DVD copy at one of the stalls which was already 
selling it. They then made their copies for sell from this. 
The account above illustrates the basic process that traders go through in 
making copies for sale at the market. At another level it also demonstrates that one 
does not need to be physically in the global North to have access to the latest 
images, sounds and motion pictures that “make waves” in the heartland of the 
global entertainment industry. The ability of traders to access films which would 
otherwise not make it to the film circuit in Zimbabwe can be described as an 
instance of the “global in the local” as suggested by Robertson (1995). Through 
the Internet and relatively simple technologies like reproduction machines and 
photocopiers, traders gain access to global products and disseminate them at the 
local level. So while the traders are definitely not actors in the legitimate global 
film industry which nets billions of US dollars annually for studio companies, 
they are actors, albeit in a different and unequal manner, in the illegal side of the 
industry. They are part of a global but illegal entertainment industry that also nets 
billions of US dollars for those who participate in it. Movies can be downloaded 
as soon as they are released and customers in Zimbabwe can watch the same 
movies that other people across the globe are watching. 
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Customers indicated that if it was not for the traders at the flea market they 
would not get to watch the latest films. According to one customer, a regular at 
the DVD stalls at the flea market: 
If you go and check what is showing at the theatres right now you will 
notice that they mostly screen movies released several months ago. Some 
are even releases from more than a year ago. Here at the market I can find 
the most recent movies and the quality is not bad at all. I can also watch 
and rewind the movie in the comfort of my home. I don‟t have to worry 





A contentious issue in the globalisation debate is that the world is becoming 
homogeneous as a result of globalisation, while on the other hand there are 
arguments that the world is becoming more “hybridized” and “polarized” (Holton, 
1998). While the world is by no means becoming homogeneous, it is important to 
acknowledge the way in which the (visual) content of DVDs, in the form of music 
DVDs and movies for example, may also shape some of the tastes and 
consumption patterns at the local level, as seen in the account below. 
 
5.7 Sourcing DVDs and video games (part two) 
 
5.7.1 The Americanisation of the world?: DVDs, their content and local 
taste 
 
In the winter of 2007 a young male, clutching a music DVD bought at one of the 
DVD stalls, approached one of the traders at the flea market. The trader is well-
known for stocking a variety of the most fashionable hooded jackets, also called 
“hoodies”, especially in winter. The sleeve of the DVD was emblazoned with the 
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image of Kanye West in a hooded jacket and the young man wanted a jacket 
exactly like that. The trader had something similar going for US$50. 
 The trader stated that it was common for customers to inquire about 
certain styles of jeans, t-shirts and jackets based on the style they had seen in 
movies or on music videos, and in some cases he would even go to watch some of 
the DVDs to catch on to the styles. Some of the customers would also bring 
pictures of the sneakers that they wanted, which they had downloaded from the 
Internet, and they would show these to the traders and ask for something similar.  
 Another trader noted that dressing styles and even the way that some 
young people talked were very much shaped by the kinds of movies that they 
watched. He recounted that many of the young people now used swear words 
because of the movies that they watched, and that the f-word was becoming 
ubiquitous among young people. Minutes later a group of boys in their teens 
passed, using all sorts of invective, clad in baggy jeans and head bands. The trader 
gave me a knowing “what did I tell you” look. One trader at another stall had the 
same sentiments and said that he was always shocked by some of the things that 
some young people and customers at the market knew and talked about. He 
remarked that it was common to see young people of school-going age smoking at 
the flea market, and in his mind it was because of “all those DVDs from America 
that they watch”. The themes in this material included violent crime, war, science 
fiction and romantic love. Some of the DVD movies showed rebellious teenagers 
who talked back to their parents and had no respect for older people. Others 
showed teenage sex, according to the trader, and he said this was “immoral”. 
Some movies were liked by teenagers for the “fashionable” clothes like baseball 
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caps, baggy jeans and flashy sneakers, and the trader said that was how most 
teenagers acquired the tastes they had in certain kinds of clothes. 
Besides shaping their tastes and consumption patterns at the local level, 
customers maintained that an advantage of piracy was that they had access to the 
latest movies, sometimes even before they were officially released. They boasted 
that they were part of the global. One customer said, “Whatever they watch there 
we are also watching here in Zimbabwe.” Another customer shared similar 
sentiments by saying, “I don‟t have to travel to America for the latest movies or to 
know about the latest dressing styles. I see it in the music DVDs and the movies 
that I get at the market.” In the current conjuncture it is important to acknowledge, 
however, that sometimes the local can also influence the global. Dreadlocks, for 
example, have become global. African music is also very popular globally. In the 
case of Zimbabwe, local musicians such as Oliver Mtukudzi, Thomas Mapfumo, 
and Chiwoniso Mararire are well-known internationally through stage 
collaborations or solo concerts in North America, Europe and on the African 
continent. 
While customers applauded piracy in terms of its ability to allow them to 
access those commodities (material, cultural, visual) which are considered de 
rigueur at a particular time, traders justified piracy in different terms which 
sometimes included economic necessity. Some traders indicated that “piracy is 
everywhere”. One trader argued that if the people in the United States and in 
Europe were also involved in pirated products then they saw nothing wrong in 
them doing it to make some money to survive in the difficult Zimbabwean 




These people make millions of dollars on some of these movies. I am sure 
that me selling fakes is not going to affect how much they make, is it? I 
mean, we are just the small fish men. We need to make money. Things are 




Yet another trader saw it in similar economic terms, saying, “Things are tough 
right now. I have to survive. My family has to survive. Piracy is everywhere, 
man”.96 On top of participating in DVD trading, traders also participate in a small 
way in the global video gaming industry by distributing pirated copies of video 
games. Like pirated DVD movies, most video games sold at the flea market also 
came from the Internet.  
 
5.7.2 Getting the video games 
 
According to an online gaming and technology news website, www.xbitlabs.com, 
“combined video game software unit sales across the world‟s three largest games 
markets
97
 experienced growth of 11% in [the] calendar year 2008, totalling 409.9 
million units versus the 367.7 million units sold across these markets in 2007” 
(Shilov, 2009: online). From such figures the video game industry is definitely a 
billion dollar industry. 
The process of getting pirated video games is very similar to getting video 
games. Traders at the Harare market sold a mixture of pirated and a very small 
number genuine copies. In a piece titled Biting the Hand that Feeds You, posted 
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 Trader interview: Munyaradzi, June 2008. 
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 The United State, the United Kingdom and Japan are the three largest markets for video games. 
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on a popular gaming resources website, the author indicates that “Virtually every 
game ever made can be found on the Internet and downloaded for free” and that 
“it has been this way nearly since the Internet was made public” (Guisinger, 2009: 
online). International intellectual property stipulates that it is only the owner of a 
game that can make a back-up copy for personal use and that copies should not be 
distributed. The “sharing, downloading, or game distribution of any kind is illegal 
whether the offender owns an original copy or not” (Guisinger, 2009: online). 
While the traders did know that what they were doing was illegal, they did not 
have a very sophisticated grasp of copyright law, which corporate lawyers for big 
companies definitely have.  
Most traders at the flea market got their games from Taurai (Profile 5), 
who supplied them for a fee that both traders and Taurai himself refused to 
disclose. However, I often accompanied Taurai on his rounds around the market, 
where he would be given amounts varying from ZAR100 to as much as ZAR300 
by different traders, which he simply said was money for movies and videos he 
had given the particular traders. Taurai was well-known for having flamboyant 
lunches at some of the food outlets nearby, so he probably made a reasonable 
amount of money from distributing films and games. It was up to the traders to 
make their copies for sale, a task which required a basic desktop computer with an 
optical device able to make copies in a file format called CD-ROM. PS2 version 
video game releases from the previous three years sold at the market for roughly 
the equivalent of ZAR80-150 (negotiable).  
While the price of DVDs hovered around a particular mark, the case of 
video games was different. Issues of availability were very important and, 
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according to Taurai, games did not make it onto downloadable Internet sites as 
quickly as DVDs. For example, some traders charged as much as ZAR180 for 
newer releases of the PS3 version of video games. Those traders able to acquire 
high-quality pirated hard copies of recently released games could sell them for as 
much as ZAR250. However, one trader indicated that he preferred not to sell these 
high-quality pirated hard copies so that he could make further copies for sale.   
Another very important source for video games was the Chinese 
community, which has a relatively strong presence in Zimbabwe. The 
Zimbabwean-focused news website www.newzimbabwe.com reported in 2008 that 
“Mugabe has cultivated relations with Asian countries as part of a so-called „look 
east‟ policy since many western countries imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe four 
years ago, accusing the president of human rights violations” (newzimbabwe.com, 
2008; online). Though actual figures on the settlement patterns of the Chinese are 
unavailable, the “look east policy” deliberately encouraged Chinese nationals to 
settle in the country, and the national airline, Air Zimbabwe, even had a direct 
flight to Beijing on a weekly basis. Processes of globalisation also involve the 
increased movement of nationals from different countries across the globe 
(Appadurai, 1990) and Zimbabwe, despite its pariah status, still had nationals 
from different countries visiting the country, though at a much slower pace than 
previously.  
Social relations between Chinese nationals and some of the local traders 
facilitated access to pirated copies of video games (and in some cases DVDs) for 
the traders. While there were no Chinese nationals at the market trading in video 
games or DVDs, traders indicated that they had Chinese friends who sometimes 
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brought video games for them when they returned from their annual holidays in 
China. This demonstrates the importance of social networking between those at 
what could be termed the local and those that are at the global or have access to it, 
in facilitating the flow of commodities between the two. Traders indicated that 
they sometimes paid a nominal fee (which they were unwilling to reveal) for these 
games. However, some of the traders (not involved in selling video games) at the 
market claimed that teenage Chinese nationals would sometimes ask to be paid in 
cannabis. Further probing of these claims did not yield much, hence their veracity 
could not be ascertained. 
One trader at the market, Kuziwa, on some occasions had Playstation 
game consoles for sale. In video game terminology such devices, on which games 
are played, are termed “platforms”. Desktop computers are another cheaper 
platform that “gamers” use. Some gamers also use their television sets for the 
simpler games, which just require a simple controlling device like a “joystick”. 
For a PS3 console customers would have to pay at least US$1000. A pertinent 
point is that Kuziwa heavily relied on his brother who is based in Australia to 
send him some of these electronic devices. Though most of the devices were 
supposed to be for his personal use, Kuziwa sold them: 
Sometimes it is very difficult for me to ask for money from my brother in 
Australia as regularly as I would want to. If I ask him to send me gifts I 
can always convert these to cash by selling them. A PS3 is relatively cheap 
in Australia. I can also ask him for games that can play on the PS3. I am 
25 years now so it‟s expected that I should be looking after myself. I don‟t 
have any qualifications so there is no way I am going to ask my brother to 
join him in Australia. I visited him once but it‟s not the kind of lifestyle 
that I would want to live. It‟s tough, especially if you are not educated.98 
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 Trader Interview: Kuziwa, 15, August 2007. 
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It is through relatives that traders like Kuziwa can access the latest technological 
products. Earlier on we indicated that monetary remittances have remained an 
important global connector. The same argument can be made for some of the 
latest electronic equipment that traders receive from relatives who are based 
abroad. They are a form of non-monetary remittances that traders may convert to 
cash at a later stage depending on their financial needs. In a time of globalisation, 
commodities, rather than the Internet or air travel may sometimes be the link that 
connects people. These connections should be seen as an alternative form of 
globalisation, contrary to conceptualisations that see Africa as a disconnected, 




In End of the Millennium, Castells (1998) hypothesises that hope for most of sub-
Saharan Africa to connect with the networked society lay with South Africa which 
accounted, at the time of his writing, for 44 per cent of the total GDP of sub-
Saharan Africa and 52 per cent of the industrial output. While South Africa 
continues to be the continental economic powerhouse, Castells does not take into 
consideration that countries on the continent could actually be part of the global 
networked society in a different, albeit unequal way to those countries in the 
global North. Throughout the thesis there has been an emphasis on this unequal 
pattern of global connections across Africa.  
In a critique of some of the negative conceptualisations of the African 
continent, one analyst asserts that “recent thinking about „the globe‟ and „the 
global‟ often evokes an image of a planetary network of connected points, and 
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that „Africa‟ is marginal to, and often even completely absent from such dominant 
imaginations of „the global‟” (Ferguson, 2006: 6). Africa is not completely absent 
from what is happening globally. For instance, the activities of Chinese 
companies who are investing in oil ventures in countries such as Angola shows 
the way in which the continent is linking up to the globe. Recently the Chinese 
government pledged US$10 billion to sub-Saharan African countries, again an 
example of how capital is connecting the continent. 
If anything, the Internet has allowed Africa to have the same desires as the 
rest of the world and to consume the same images, sounds and products. The case 
of the DVD and video game traders reveals the need for such a conceptualisation. 
As Ferguson (2006:49) writes: 
The fact that an African-focused picture of globalization looks so unlike 
what most global theories lead us to expect does not mean that other 
accounts, „from‟ other „places,‟ can simply be dismissed…. Instead, the 
view from Africa challenges us to develop new, more situated 
understandings of emerging global patterns, understandings that attend 
more adequately not only to new interconnections, but also to material 
inequalities and spatial and scalar disjunctures that such interconnections 
both depend on and, in some ways, help to produce. Above all, what the 
inconvenient questions coming out Africa show us is how much more 
thinking, and how much more empirical research, remains to be done 
before we can really understand a globalization that divides the planet as 
much as it unites it. 
 
The approach in this project is to consider the variability of globalizations as far 
as Zimbabwe is concerned. While the role that Zimbabwe is playing in the global 
economy or the information technology industry is minimal, a different lens 
reveals that the global connections through commodity flows like clothes and 




In addition, social capital and social networks are important in 
understanding the lives of traders at the market and in enabling these global 
connections. It is also pertinent to re-imagine and contextualise how networks and 
social capital enable those in the developing world, like Zimbabwe, to manoeuvre 
their way in difficult times. A central point is that social networks and other types 
of social capital are also enablers in periods of economic crises as they facilitate 
access to certain kinds of resources, especially where the state has been “scaled 
back” or where it is unable to meet the needs and demands of the populace.  
Also, on a global scale it is much more useful to think in terms of different 
and alternative globalizations that may follow multiple, dissimilar and (materially) 
unequal trajectories. Countries like Zimbabwe may actually be networked much 
like the global North countries, albeit in a different way. Informal economic 
activities among the clothes and shoe traders and the DVD and video game traders 
“reach to the global”. At a time when the Zimbabwean economy has essentially 
involuted, the activities of these particular traders have not reverted to a 
primitivist domestic economy but are in actual fact connected to the global.  







The Case of Arts and Crafts Traders and Second-hand 





The previous chapter considered the cases of the clothes and shoe traders and the 
DVD and video game traders with reference to issues of social networking as a 
source of social capital. The chapter also considered how the activities of these 
traders connect them to the “global”. This chapter proceeds with a similar 
conceptual and analytical framework to reveal the other side of the story. The 
focus shifts to the case of arts and crafts traders and the second-hand book traders 
who largely source their goods locally. Social networks also play a pertinent role 
among these traders, especially in the sourcing and selling of goods. 
While all the clothes and shoe traders interviewed had to travel outside the 
country at some point to source goods, this was not the case for the majority of 
arts and crafts traders interviewed. A few did travel to places like Cape Town in 
South Africa. They travelled there either to deliver goods to other Zimbabwean 
street traders or to meet with dealers from countries such as the Netherlands who 
had a consignment of arts and crafts. 
Clothes and shoe traders and the DVD and video game traders acquired 
goods manufactured at the global level and sold them at the local level. Their case 
is that of the “localisation of the global”. The focus of this particular chapter is on 
the “globalisation of the local”. These are instances in which goods acquired 
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locally and sold at the market find their way onto the global level. The activities 
of the traders extended into the SADC region. They sold commodities like arts 
and crafts to dealers from countries like South Africa and Botswana. These 
dealers then often exported the arts and crafts directly to international destinations 
or sold them to tourists and other dealers who visited countries in the region. In 
recent times there has been a contraction of the number of tourists coming to 
Zimbabwe because of political instability, and this has diverted tourists towards 
other regional destinations which are seen as much more stable politically, 
economically and socially. 
While the economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe certainly resulted in a 
reduction in tourist arrivals, there has not been an outright collapse of the tourism 
industry. For arts and crafts traders, tourists constituted a substantial portion of 
their customer base. In the context of a collapsing economy where many locals 
faced, and continue to face, economic difficulties, the amount of disposable 
income that locals can spend on luxury items like arts and crafts has definitely 
contracted. Foreign nationals and some of the locals based in countries in the 
region occupied an important nexus in the flow of arts and crafts to regional and 
in some cases international destinations.  
Book traders, as will be seen, gained in that they were able to access cheap 
books from Zimbabweans who were relocating because of the economic and 
political crisis. On the other hand, their trade was hit by the crisis in that slowing 
tourist arrivals resulted in declining sales of “rare” and out-of-print books which 
were much sought after by tourists from other countries. Due to the collapse of the 
most productive sectors of the economy in Zimbabwe, there have also been major 
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shortages of locally printed school textbooks for almost all levels of the education 
system. Some traders were able to take advantage of this situation by buying and 
selling textbooks, though these were generally in short supply. The illicit nature of 
trade concerning some of these books will be considered later on. 
 
6.2 Early global connections in the modern arts and crafts trade 
in Zimbabwe 
 
The establishment of the National Gallery in 1957 and sculpture parks in later 
years in urban Harare was central in bringing not only stone sculpture but 
Zimbabwean arts and crafts in general to the attention of the international 
community. The gallery as an institution spawned early interest in arts and crafts 
not only among those who identified themselves as artists but also among people 
who traded in arts and crafts. 
As far as stone sculpture is concerned, the literature has most prominently 
referred to “Shona sculpture” but experts on the topic assert that the term is 
misleading because it assumes that “all artists are Shona, and implies a collective 
societal and cultural allegiance on their part. The sculptors are from different 
societies, indigenous and immigrant to Zimbabwe, with differing ontological and 
cosmological perspectives which determine subject matter, treatment of subject 
and treatment of material” (Winter-Irving, 1991: 29). At the market there were 
also sculptures in wood which traders reported to be much easier to handle 
because these pieces were much lighter than stone pieces. There were also arts 
and crafts pieces, particularly from countries such as Zambia, Malawi and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo – previously Zaire. The pieces from these 
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countries tended to be predominantly ceremonial masks, costumes, head rests and 
stools made of wood. These were sold exclusively in US dollars.  
 Stone sculpture in Zimbabwe dates back to the time of what is now called 
Great Zimbabwe, an ancient empire from about 600 years ago (Mor, 1987) which 
bequeathed stone sculptures to the present-day nation. Several pieces of sculpture 
from this era, regarded as belonging to the people of Zimbabwe, are displayed at 
the National Gallery in Harare. The first director of the National Gallery of Harare 
(then Salisbury) was appointed in 1957 and, as mentioned earlier, with the gallery 
came the attention of the international community. For example, there were 
Zimbabwean sculptures in exhibitions at the Commonwealth Institute in London 
in 1963 and the New York Museum of Modern Art in 1969 (Mor, 1987). 
Exhibitions were also held at the Musée Rodin in Paris in 1971 and at the Musée 
d‟Arte Moderne in Paris in 1972, and this was done under the auspices of the 
National Gallery (Winter-Irving, 1991). Obviously, participation in these events 
was for those who were categorised as professional artists. What is important is 
that many of these Zimbabwean artists, just like the traders who today 
manufacture their own pieces, did not go to any tertiary art school to learn their 
craft. Most were self-taught, and learned by observing others. 
The establishment of The Market, where arts and crafts could be bought, 
on the ground floor of the National Gallery in 1986 helped to expose the 
Zimbabwe arts and crafts scene to the international community (Winter-Irving, 
1991). The Market was established in time for the 1986 Non-Aligned Conference 
held in Harare and it allowed artists to gain international recognition, with some 
of them subsequently being invited to places like Hungary for exhibitions. At the 
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time metal sculpture and other arts and crafts pieces in metal found their way onto 
the arts scene (Winter-Irving, 1991). Importantly, other people who sold arts and 
crafts in the street and at informal markets also benefited from this attention as 
they also sold to tourists visiting the country. 
 Another institution which was very instrumental in the internationalisation 
of sculpture and other arts and crafts in Zimbabwe was the Tengenenge Sculpture 
Park established in 1966 on a commercial farm about 150 km north of Harare. It 
was a haven for several sculptors from southern Africa. During Zimbabwe‟ peak 
in terms of tourism – before and after independence – it was considered an 
institution that any tourist had to visit (Winter-Irving, 1991). Through Tengenenge 
various artists were also able to exhibit abroad, especially after independence, in 
places such as Bulgaria, Holland and Germany, under the auspices of the National 
Gallery and other associations like the Zimbabwe-Germany Society. Tengenenge 
attracted many art buyers from international markets, and in the process made 
Zimbabwean arts and crafts widely available to the international community in the 
post-independence era (Winter-Irving, 1991). 
The Chapungu Sculpture Park in Harare was also instrumental in bringing 
arts and crafts in Zimbabwe to international attention, with exhibitions in 
locations such as the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and the 
Middle East, as well as in African countries like South Africa. Established in 
1980, the Chapungu Sculpture Park played a prominent role in the large-scale 
commercialisation of the arts and crafts, especially of stone sculpture, and had a 
widely circulated monthly newsletter in its heyday (LaDuke, 1997). Perhaps a 
testament to the success of the commercialisation of Zimbabwean crafts, 
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especially sculpture, is that Chapungu also has very prominent operations in 
Colorado in the United States under the directorship of Chapungu‟s original 
founder, Roy Guthrie, where there is a 26-acre open-air exhibition park popular 
with tourists and locals. Sculpture pieces can also be bought there. Traders at the 
market in Zimbabwe did not report any linkages with international operations like 
that of Chapungu in United States, although two very successful traders at the 
market did report that on occasion they sold a large number of pieces to some 
Zimbabwean nationals and they suspected they were exporting these pieces to 
foreign destinations like the United States.  
Trading in arts and crafts in the current environment is seen as especially 
risky by some of the traders because of the decline in tourist arrivals. The collapse 
of the Zimbabwean economy and issues concerning negative international outlook 
for the country have already been charted in Chapter 2. Traders at the market had 
a very good grasp of the root causes of the decline of their trade, especially with 
reference to the non-arrival of tourists. With the economy sinking ever deeper, 
British airways, the only other carrier which still had direct flights into Zimbabwe 
from Europe, ceased direct flights from the end of October 2007. This did not help 
the image of the country. The situation was compounded when warnings were 
issued by countries such as the United States, Germany and Australia regarding 
travel to Zimbabwe. These negative perceptions abroad definitely contributed to 
the contraction of tourism in the country. The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, which has 
offices in Zimbabwe, cited figures showing tourist arrivals had declined by 36 per 
cent in the first half of 2004 when compared to 2003 (FES, 2004). The FES also 
indicated that tourism performance in Zimbabwe had declined at an accelerated 
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pace, especially since 2002, contributing to continued negative performance of the 
economy. A testament to the institutional collapse is that none of the tourism 
bodies, like the Zimbabwe Tourism Authority (ZTA), have produced any 
information in recent times which empirically track statistics like tourist arrivals. 
In early 2009 hotel occupancy rates were reported to be about 30 per cent, if not 
lower. Generally, there has been a negative growth in the hospitality and tourism 
industry in the past few years, just like in other sectors of the economy. The 
decline in tourist arrivals has affected traders like Mason, profiled below. 
 
6.3 The traders: Profile 7 – Mason 
 
Mason, also known as Dread because of his mop of dreadlocked hair, is a 36-year-
old arts and crafts dealer who stays in Chitungwiza, which is part of Greater 
Harare. He is married with two children, a boy and a girl, both of whom are in 
primary school. His wife does not work. She is a full-time mum. On the morning 
that I arrive at his stall in mid-2007 looking to establish rapport with him, after 
having been introduced the previous day by another trader, he is late by the 
standards of the market, where most people open their stalls around 9 o‟clock in 
the morning. When he does show up two hours later, he tells me he went to bed 
well after midnight because he had to move house after a dispute with the landlord 
over rent.  
According to his estimates he had been paying an equivalent of almost 
ZAR500 per month to rent a four-roomed cottage, and the landlord wanted to 
double the amount on short notice. Mason felt that this was unreasonable and 
totally out of his reach given that he was already struggling with the current rate. 
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Mason‟s rental payments were a mixture of Zimbabwean dollars, US dollars and 
South African rand, depending on what he had managed to make at the market 
and on his “reserves.” When he got back home from work the previous evening, 
the landlord was threatening immediate eviction if Mason did not agree to the 
rental increase. Having failed to reach an agreement, Mason called some of 
friends in and around Chitungwiza to find out if they could assist him in getting a 
place to stay. It was at about 10 o‟clock at night that one of his friends found a 
place belonging to his uncle that was available to rent.  
Mason hired a small truck to move his furniture the same night; he was 
charged the equivalent of ZAR300 for the three trips needed to move to the three-
roomed cottage about two kilometres away from where he was. He managed to 
pay half of the amount and promised to pay the rest in future in hard currency. His 
new rent was the equivalent of ZAR300. Evictions at such short notice are very 
common in Harare where there is shortage of accommodation. Landlords prey on 
the situation of urban dwellers like Mason and often announce abrupt rent 
increases to coerce tenants to agree to them. Though legally the Rent Board 
stipulates at least one month‟s notice for eviction and for rental increases, this 
edict is rarely followed by the city‟s landlords. Many, like other Zimbabweans, 
are reeling under the effects of Zimbabwe‟s economic crisis.   
Mason‟ life story, like that of most traders at the market, is also the story 
of the Zimbabwean crisis which has had a deleterious impact on the lives of the 
local populace, traders included. He recollects that he started a stall at the flea 
market in about 1996 or 1997. He claims that then the arts and crafts dealers and 
manufacturers did not pay rent because the owner of the market had personally 
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invited them to come and sell their goods there. This, according to Mason, was 
meant to introduce some diversity to the market, where most of traders just sold 
clothes. His account of events is disputed by other traders, who say they were 
there in those early days, and maintain that everybody paid rent though none of 
them, a mixture of retrenched workers and school dropouts, had any recollection 
of the precise amount they paid. Mason, however, says that it was only when there 
was increased pressure on stall space that everybody began to pay rent.  
 Mason dropped out of school before he completed his O-Levels. He was 
very evasive about why he dropped out. He had been staying with an uncle, his 
late father‟s brother, whom he said could afford to pay his fees. Mason said, “It 
was all right staying with him”99 and left it at that. After dropping out he moved in 
with a friend who was a bachelor and stayed in Glen Norah in southwest Harare. 
The friend made and sold arts and crafts at the road side on Beatrice Road, which 
connects Harare to Masvingo where the Great Zimbabwe ruins are located, and 
goes on further to the border town of Beitbridge.  
Mason learned sculpture by observing, and began making and selling 
small pieces of birds, the human form and others. When the friend got married, 
Mason moved to his own rented room in Highfield but continued working with 
his friend. Although he was young then, about 19 years old he said, he was 
already learning to look after himself. Most of his friends then either stayed with 
relatives or parents. He could not move in with his sister who was married. He 
said, “It‟s not right to go and stay with a brother-in-law where I come from”. 
Also, his sister was still not happy with the fact that he had dropped out of school 
                                                 
99
 Trader interview: Mason, Harare, June 2007. 
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when there was somebody who could afford to pay school fees for him. She felt 
that Mason should have stuck it out. 
 Mason recounts that in those days, in the mid-1990s, things were fine. He 
could pay his rent and he could also send bags of seeds and fertilizer to his mother 
in the rural areas in Masvingo about 280 kilometres from Harare. He sold 
sculpture pieces and other curios to motorists, some of them white South African 
tourists travelling by road, and also other tourists from Namibia and Zambia. 
Mason says that he moved to the flea market in the hope that he would develop 
and grow his business. When he started out at the market he got friends to leave 
their pieces and sold them at a mark-up and pocketed the difference. Over time he 
developed a client base that included tourists and cross-border traders who sold 
arts and crafts in countries such as South Africa and Namibia. With time and with 
better revenues, Mason bought sculptures and other arts and crafts from his 
friends and then put a 40 to 50 per cent mark-up on them, and then sold these to 
clients. Mason said that then he would buy necklaces for the equivalent of ZAR10 
and sell them for the equivalent of ZAR15. He relied on selling large volumes. He 
remarks that he made some good money, though it is unclear what he did with the 
money he made, given his precarious situation at present. He does not seem to 
have saved or invested any of it. When he was 26 he got married and moved to 
Warren Park which is closer to the CBD, where he rented a comfortable two-
roomed cottage with his young wife. He was able to furnish his house, and when 
his wife became pregnant he could afford medical check-ups at the Avenues 
Clinic, known then for its high-quality services. She also delivered there. He said 
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it cost him a “bit of money” and though he paid up front he could “afford” it and 
his wife got the best medical attention. 
Mason recalls that in the late 1990s and early 2000s things had gone bad 
and his income was dwindling. He also found himself constantly moving house. 
Sometimes he missed rent payments because he did not make any sales and on 
other occasions the landlord requested that he move because a male relative who 
had been retrenched needed a place to stay with his family. From Warren Park he 
moved to Chitungwiza in 2002. By then they already had a second child. He 
recalls that the rent in Chitungwiza was about three-quarters of what he paid in 
Warren Park. However, cheaper rent also meant that he moved further away from 
the CBD, Chitungwiza being some 25 kilometres from the Harare CBD, so 
commuting to work took longer. On the infamously inefficient Harare public 
transport system it sometimes took him three hours or even more, including the 
time spent queuing for transport, to commute from home into the CBD and then to 
the flea market. This commute could be tiring at times. 
The periods of decline in business mentioned by Mason coincide with the 
problems in the Zimbabwean economy which affected industries such as 
manufacturing, agriculture and also the tourism industry from which traders like 
Mason earn their living. This was confirmed by the accounts of other arts and 
crafts traders who said that their businesses had been hit in recent years as the 
tourist arrivals had slowed down.  
Mason remarks that in the current, very difficult environment his priority 
was making sure that his children had enough to eat and could go to school. His 
wife now insisted that the children take off their school clothes and shoes as soon 
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as they got home because she did not want them getting worn out quickly since 
there was no money for replacement. Mason says that he can no longer afford to 
send seeds or fertilizer to the family rural home where a married male cousin 
looks after the place, Mason‟s mother having passed on. He fears that if he does 
not make enough money he cannot not pay his rent which might result in eviction, 
putting his family out on the street. Mason also has deep-seated anxieties and 
fears about anybody in the family falling ill. Though he tries to always keep about 
US$100 stashed away in case of a medical emergency he sometimes has to use 
this money either to pay rent when he does not make enough in a particular month 
or to pay a supplier he owes and has not paid for a while. Like other traders, 
Mason remarks that if he falls ill it would curtail his ability to make a living and it 
would also cost him money. He could not afford private medical aid for himself 
and his family, so in case of an emergency he would have to pay medical fees 
upfront. Also, medicines and other essentials like basic household commodities 
were scarce and where available, out of reach for ordinary Zimbabweans.  
When he manages to make a sale Mason sometimes asks his friends who 
trade in clothes and shoes to get a few basic commodities in South Africa when 
they make trips there. Like other traders he relies on social ties and networks with 
colleagues at the market for sourcing these basic groceries in an environment 
where basics are unavailable in local shops. His priorities in such cases are mielie 
meal, cooking oil, bathing and washing soap, and non-perishable foodstuffs for 
his children‟s lunch boxes when they go to school. The difficulties that he 
experiences with transport and the decline of earnings resonate with the accounts 
of the majority of traders at the market. These traders, just like Mason, have very 
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precarious lives where incomes are unpredictable. Life is a daily struggle in an 
economy in crisis where social reproduction is largely individualised. 
Mason uses his access to the market to dominate his suppliers, who 
include peasants from rural areas. In the tough economic situation he insists that 
suppliers leave their crafts and then come to collect the proceeds of the sale at a 
later date. He says that in the past he was able to pay up front but given the 
declining sales he wait to sell a piece before paying the supplier. Mason simply 
does not have the money to pay his suppliers. He also remarks that he has to 
maximise his profits when he gets an opportunity to make a sale. Mason says, 
“Business is business, man. I have to make money when the opportunity is there. I 
might not make a sale for a while so I have to make sure a sale is a good sale”.  
Sometimes Mason buys a small sculpture for the equivalent of ZAR50 and 
sells it for seven to ten times the price. He does not have any qualms about the 
huge difference between the price differential. In most cases he tries as much as 
possible to undercut the prices that he pays suppliers for their commodities. The 
relationship between him and his suppliers is thus an exploitative relationship. 
The vast majority of arts and crafts traders at the market who rely on suppliers for 
commodities also tend to have exploitative relationships with their suppliers. 
Traders sell finished arts and crafts, and in that sense do not add any value 
to the goods they sell but exploited their position in the commodity chain. There is 
considerable evidence of this exploitation and inequality in other parts of the 
African continent as far as economic relations in the informal economy are 
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concerned. For example, a study of women shea butter
100
 producers in the 
informal economy in West Africa by found that the women were exploited by 
local middlemen who sold the raw material to other exporters and accrued most of 
the profits along the chain (Carr, Chen and Tate, 2000). For example, in the case 
of the shea butter produced in Burkina Faso, the end consumers in Europe paid 84 
times the price that local women were paid for the raw material by the local 
middlemen. In their compelling account Carr, Chen and Tate (2000: 129) argue 
that most commodity chain analysis considers the main agents locally and 
globally and fail to consider “weaker links” in the chain, where those with the 
“least knowledge, mobility, or power, and hence, the lowest returns” are located. 
This is where the suppliers who sell arts and crafts to the traders at the flea market 
are located. Besides the struggling young and old peasants from rural areas, there 
were other suppliers. Some were young male urban dwellers who were trying to 
raise money for passports fees and intended to leave Zimbabwe for countries such 
as South Africa, Botswana or Namibia. Others were urban dwellers looking for an 
opportunity to make money quickly. They possessed less power and knowledge in 
the commodity chain than the traders who sourced goods from them and 
“squeezed” them on prices. 
 Although most traders sourced arts and crafts such as stone and wooden 
sculptures locally, there were goods that came from other countries in the southern 
African region. 
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 Shea butter is used for cooking, as lotion and for medicinal purposes, and there is a growing 
market for it in North America, Europe and Japan where it used in high-end cosmetics (Carr, Chen 
and Tate, 2000). 
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6.4 Sourcing arts and crafts: local and regional connections 
 
6.4.1 The local connections 
 
In addition to stone and wooden sculpture, the arts and crafts scene at the flea 
market also involved the production and selling of handicrafts and curios. Traders 
sold pieces like bangles, necklaces, earrings, wire crafts (small figurines made of 
wire and sometimes larger pieces), paintings, wallets, picture frames, head rests, 
baskets and a variety of ironwork. The rubric term “arts and crafts” is used here to 
refer to all the goods sold by traders at the market. Similar arts and crafts are also 
ubiquitous in informal markets in other parts of southern Africa. For example, 
Peberdy (2000) gives an account of the handicraft and curios sector among traders 
in Cape Town and Johannesburg, with some of the pieces originating in 
Zimbabwe. Demonstrating the transnational nature of this sector on the African 
continent, the author also found that some of the arts and crafts and the traders 
themselves came from other southern African countries such as Zambia, Malawi 
and Mozambique, as well as countries such as Kenya and Ghana. 
 As indicated earlier the majority of arts and crafts traders at the market did 
not need passports in order to ply their trade. While there were regional 
connections, for example with Zimbabwean traders in places like South Africa 
and traders and dealers from other regional countries and other international 
destinations, the large majority of traders at the market did not report partaking in 
cross-border travelling in the sourcing and selling of their commodities. Unlike 
the clothes and shoe traders who are highly connected to what can be termed the 
global, in the sense that their goods originated from countries as distant as China, 
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this was not the case in the sourcing of arts and crafts. Also, while clothes and 
shoe traders interacted with the state in terms of getting passports and in 
manoeuvring the customs and excise regime, this was not the case with the 
majority of the arts and crafts traders who mainly sold their goods locally.  
The vast majority of arts and crafts sold at the market were manufactured 
in Zimbabwe, either by the traders themselves or by other manufacturers who then 
sold them to traders at the market. All 11 arts and crafts traders at the flea market 
were interviewed. As indicated earlier, there were nine males and two females 
trading in arts and crafts. Of the two females one was 60 years old and married 
and the other was 39 years old and widowed. Of the male traders five were 
married and four were single. All of the traders reported sourcing most of their 
goods locally. All nine male traders reported that they had at some point made 
certain pieces themselves or continued to do so, especially pieces like bangles and 
necklaces.  
Traders considered items like bangles and necklaces as reasonably easy to 
make since the manufacturing process does not require much artistic expertise. 
The 39-year-old female trader at the market reported that she made most of the 
items that she sold, sometimes at the market in between attending to customers 
and at times at home as she prepared meals. She mainly sold necklaces, bangles, 
earrings, key rings, rings carved out of wood, and other accessories. She also 
made and sold wire-craft. She reported that she had learned to make these by 
observing others. This trader reported that she had started her business in 1995, 
making and selling crafts on the Msasa Road which connects the Chapungu 
Sculpture Park and the CBD. Like other traders, she hoped to take advantage of 
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tourists on their way to the park. With the decline in tourist arrivals she had 
moved to the market in the hope that she could make more money there, but life 
was a struggle. 
The other female trader reported that she had always bought her pieces and 
had never been personally involved in manufacturing what she sold at the market. 
She was a globally connected trader, with children in the United States and the 
United Kingdom who facilitated her sale of expensive sculptures. She reported 
that her children sometimes carried one or two large pieces with them when going 
back abroad after coming to visit her. Despite the vast geographic distances, this 
trader maintained social ties to her children who remitted money to her. In her 
case money was sent through the bank to relatives in South Africa who then had 
the money physically taken to her by relatives or friends visiting Harare. She 
acknowledged that the money sent to her did cushion her when things were not 
going well, but said that it was good that she did not always have to rely on these 
remittances. She said, “I like doing things for myself. If I fall sick or there is an 
emergency I am sure I will manage to at least take care of the situation until my 
children send money later on if there is a need”.101 Her case, however, is atypical 
from that of most of the traders at the market who did not have children overseas 
they could rely on either to sell goods on their behalf or to remit money to them. 
Most of the traders relied on themselves for sustenance, especially in an 
environment where unemployment or pension benefits were virtually non-existent 
and where the task of social reproduction has been “downloaded” on to the 
individual.    
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 Trader interview: Aunty Tilly, Harare, Dec 2007. 
 275 
 
 Traders regarded the sourcing of arts and crafts as an art in itself, and most 
considered the ability to acquire those pieces that were not ubiquitous at the 
market as a very important criterion for a trader to attract more customers. 
Generic pieces like bangles, necklaces and figurines could be found at almost all 
stalls. Those traders with the “discerning eye” and who had the money to buy the 
more expensive and unique pieces stocked and sold them at their stalls. This was 
very common with stone and wooden sculptures which were considered by traders 
to be very valuable because of the amount of labour which went into not only 
producing such pieces, but also into sourcing the raw materials involved. 
However, while the traders regarded issues like the amount of labour and 
materials used in larger sculptures as important when setting the price to 
customers, there were double standards in that they did not consider these issues 
when coercing manufacturers into accepting lower prices that were not 
commensurate with the labour and time invested in their manufacture.  
Traders indicated that if they were going to spend a lot of money on a 
unique piece it had to be worth it. The piece had to be something that they could 
sell at a considerable profit. For example, one itinerant wood carver reported that 
a piece he was selling – a wooden carving of a fish eagle clutching its prey, just 
over one metre high with a circular base about 40 cm wide – had taken him almost 
a month to make. This included the time it took him to scout for a suitable tree, 
cut it down and then do the actual carving using a hammer and chisel. For such a 
large piece the carver was hoping to find a trader who could purchase it from him 
for the equivalent of ZAR500. It was bought by one prominent male trader at the 
market for a negotiated price equivalent to ZAR300, with half of it paid in cash. It 
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was agreed that the rest would be paid at later date when the piece had been sold. 
This could sometimes take weeks if not months due to the slow nature of the arts 
and crafts business at the market. This piece was later sold in foreign currency for 
US$150 to a former (white) Zimbabwean
102
 who had since converted to South 
African nationality and was now based in France. This was over three times the 
price the trader had paid for it. The former Zimbabwean owned a curio shop on 
the French Riviera: a European tourist hot spot. Some of the commodities that 
informal traders sell at the market travel truly “global” journeys to other places 
where they are sold (e.g. France and the Netherlands). 
 One male trader, who was very well known in the arts and crafts business 
at the market and who had been trading at the market since 1998 reported that 
most of the large and therefore valuable sculptures were not usually bought for 
cash because there was always the risk that a trader might either fail to sell them 
after having paid the full price or might fail to sell a piece for a targeted price 
which would mean a loss. Such dynamics sometimes meant that traders reneged 
on agreements. For example, the prominent trader mentioned above sometimes 
told his suppliers that he had only managed to sell pieces for a price similar to the 
buying price so that he could not afford to pay the remainder of the money 
without making a loss. Usually this was untrue and often it was a stratagem for 
undercutting suppliers.  
Undercutting suppliers was very common among the traders, both male 
and female. Traders at the market, like Mason in Profile 6, often exploited their 
ability to access customers and markets as indicated earlier. In other cases traders 
                                                 
102 This case is also referred to later to illustrate the point on globalisation of the local. 
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bought pieces from kin living in the rural areas. This is an illustration of the 
importance of social networks in the interface between rural and urban livelihoods 
of Zimbabweans in the current conjuncture. Although traders claimed that that 
they paid a fair price when supplied by kin, there were still huge disparities 
between the cost price and the selling price. There was no “moral economy” in the 
sense of a consensus on fair prices that was recognised and understood by both 
parties. 
 A pertinent point to consider in the arts and crafts trade was the burden 
placed on the suppliers to scout for business among the traders at the market. 
While travelling expenses to source goods were considerable for clothes and shoe 
traders, for example, the arts and crafts traders mostly had goods brought to them 
by their suppliers. One sculptor said, 
I came from Murehwa. I had to pay bus fare to come here and I do not 
know anyone here in Harare. I make sure I get here early in the morning 
and then sell some pieces and go back. If I don‟t manage to sell anything I 
am in trouble. I have to look for people to buy my items. They will never 
come to me at my rural home. I have to look for them. It‟s expensive for 
me to come here…. These guys don‟t want to pay. Sometimes I have to 





Although the majority of traders waited for suppliers to bring pieces to the market, 
there were occasions when some traders, on visits to their rural homes, also 
brought pieces to the market. For instance, traders took advantage of the times 
they travelled to the rural areas for the festive season, to visit a sick relative or to 
attend a funeral to bring pieces from there. They also sometimes made 
arrangements for a supplier who might be a distant uncle or young male in a 
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nearby village to travel to Harare later in the month and bring the arts and crafts. 
In such cases traders advanced bus fare for the trip to the city, which in most cases 
was deducted from the total amount due on the supplied stock, especially if 
traders were dealing with more distant relations or with non-kin suppliers.   
The sourcing of goods by the arts and crafts traders relied on the social ties 
and networks they had established with their suppliers. All the traders who at 
some point sourced crafts from other suppliers or manufacturers reported that they 
sourced them from the same people they had been doing business with when they 
came to the market or even before they came to the market. Some traders 
indicated that they could rely on and trust the quality (real or perceived) of the 
pieces made by these suppliers. They also felt that they had to support the 
business of their colleagues by buying from them, especially given the harsh 
economic times. Despite the exploitative nature of the relationships between most 
traders and suppliers, these networks, nurtured over very long periods were very 
important for the survivalist strategies of both traders and suppliers given the 
involution of Zimbabwe‟s economy. The decline in tourist numbers meant 
demand was much lower, which consequently meant that traders could only buy 
so many pieces from their traditional suppliers. The economic crisis was a strong 
negotiating point for traders, who took advantage of the suppliers whom they 
knew also had precarious lives. Even if suppliers asked for what they felt was a 
fair price, traders would always push these prices downwards.  
Those traders who had made pieces for themselves in the past (nine male 
and one female), or who continued to do so, relied on their own labour and 
expertise for production. They even made these pieces (bangles and necklaces) as 
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they attended to their stalls. This meant that the space used for production of the 
arts and crafts pieces was sometimes the same space used for selling them. The 
female trader who made items on her own reported that in some cases she made 
these pieces as she cooked. This shows how in the informal economy there may 
sometimes be no demarcation between the “production space” and the “living 
space”. A 2008 study of shebeens in Soweto, South Africa, reported related 
patterns where the space in which families lived was also used to entertain patrons 
(Tsoeu, 2008). 
Traders acquired for themselves most of the raw materials such as scrap 
metal, stone, wood from places like industrial dumps and sometimes from nearby 
bushy areas, especially in the high-density suburbs such as Tafara and 
Kambuzuma, suburbs on the city‟s outskirts, where there are sometimes tracts of 
forested areas. Some traders brought string for making beaded necklaces from 
formal shops in the city centre while some scouted other informal markets in 
Harare for the beads which they used to make earrings and bangles. 
 An important point is that, contrary to the articulations of the dual 
economy thesis, multiple “forward and backward linkages” do exist between the 
informal and the formal parts of the economy, as illustrated by traders who source 
raw materials from the formal and make goods for the informal. The informal and 
the formal are not two distinct, separate economies. Linkages also exist among 
traders and suppliers in the informal part of the economy where, for instance, 
traders manufacture arts and crafts using raw materials they acquire from 
suppliers in that segment. One male trader who made metal sculptures said that he 
would get scrap metal for free from some informal “home industries” which 
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manufactured window frames and door frames. It was his responsibility to 
transport these materials to his place of residence. On some occasions his 
neighbour, who had an informal home-based business manufacturing burglar bars, 
also gave him leftover material (off-cuts) that he no longer required. The trader 
then used these materials to manufacture pieces sold at the market. While these 
materials were ostensibly for free, there were also occasions when the same 
neighbour would ask the trader for rods used in the welding process. This 
illustrates the importance of social networks in the survivalist activities of traders 
that may sometimes rely on reciprocity and co-operation.  
 These social networks were also important to the three male traders who 
sold sculptures and figurines made from scrap metal. They reported that they 
relied on the goodwill of kin and friends who allowed them either to use their 
welding machines on weekends or in the early mornings when they themselves 
were not working or sometimes provided them with raw material for free. These 
traders had acquired the necessary skills to weld metal pieces into intricate 
sculptures of birds, wild animals and the human form by watching kin and friends 
who had home-based industries that involved welding. They had simply adapted 
and refined these skills to the making of sculptures, and they maintained that 
anybody who was willing to learn could acquire these skills in a few months‟ 
time. One male trader pointed out that necessity had forced him to learn very fast:  
In these tough times I had to find something to do. I have a wife and one 
child. When things were fine you could live with relatives. I had an uncle 
who had a welding business and I used to help out. I was not paid anything 
but I lived in his house. I wasn‟t married then. He looked after me and I 
ran errands for him. He has since closed his business. Things are tough 
now. I am 32 now. It‟s expected that I should be able to look after myself. 
Besides, I can‟t go back to the rural areas. I haven‟t been there for years. 
So I now make metal sculptures and I sell them at the market. It‟s tough 
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but I can afford to pay my rent. I am surviving, but you know things are 




The account of this trader illustrates the importance of social networks and ties in 
the acquisition of skills that are necessary for survival. In addition, social ties 
enabled some of the traders to access certain resources, for example, the welding 
machines that they required to manufacture pieces. Tostensen, Tvedten and Vaa 
(2001) assert that various forms of associational life and social networks are 
crucial for survival in periods of crisis in African cities. The examples given 
above illustrate the vital role played by social networks in the ability of some 
traders to manufacture crafts sold at the informal market. Selling these items was 
essential for their very survival in urban Harare, a city in a country in crisis. 
In times of such crisis, when institutions of governance cannot cope with 
the needs of the city dwellers, they have to confront economic challenges on their 
own (Hansen and Vaa, 2004). Concerning informal trading and distribution, it has 
been found that strong social networks and ties between traders and suppliers 
develop in such situations. For example, Meagher (2006) reports on the very 
strong social ties that exist between raw material suppliers and manufacturers in 
the informal shoe and garment production clusters in Aba, Nigeria, among the 
Igbo. These social networks are also important for imparting skills necessary to 
make shoes. Broadly, the social networks among Igbo have been singled out by 
some analysts as a blueprint for “entrepreneurial success” in the informal 
economy (Forrest, 1994; Brautigam, 1997; Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 1997). Among the 
arts and crafts traders studied, social networks were also important in how some 
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of them acquired skills, as Mason‟s profile shows. Through observing a close 
friend, he acquired skills for making sculptures, and he was also introduced to the 
arts and crafts business he originally operated from the roadside. Social networks 
are also important in connecting some of the traders to suppliers from countries in 
the southern African region. 
 
6.4.2 The regional connections 
 
Three traders at the market sold goods which they acquired from suppliers outside 
Zimbabwe. These suppliers included: truck drivers who were driving through 
Zimbabwe to southern African countries such as Zambia, Botswana, 
Mozambique, and Malawi; Zimbabwean citizens of Malawian or Zambian origin 
who sometimes visited their relatives still living in those countries and brought 
pieces on return trips which they would sell to the traders; traders from countries 
such as the DRC who supplied to curio shop owners, especially in the Victoria 
Falls area, and who travelled on cross-border trucks. They sold some pieces to the 
traders at the market to take care of their costs while they were in Harare.   
Even though there are economic problems in Zimbabwe, there is still a 
considerable amount of road traffic, especially in the form of haulage trucks that 
can be seen at the Beitbridge border post and also along the Harare Beitbridge 
road. Traders reported that truck drivers travelled through many countries and 
sometimes brought pieces which they supplied to traders. In most cases they came 
back for payment at a later date. Traders said that these drivers wanted money to 




Arts and crafts from outside Zimbabwe were mainly ceremonial masks, 
head rests and stools which they said were from countries such as Zambia, 
Malawi, Nigeria and the DRC. These pieces were sold strictly in US dollars. A 
mask said to be from Nigeria could be bought for upwards of US$100 and a stool 
for US$150. Traders largely acted as middlemen in these transactions. Their 
suppliers left these goods at the market and settled on a particular price for them. 
They sometimes showed up again after several months to collect what was owed 
to them. It was up to the traders to make sure they sold the pieces at a price above 
the one agreed upon with the supplier; they could pocket the difference as their 
share from the sale. In this commodity chain, truck driver suppliers were probably 
knowledgeable about prices since they travelled in different parts of the southern 
African region and knew the value of the arts and crafts they gave to traders. This 
contrasts with the local suppliers and manufacturers, who did not have the same 
knowledge of markets and were more susceptible to exploitation by the traders at 
the flea market who bought from them.   
Social networks, reciprocity and trust are also involved in these cases. One 
supplier reported that he trusted the particular trader he dealt with at the market 
because they had been doing business together for a very long time. According to 
him they both had an interest in maintaining the good relations between the two of 
them. They understood that they made money off each other and that it was in 
both their interests to keep it that way. The local trader indicated that the supplier 
kept on leaving pieces with him and had been doing so for over five years. This, 
he said, showed that they had a mutually beneficial relationship, otherwise the 
supplier would have stopped leaving pieces. This type of relationship was also 
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beneficial to the traders because all arts and crafts from outside Zimbabwe were 
sold in US dollars and provided the traders with an opportunity to earn the much 
more valuable hard currency which was not susceptible to fluctuations like the 
local currency still in use at the time. 
The social ties and networks between traders and such suppliers had 
obviously taken a very long time to nurture, and hence the situation worked for 
both the traders and the suppliers. This indicates how the traders are rich in social 
capital, as opposed to economic capital, in the form of social ties and connections 
that they can draw on in the sourcing and selling of goods at the market 
 
6.5 Selling arts and crafts: global, regional and local 
connections 
 
As mentioned earlier, the arts and crafts traders maintained that their trade had 
been hit by the decline in traditional tourist arrivals because of the conditions in 
Zimbabwe. The so called “look east policy” in Zimbabwe promoted tourism with 
Asian countries, especially China. In a 2004 policy briefing paper on Sino-
Zimbabwean relations, the FES reports that the number of Chinese tourists to 
Zimbabwe went up by 254 per cent in 2004 and that Chinese tourists made up 7 
per cent of all tourists arriving in the country in 2004. In August 2007 a local 
Zimbabwean tour company brought Asian nationals to the flea market in a 40-
seater bus, a sign of increased tourist arrivals from that part of the globe. Arts and 
crafts traders were the main beneficiaries of that particular visit. One male arts 
and crafts trader said: 
We don‟t sell as regularly as other traders, and most of our customers are 
the few tourists that still come here. With the way things are in the 
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country, business has gone down. Sometimes I come to the market and 
spend the day talking to friends, reading the newspaper and discussing 
what‟s happening in the country. Politics especially. It keeps me busy and 
I don‟t think about the difficult times. I also make friends. On some good 
days we can sell to the Chinese when they come here like today. I sold 
some big pieces today. I sold a piece for US$100. It‟s been a good day for 
me. Such sales are far between, though. I might not sell any big pieces for 




Some of the traders, however, described the Chinese as very “difficult customers” 
who always wanted a bargain and often engaged in “long-winded” negotiations 
when it came to the price of arts and crafts. One trader said, “They always want 
something cheap”.106 Another said that they did not have an appreciation of how 
expensive “good art” was and they offered what he felt were low and “insulting” 
prices. All the same, the Chinese customers were important to the traders given 
the decline in tourist arrivals from traditional locations like Europe and North 
America. The few that bought pieces were partaking in important economic 
exchanges with local traders. In addition, the case of Takesure who may spend the 
whole day talking to friends and discussing local politics demonstrates that the 
market needs to be understood not only as an economic space but as a social space 
as well. 
Some of the Chinese nationals, in informal conversations at the market, 
reported that they had bought small sculptures as souvenirs and as gifts for when 
they returned home. On the day mentioned above, in August 2008, six out of ten 
randomly-approached tourists who came on the bus were Chinese nationals from 
either Beijing or Shanghai. Five of them were males who reported that they 
intended to sell the pieces they were purchasing in their own curio shops in China 
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to nationals from different countries. One female reported that the items she 
bought were ornaments for her home, and the smaller pieces like bangles and 
earrings were gifts for kin and friends back home. This account illustrates the 
ways in which the informal economic activities of seemingly globally 
disconnected informal traders have connections to what is happening at the global 
level. As mentioned earlier, these instances of particular connections of the local 
to the global demonstrate that it is imperative to conceptualise globalisation in 
alternative ways which may not conform to patterns which are seen as the 
standard. For instance, in The Rise of the Network Society, Castells (1996) mainly 
uses examples from the wealthier OECD countries
107
 to make arguments on the 
“network society” and therefore makes sweeping analyses which do not consider 
the more textured and nuanced way in which countries outside his lens are 
connecting to the global. This study considers global connectedness in Zimbabwe, 
an example of a developing country which is not considered in Castells‟ analogy. 
Another way in which the local activities of the traders at the market are 
being connected to the global is through the Chinese, who have an expanding 
presence in countries like Zambia. Chinese economic activity on the African 
continent in general has grown in recent years. For example, Ching Kwan Lee 
(2009) charts the growth of Chinese capitalism on the African continent using the 
case of the Zambian mining industry and the Tanzanian textiles industry. Such 
economic activities are sometimes accompanied by short-term to long-term 
settlement and also diversification into other sectors of the economy. According to 
Simon, an arts and crafts trader at the market, on two occasions in August 2007 he 
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had sold several pieces worth US$250 to a Chinese national who owned a lodge in 
Zambia. The customer, according to Simon, bought them for his curio shop at the 
lodge. This case shows how the Chinese are also diversifying out of their 
“traditional areas” of trading in cheap clothes and electronics into the tourism 
industry as they set up bases on the African continent. 
In an environment of declining tourist arrivals, the Zimbabwean arts and 
crafts traders relied on these connections for them to do business. However, they 
also complained that because of the economic situation they were undercut by 
shrewd customers and dealers who were aware of the declining tourist arrivals. 
Some of these customers were curio dealers of other nationalities based in 
countries in the southern African region or Zimbabweans who had curio shops in 
some of these countries. Simeon said: 
Some of my customers know that most tourists are now visiting Zambia 
instead of Zimbabwe to see the Victoria Falls. They know we are not 
selling as much as we used to. They will obviously make very low offers. 
Some of the times you have no choice but to accept the offer. If you have 
not sold anything for three weeks what choice do you have? There are 
some guys who had to close their shops because they were not selling 
anything. They could not afford to get new pieces and also pay the rent
108
 
here. I mean, if you have a lot of pieces you might need to have a bigger 




While arts and crafts traders took advantage of the local suppliers, they were taken 
advantage of by arts and crafts traders coming from countries in the southern 
African region who exploited their position in this commodity chain to their 
advantage since they had knowledge of tourist trends in Zimbabwe. They knew 
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that not many tourists were coming to the country because of the economic and 
political situation. They then used this knowledge to “squeeze” the local 
Zimbabwean traders to lower their prices.  
Some Zimbabwean nationals have gone into business in countries such as 
Malawi and Zambia, and are important conduits in the flow of commodities from 
the local into the southern African region. They maintain the connections to, and 
use knowledge of their native country to spur the growth of the business ventures 
they have established. A female customer buying curios at one stall said that she 
owned a spa in Malawi which she had set up with the assistance of some of her 
extended family members staying in that country, an example of the social 
networks and ties that are maintained when transnational emigration occurs. This 
case also shows how countries like Malawi, which used to send labour to 
Zimbabwe during the colonial period, have in the recent past began to see 
Zimbabweans with Malawians connections like relatives, going to establish 
business there as the Zimbabwean economy has imploded: a reversal of fortunes, 
perhaps. According to the female spa owner, her establishment was frequented by 
nationals from Europe and America and also by some African nationals. She had 
decided to set up a small curio shop at the spa, and she sourced most of her curios 
from her native Zimbabwe, which she had intimate knowledge of. For her, the 
quality of the products could be trusted and they were “different” from the curios 
that she found in Malawi.   
One trader at the market indicated that he had connections with a white 
couple who used to own a game farm in Zimbabwe, and who had moved their 
operations to Namibia because of the land invasions that rocked Zimbabwe. In 
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their new venture, they had set up a lodge and a curio shop. The couple visited 
Zimbabwe twice a year, according to this trader, and sometimes bought one or 
two metal sculptures from him as well as other smaller items like wallets, rings 
and earrings, which they said were easier to carry. He indicated that he had 
managed to sell the couple a metal sculpture of an eagle (about a metre high) for 
ZAR400; he had bought the sculpture for the equivalent of ZAR100 from a 
peddler at the market. However, he said such good sales were not very common 
so he always tried to maximise profit when such opportunities presented 
themselves. “They own a lodge in Namibia now. I know they will make much 
more than the ZAR400 I charged them. Most of their customers are rich tourists,” 
he said. As mentioned earlier, the connections that exist between traders and some 
of the Zimbabweans that left the country for a variety of reasons have proven to 
be important nodes in the arts and crafts business in the current conjuncture, since 
they enable the local traders engaging in survivalist trading activities to eke out a 
living. 
Connections also existed between the traders at the market and other 
Zimbabwean traders in places like South Africa, where they are involved in 
selling arts and crafts in places like Cape Town and Johannesburg. Six male 
traders at the market reported that they either had kin or friends in South Africa 
who were involved in arts and crafts trading. These kin or friends would 
sometimes take crafts from traders at the market and then sell these pieces in 
South Africa. For example, in December 2007 one male trader said that a friend 
he trusted had taken two sculptures with him to Johannesburg at the beginning of 
the year, and it was only in August that the friend had sent some money 
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(ZAR300) and groceries from the proceeds of the sale of the sculptures. The 
trader reported that the groceries and the money sent by the Zimbabwean friend 
matched reasonably well what he had hoped to get from selling the sculptures. 
Whether kin or friend sent back proceeds in money or other form in future, the 
traders reported that they trusted the value of what was given to them. One trader 
said, “I have known this guy for years and we went to school together”110. 
Another trader said, “I know his family and he knows my family. We have 
worked together for a very long time”.111 And another trader speaking with 
reference to a member of his kin group said, “We are relatives. We are close. He 
wouldn‟t cheat me”.112 As indicated by Bass (2000:33), in a study of informal 
traders in Senegal, “Kinship plays an important role in the adaptations of market 
sellers”.  
The case of arts and crafts traders who had kin or friends who took pieces 
which they sold on their behalf in Johannesburg or Cape Town also illustrates 
another process of informalisation. This is the informalisation of money transfers. 
For instance, the six male traders mentioned above never travelled to South Africa 
to collect proceeds from the sale of arts and crafts they had given to friends or to 
kin. On some occasions groceries would be sent in lieu of money. Traders said 
they never insisted on receipts as they had a general idea of how much things cost 
in South Africa through friends and colleagues who travelled there regularly. In 
cases where actual foreign currency was sent, it was given to colleagues, friends, 
bus drivers or to other kin returning from South Africa. The money was never 
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deposited into a bank account and neither was an official money transfer agent 
used. All these examples indicate high levels of social capital in the form of 
relations of trust and reciprocity. 
The accounts here show the importance of social ties and social networks 
in the operations of the arts and crafts traders, much like in the cases of the two 
types of traders in previous sections. They also illustrate that in periods of crisis 
individuals build institutions, whether de facto or de jure to “substitute for those 
formal sector ones that have been functionally lost” (Bracking and Sachikonye, 
2008: 5). For example, transnational economic transactions rest on relations of 
trust connecting the Zimbabwean traders in South Africa, who may have a better 
market access, to local traders who have been struggling given the economic crisis 
and the low tourist arrivals. The Zimbabwean arts and crafts street traders in 
South Africa are part of a larger cohort made up of nationals from other southern 
African countries also partaking in survivalist informal economic activities.     
In a study of the handicraft and curio sector among African nationals in 
South Africa, Peberdy (2000) reports that the majority of the traders in her sample 
came from either Zimbabwe or Malawi and some from other southern African 
countries such as Mozambique, Swaziland and Zambia. The study indicated that 
traders in that sector made regular trips to their countries of origin to visit kin and 
to source crafts, and they maintained social ties with them. These kin and friends 
regularly facilitated the movement to South Africa of not only the finished arts 
and crafts but also raw materials. Much like the locally-based traders referred to 
earlier, some of the traders from countries in southern Africa in the study by 
Peberdy (2000) possessed the necessary skills and used raw materials supplied 
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through kin to manufacture arts and crafts as they worked at their stalls. The social 
networks and ties among traders also facilitated the movement of money among 
traders themselves, and also between the traders and kin in other regional 
countries, showing the importance of these relationships in providing incomes 
where the so-called free market has failed. Many of the countries of origin of 
these traders, such as Zambia and Malawi, implemented austerity economic 
restructuring measures which had negative consequences on economic growth and 
consequently on levels of employment. 
On some occasions the traders in this study were fortunate enough to have 
direct contacts with dealers from countries like Germany, but these arts and crafts 
dealers were only willing to go as far as South Africa in terms of picking up the 
consignment. Only one male trader reported having such contacts. In this case the 
contact, according to the trader, did not want to come to Zimbabwe because he 
believed it was unsafe. It was the responsibility of the trader to facilitate the 
process of moving arts and crafts pieces from Zimbabwe. The trader personally 
made sure that the sculptures were properly wrapped so that breakages did not 
occur during shipping. He also arranged to transport the sculpture pieces to the 
nearest DHL depot and did all the paperwork required. Fortunately, the shipment 
was for a customer who, according to the trader, was a diplomat who in the past 
had been based at the Germany embassy in Harare. The trader reported that he did 
not have to worry about the payment of customs and excise duty on the 
Zimbabwean end. It was free for diplomats. Any fees that needed to be paid on the 
South Africa end were the sole responsibility of the customer. The trader indicated 
that payment for the sculptures came through Western Union. In April 2008 this 
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trader reported that in February and March of that year he had shipped two 
sculptures for the customer, one worth US$100 and the other US$120, and the 
customer had also reimbursed him for the DHL courier fees. 
The above example illustrates an instance of the “globalisation of the 
local”, where informal trading not only has regional cross-border connections but 
also transcontinental connections. Again, it was through social ties established 
between the trader and the customer when the later was still based in Zimbabwe 
that enabled the particular trader to sell crafts to the customer who had since 
moved back to Germany. The trader indicated that sales like these, which came 
intermittently, cushioned him against economic challenges in the country, 
especially when he was unable to make a sale for long periods of time. He 
claimed that he could live off one such major sale for a month and a half, even if 
he did not sell anything else in the interim period. 
Small arts and crafts pieces are easier to transport, especially for customers 
who have to travel long distances. Traders said that customers did not have to 
worry about expensive cargo fees and about the possibility of damage during 
transportation. Small pieces could be packed into hand luggage and then declared 
as gifts or personal items at customs and immigration. In contrast, large pieces 
like sculptures are difficult to transport and there is always the extra burden of 
paperwork. Customs and excise might also want to know whether certain pieces 
have not been illegally acquired from the National Gallery, for instance. In recent 
times there have been concerns regarding the smuggling out of the country of 
valuable national treasures housed at the National Gallery and museum, and some 
former Zimbabweans have been implicated.  
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In November 2007 an ex-Zimbabwean (white male and 30 years old) who 
had assumed South African citizenship was scouting the market for beads, 
necklaces, bangles, earrings and other smaller items to the tune of 200 Euros. He 
said smaller arts and crafts such as beads and bangles were easier for him to carry. 
The ex-Zimbabwean had trained as a helicopter pilot in South Africa but had since 
quit his job and moved to France with his French fiancée.  
The ex-Zimbabwean was now a part owner in a small curio shop on the 
French Riviera, a European tourist “hot spot”. According to him, there was a 
tremendous demand for African crafts, especially small curios, among the tourists 
that frequented his shop: 
It‟s amazing that people would travel all the way from the US and all over 
Europe to buy souvenirs of African crafts. You would think that after 
coming to France they would want a souvenir that‟s French. Half of the 
people that I sell curios to insist they want something African. Funny! 
They want something African to remind them of having been to France, a 
European country. I sometimes get friends and relatives who make trips to 
some African countries to bring small curios for me. I have just been 
bungee jumping at the Vic Falls and came to visit some relatives here in 
Harare. I figured I should get some pieces while I am here. It will give me 




The ex-Zimbabwean asserted that perhaps the reason that tourists wanted African 
curios was that “they are different from most of the curios that you see in 
Europe”. On top of this, the ex-Zimbabwean said that some of his tourist 
customers wanted a “part of Africa without having to travel to Africa”. The case 
illustrates an instance of global connections which draw on an exotic (non-
existent) image of Africa. Through these connections in the tourism industry 
commodities like arts and crafts make their way to countries in the global North, 
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such as France, where they are sold to well-off customers. While the ex-
Zimbabwean was endowed with economic capital which enabled him to move 
around the globe and still come back to his native country and be a tourist, the 
majority of the traders he purchased arts and crafts from had different profiles. 
They lived very precarious lives of constant struggle, a revelation of the 
inequitable gains from globalisation.  
Broadly, like most other traders at the market, the arts and crafts traders 
relied on their social ties with customers, kin and friends when they carried out 
their trading. Ties with customers in other countries “globalised” the commodities 
that traders sold at the market in Zimbabwe. Often kin and friends in other 
countries acted as middlemen and facilitated access to markets in the southern 
African region. These kin and friends also provided important links in informally 
remitting money back to Zimbabwe, and in some instances they also sent back 
scarce basic commodities in lieu of actual money to cushion traders from 
shortages in the country. Important family news also flowed between the two 
points. The case of sending back money through informal channels and sending 
basic food commodities illustrates the informalisation of the social welfare 
economy. In the case of money, there is circumvention of formal money transfers 
through banks and money transfer agencies which may sometimes be costly. 
Traders said they preferred receiving money through such informal channels 
because in most cases banks and money transfer agents might not have the money 
to pay out, and some banks insisted on making payments in local Zimbabwean 
currency at lower exchange rates. These examples show the ability of individuals 
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to adapt where institutions are incapable of meeting their needs, by putting in their 
place informal means.  
A 2005 survey study on the flow of remittances, carried out in the 
residential areas of Harare and Bulawayo (Zimbabwe‟s two largest cities), 
reported extensive use of money couriers, kin and friends, in transferring money 
back to the country (Bracking and Sachikonye, 2006). The authors argue that this 
informalisation of the money transfer system is an indicator of the widespread 
informalisation of the broader social welfare economy in Zimbabwe. In a follow-
up study the authors assert that “reliance on the personal physical carriage of 
money has grown as trust in other individuals and firms has shrunk during a 
period of deep and extended crisis” and that “the resourcefulness of people in 
crisis continues to astound (Bracking and Sachikonye, 2008: 2). Traders were 
resourceful in that they took advantage of their social ties and networks to access 
the South African arts and crafts market. These social ties and networks were also 
important conduits through which family news, gossip and notifications 
sometimes flowed, taking advantage of the high levels of both vehicular and 
human traffic between the two countries. Indeed, as noted by Akyeampong 
(2000), in the context of crisis and scaling back of national governments it is 
important for African families to have members in the diaspora for them to 
economically survive and to prosper.   
The case of second-hand book traders who operate at the Harare flea 
market also reveals the importance of social ties and networks in their survivalist 




6.6 Sourcing second-hand books: the local connections 
 
This section reports and analyses data on the sourcing of goods by all ten of the 
second-hand book traders interviewed at the market. Of the traders, seven were 
male and three were female. All of the traders sourced their books locally. A 
range of titles and types of books from different sources were available for 
purchase at the market. 
 The second-hand books sold at the market included novels by local 
authors like Chenjerai Hove, Dambudzo Marechera and Shimmer Chinodya. 
There were titles by well-known African authors like Chinua Achebe, Ngugi wa 
Thiongo, and Wole Soyinka. Titles from outside the continent including the 
various genres of thrillers from authors such as Steven King, Dean Koontz, John 
Grisham, Robert Ludlum, James Baldacci and Patricia Cornwell were available. 
There were also romance novels of the Mills and Boon type. Classics from 
authors like Jane Eyre, Charles Dickens and Thomas Hardy could also be found. 
There were children‟s books like the Dr Seuss series, books by J.K Rowling and 
abridged popular classics for children by Charles Dickens such as Oliver Twist. 
Cookery books, rare books from colonial Zimbabwe, school textbooks across the 
disciplines (for all levels of schooling) were available. Traders also sold books on 
birds and other wild animals, focusing particularly on Zimbabwe and other 
southern African countries.  
The most popular books at the flea market were novels, especially thrillers 
by authors such as Patricia Cornwell and John Grisham, which changed hands 
constantly as people came to do exchanges. Among children, especially those in 
the 10 to 13 year age group, the Harry Potter books were very popular, though 
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these were also very difficult to find, especially the more recent titles. Older 
woman, both black and white, in their 40s and over, regularly searched for 
cookery and baking books.  
 Traders reported that in recent times they there had been many 
schoolchildren, especially those sitting for O-Levels and for A-Levels looking for 
various study guides and book series with collections of past exam papers and 
solutions, especially in the sciences and commerce. These were scarce in school 
libraries and in bookshops. However, traders did not have sizeable stocks of these 
books to meet the high demand. Supplies from school leavers, for instance, were 
few and far between. Also popular at the market were primary school books, 
especially for the early school grades for disciplines like English and Maths, but 
these were not easily available. All the books sold at the market were second-
hand, some of them in pristine condition while others were relatively old but still 
intact.  
The concern in this section is with the first source of the books for the 
traders at the market. The trade in books in Zimbabwe has to be understood 
against the background of a declining economy where individuals may sometimes 
choose the simplest route to make an income. This route may be illegal. The case 
of books also shows how the economic difficulties in the country have affected a 
large spectrum of the population in Zimbabwe, from the well-off to the poor. 
 For example, “live in” gardeners came with books to the flea market, 
some of which may have been stolen from their employers. They sold these to 
make extra money. At the same time the relatively better-off who had connections 
in other countries came to the market to dispose of their books (sometimes for 
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free) as they relocated to these foreign destinations. According to traders, they 
cited the difficult economic and political situation as the main reason behind their 
choice to emigrate. Other sources of books are shown in Table 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1: Sources of second-hand books 
 
Source 
Number of Traders Reporting Source 
Male Female Total 
Purchased from people they knew were 
gardeners 
7 3 10 
Purchased from people who said they were 
relocating 
5 3 8 
Purchased from other traders at the market 4 0 4 
Purchased from schoolchildren 7 3 10 
Purchased from bookshops 2 0 2 
Purchased from street traders in the CBD 7 0 7 
Given as gifts by past customers 7 3 10 
Purchased from itinerant strangers 7 3 10 
Trade-ins by past customers 7 3 10 
 
 
The bulk of the books that traders had for sale at the market were delivered to 
them at their market stalls by their owners. This was advantageous for traders as 
they did not have to travel to collect the books, hence they saved on transport 
costs. If it was a bulky load, a trader paid the equivalent of an adult public 
transport bus ticket to transport the books to the market. Relocating individuals 
were reported by eight book traders at the market to be a source of good quality 
second-hand books. Traders said that relocating individuals provided a good 
opportunity to get a large supply of a variety of books all at once. Relocating 
individuals were also willing to sell books at very good prices. For example, in 
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August 2007 one trader said that he had managed to get a box with an assortment 
of 20 novels for the equivalent of ZAR100 and he had already managed to recoup 
the money he had spent on the books. He estimated he had made some ZAR200 in 
profit and he still had almost half of the books that he had purchased from this 
relocating customer unsold at his stall. 
Historically, with the worsening of the Zimbabwean economy people 
relocated to a range of countries. A study of Zimbabweans living in the diaspora 
estimated their total number based on various scenarios – that none of them came 
back, or either 5 per cent or 10 per cent came back (Chetsanga and Muchenje, 
2003) (see Table 6.2).  
The UK was the most popular destination in the study, especially with 
professionals such as engineers, teachers and medical personnel. A different 2004 
study
114
 by the International Organisation for Migration on Zimbabweans in South 
Africa and the United Kingdom reported that 48 per cent of respondents, in a 









                                                 
114
 The survey study comprised 1 000 respondents, 500 in the United Kingdom and 500 in South 
Africa. It was carried out with the assistance of City University, London. 
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Table 6.2 Estimated number of Zimbabweans in the diaspora 
 
Country Proportion   
of Total 
Population 
Assumed % Returning 
0% 5% 10% 
(Estimated total)  (532 609) (505 978) (479 348) 
United Kingdom 0.368 196 000 186 200 176 400 
Botswana 0.345 24 500 174 563 165 375 
South Africa 0.046 25 500 23 275 22 050 
United States 0.069 36 750 34 913 33 075 
Canada 0.034 18 109 17 203 16 298 
Other 0.138 73 500 69 825 66 150 
Source: (Chetsanga and Muchenje, 2003) 
 
In South Africa, Zimbabweans are said to constitute the largest group of migrant, 
and estimates of their total number range from one million to five million, 
although these include undocumented border crossings (Polzer, 2008). A 2008 
study by the Centre for Development and Enterprise reported that Johannesburg 
city officials put the number of foreigners in Johannesburg at 2.5 million and said 
most of them were Zimbabweans. Empirically reliable recent statistics on the 
number of Zimbabweans who have relocated, whether legally or illegally, are 
unavailable as shown by the variability in some of the estimates. Statistics aside, 
relocating individuals were an important source of books sold by traders at the 
market.  
Other sources of books included schoolchildren, gardeners who worked in 
the surrounding suburbs and other itinerant individuals. While on the one hand the 
sources of these books were legal, there were other aspects of this sourcing which 
bordered on or were outright illegal. Sourcing books from illegal sources was for 
traders a way to make larger profit margins because they could always push prices 
 302 
 
downwards for suppliers who wanted to get rid of their “contraband”. According 
to one trader, when somebody was in a hurry to get rid of books they could 
always be convinced to sell at a much lower price. This would enable second-
hand book traders to make a much larger profit when they sold books later.  
Like the arts and crafts traders, the second-hand book traders took 
advantage of their position in the commodity chain as they had the access to the 
market in a situation where most formal bookshops in the CBD did not have 
adequate stock. Some of the second-hand book traders had become the de facto 
book suppliers to customers. In informal conversation in early 2008, one customer 
searching for school textbooks around the flea market, together with his two 
daughters who were preparing for A-Level and O-Level examinations later in the 
year, said: 
These days you cannot even find books in the shops. There is nothing. The 
schools don‟t have books either. It‟s sad. We are trying to get books before 
examinations later in the year. Exam preparation books are in short supply 
even in good schools. Kids have to share with several other kids. For them 
to prepare well it‟s best they have personal copies.115    
 
Central to the sourcing of second-hand books was the nurturing of relationships 
with the different suppliers, sometimes over very long periods of time. For 
example, Louis, a 33-year-old male who had been at the flea market since 1995, 
said it was important to maintain good relations with the customers who 
sometimes came back to do “trade ins.” He said: 
It‟s important to always keep in touch with one‟s suppliers. They have to 
trust you and you always have to pay them a decent amount for their 
books. Most of my suppliers are old white couples who are always looking 
to get rid of books. Some of these have only been read once and they are in 
very good condition. They also put me in touch with some of their friends 
                                                 
115
Informal conversation with customer, February 2008. 
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who want to get rid of their own books. Often, I get somebody calling me 
saying that they heard I give good prices for books. Most of the time they 




Maintaining these relationships involved keeping a log book of suppliers‟ contact 
numbers, both cell phone and landline if available. A few of the suppliers 
preferred that book dealers came to their places of residence to pick up the books. 
Louis also mentioned that sometimes there were advantages to going to pick up 
books. Often times an individual who wanted to dispose of a large consignment of 
books was also relocating and would have other items like small furniture pieces 
that they were selling. Tina, also a book trader, said: 
If I go and pick up the books I always make sure that I choose those titles 
that I know sell much faster. I always give a fair price. Sometimes when I 
visit my suppliers I find that they are selling much more than just books. 
Their assumption when they get in touch with me is that I am only 
interested in books because that‟s what I deal in. I am also interested in 
small furniture items and even electrical appliances for my place. One time 
I got this really good radio at a bargain price from this old white couple 
who were leaving the country. The other time I managed to get a kitchen 
table and a set of chairs. I mean, I would have had to pay a fortune for 





The case of traders purchasing goods for personal use, other than the second-hand 
books that they sold at the market, demonstrates the occurrence of “commodity 
circuits” that connect the better-off Zimbabweans leaving the country to the 
struggling traders. These commodity circuits mirror the second-hand clothing 
exchanges that link advanced industrial countries, the source of these clothes, to 
the developing world, where they are sold at informal markets.  
                                                 
116
 Trader interview: Louis, Harare, August 2007. 
117
 Trader interview: Tina, Harare, March 2007. 
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Though traders like Louis and Tina made proclamations about their 
supposed fairness when dealing with suppliers they, like other traders, always 
looked to “squeeze” suppliers, especially itinerant book owners whom they 
sometimes knew were struggling themselves and wanted to make money quickly 
off possibly stolen books. Like other trader they always justified buying from 
such sources with statements such as, “Well, how do I know he has stolen them? 
If he says the books are his then I suppose they are his, hey?” or “Well, I never 
ask too many questions”. Their trading in second-hand books, it seems, did have 
illicit elements. 
 In August 2007 there was an incident at the market concerning accusations 
of stolen books, which illustrates involvement in some these criminal activities. 
On this particular day a white male visited a stall belonging to Louis and claimed 
to be looking for any books on southern African birds. These books were in stock 
at the stall and the potential customer, after browsing through them, said he would 
be back during the course of that day or the following day to buy the books. 
When the customer had left Louis took the books off display because he 
felt that “something is not right”. Towards the end of the day the customer 
returned, this time accompanied by a policeman. The customer looked through the 
shelves but could not find the books he had seen only a few hours earlier. He 
demanded to know where the books were. According to him these were his books 
which had gone missing from his house a few days earlier. He strongly suspected 
that his gardener, whom he had since dismissed, had stolen the books. Louis 
claimed he had sold the books in question to someone else. He told the police that 
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the books in question belonged to him and he had purchased them from a nearby 
bookshop several months back. 
 The issue of the stolen books could not be resolved because no proof could 
be found. The most the aggrieved customer could do was to make a police report. 
When the customer and the policeman had departed, Louis revealed that he was 
aware that some of the books he sold may be stolen. He said: 
When that guy came here I was immediately suspicious. He did not even 
want to negotiate the price on the books. This is a flea market. People 
always want a lower price. That‟s why I removed them from the shelf. I 
bought these books from one of my regular suppliers. He was in a hurry to 
sell the books and he was asking very little for the books. He wanted 
ZAR50 for each of the three books. We ended up agreeing on ZAR130 for 
the three books and I paid him half in Zim dollars. I told him to come back 
after a week to get the rest of the money. I could get US$50 for those 
books. They are very rare and you can‟t find them anywhere these days, 
even if you go to South Africa. They are out of print. I am sure they were 
stolen books. A lot of live-in gardeners have access to some of these 
books, and they probably steal them and sell them to him at very low 





In some case there were a few textbooks with school stamps of various Harare 
public and private schools in them; Louis and other traders sold them even though 
these stamps clearly meant the books were school property. Though many school 
leavers did sell books that legitimately belonged to them, Louis did not seem to 
have any moral difficulties concerning the handling and selling of what were 
potentially stolen books. He said: 
If a guy comes here to sell me books and they are cheap, well, I buy them. 
It‟s the only way to make money. How can I know whether they have been 
stolen or not? Most of the books that I get in bulk, I get them from people 
leaving the country. They are not stolen. Sometimes I have kids in uniform 
who come here to sell their books, especially at the end of the year. They 
will have written their exams and they have no use for the books. 
                                                 
118
 Trader interview: Louis August 2007, Harare. 
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Sometimes a stranger will come here and offer to sell me a rare book … 
something that I know I can sell at a good price later. Who am I to ask him 
whether the book is stolen or not? If I don‟t have money at that time I 
might even ask a fried to give me something because I know there is good 
money to be made on that book. Somebody selling you such a book 
doesn‟t want too many questions asked and I don‟t ask them. I just buy the 
book. Everybody is happy. If it something rare I don‟t even display it. I 
will put it away. I know somebody will come looking for something like 




The other traders (both male and female) reported that they sometimes got books 
which they suspected were stolen. One male trader justified it by saying that 
things were tough and they as traders had to make a living by “any means 
necessary”. A female trader said: 
Sometimes you get this guy who comes here and says he is selling some of 
his books which he doesn‟t want any more. You look at the guy and he 
doesn‟t look like the type that actually went into a shop and bought those 
books. And somebody who reads would want to do a swap and get 
something that he hasn‟t read. Obviously with such a person you know 
they are stolen books or he got them from somebody who stole them. You 




Issues of dishonesty and theft also came up among the book traders themselves. 
The second-hand book traders at the Harare market, unlike the book traders in 
Duneier‟s (1999) Sidewalk, did not have to remove their stock at the end of the 
day.
121
 It was understood by the management that it was too tedious for them to 
remove their stock daily. Book traders just covered their stalls with waterproof 
plastics and left them there for the night. Arts and crafts traders did the same. In 
June and September 2007 there were two occasions in each of the two months 
when book traders accused one another of theft of very valuable books. For 
                                                 
119
 Trader interview: Louis, Harare, August 2007. 
120
 Trader interview: Kimon, Harare, August 2007. 
121
 A security guard employed by the management patrolled the flea market space and an area 
nearby where traders stored goods at the end of the trading day. 
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example, one male book trader accused another male trader with a stall nearby of 
stealing a valuable copy of Contact by John Lovett which he had hidden away in 
one of the boxes under the tables at his stall. The trader whose book had gone 
missing indicated that the other trader was the only one who knew where the book 
was. He had seen him leaving the book there the previous day when he left early 
to go home. The book was never found. Clearly there are instances when the trust, 
reciprocity and co-operation that sustain the individual traders is disrupted. 
 As regards the above incident, non-book traders at the market said that 
second-hand book traders could not be trusted, so the trader who claimed his book 
had gone missing might be lying. Other traders said that most of the books the 
traders sold were stolen so it was not a surprise that they sometimes snatched 
books from one another. With reference to the stolen book incident, one cross-
border clothes trader said, “These guys sell stolen books most of the time. They 
don‟t know what it means to save money for months so that you can go and buy 
stuff to come back and sell. I am not surprised that they sometimes steal from 
each other.” Another trader nearby said, “The book was probably a stolen book 
anyway. He got what he deserved”. However, the book traders insisted that their 
sources of books were legal. 
Traders also sourced books from each other. Four male traders reported 
that they got some books from other traders at the market but this was not on a 
regular basis. In such cases it was usually the trader who wanted to buy a 
particular book who made an offer to purchase. Often in such cases the trader 
would have a customer waiting for the book. While a price would be agreed on 
between the traders, it was usual that no money changed hands until the books had 
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been sold. In negotiating the price the two traders often tried to undercut one 
another so that they could make a profit off each other. Other traders reported that 
they did not buy books from other traders because they either did not have the 
money to do so or because the profit margins were too small in such transactions. 
Other male traders reported that it was not good for relationships with other 
traders because there would always be a “fight” over the price. This illustrates the 
fragility of the social capital of some of the traders. 
Only two male traders said that they bought books from nearby bookshops 
and then sold them at their market stall. These were the two traders whom all 
other traders at the market (both male and female) perceived as doing more 
business than anybody else. The two traders reported that when they did buy 
books from a bookshop they did not make much money from it. Both the traders 
reported that while there was sometimes a 5-10 per cent profit to be made from 
such transactions they often sourced books from formal bookshops for trusted 
customers whose business they valued. Often such customers did not have the 
time to scout for the books they wanted. These books could be A-Level textbooks, 
for example, which were very difficult to find. If this was the case it illustrates the 
connections that exist between the formal and the informal within a single, deeply 
segmented economy and shows the flaw within the “dual economy” thesis which 
conceptualises the formal and the informal as two distinct, separate economies. 
Scouting bookshops in the Harare CBD for books for their customers was 
sometimes a lengthy process. However, the two traders who did this indicated that 
it was a way of maintaining good social relations with and gaining the confidence 
of customers. There was “always a good chance” that such customers would come 
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back in future. All the ten book traders at the market did report that it was 
important to maintain good relationships with customers because they sometimes 
came back to do swaps. For example, a customer who wanted to swap a novel for 
another novel by a similar author would have to pay half the price of the novel 
they wanted on top of leaving the trade-in novel. When I asked some of the 
traders if this was fair, they said that this was “the only way to make money”. 
Those customers they did regular swaps with had come to understand that traders 
needed to make money, he said.  
All seven male traders reported that they sometimes purchased books, 
especially school textbooks, from street traders in the Harare CBD. These street 
traders did not display books on pavements.
122
 They normally sold them from 
satchels and did not carry large stocks. The three female traders said that they did 
not like buying books from these traders because they (the street traders) were 
always looking to make “quick money” and “ripped” off customers. One of the 
female traders also said that anybody selling books from a satchel was probably 




 All the traders reported that they had at some point received books for free 
from past customers who simply did not want the books any more or who were 
relocating out of Zimbabwe as the country sank further into economic, political 
and social crisis. These were either regular customers who had bought books in 
                                                 
122
 Street traders were also affected by Operation Murambatsvina. Afterwards, it was common to 
see the few hawkers left on the streets in running battles with the police. 
123
 This trader also said that she they sometimes bought books which she suspected were stolen but 
only if they were brought to the stall at the market. She feared that the police might be following 
somebody selling stolen goods on the street and she did not want to be implicated. 
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the past, even if on a single occasion, or who had done swaps with the traders. 
This is an illustration of the significant role that having social ties with customers, 
even if thin, played in the sourcing of books. Usually, those giving away the 
books would deliver them for free to the trader concerned, and in the process they 
saved the traders transport costs. Book owners who were leaving the country 
clearly had better endowments of economic and social capital than the second-
hand book traders, and this capital opened up opportunities for them to relocate. 
Some had maintained social networks and ties with relatives, colleagues and 
friends who arranged employment and accommodation for them as they made the 
transition. 
In both second-hand book trading and DVD and video game trading there 
is some occurrence of illegal activities. Book traders were sometimes conduits for 
the sale of stolen books, and in DVD and video game trading there is rampant 
piracy. However, in both these types of trading there is scant evidence of the state 
in terms of policing. Paradoxically, it is in the largely legal clothes and shoe 
trading and the arts and crafts trading where a state presence is felt. In the case of 
the clothes and shoe traders and the arts and crafts traders, those who travel have 
to have passports, pay customs and excise duties and some of them have to endure 
the confiscation of goods. In the past the clothes and shoe traders were affected by 
a constantly changing customs and excise regime. On the other hand, the second-
hand book traders and the DVD and video game traders did not have much 
interaction with the state, although in some instances they definitely break the 
precepts of international intellectual property law by copying and selling pirated 
content. Second-hand book traders, who in some cases sold illicitly acquired 
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goods, also relied on their social ties and networks, like other traders, in selling a 
variety of second-hand books. 
 
6.7 Selling second-hand books 
 
From the onset it is important to realise that while traders sourced their books 
locally there were instances in which the selling of the books had connections to 
the region which also connected to the global. For example, two traders sold rare 
books to specialist book dealers in South Africa who then sold them on Internet 
sites to customers in Europe and North America.  
In addition, some second-hand books traders also sold children‟s films on 
video tape. These were mainly popular children‟s stories which had been adapted 
into films. For example, Louis would sometimes have a stack of children‟s movies 
alongside the children‟s books. On one occasion he had purchased these together 
with some children‟s books from a man who used to run a crèche but had since 
retired and left the country to settle in South Africa. In response to being asked 
why he sometimes traded in materials other than second-hand books, he said: 
Well the point is to make money, isn‟t it? If I occasionally sell children‟s 
movies, there is no harm in that. Sometimes children‟s books are very hard 
to find and some of the classical stories are only available on video. The 
other day I had this one customer who wanted a copy of Alice in 
Wonderland. I did not have a print copy but I offered her the video tape 
movie version of the book. She took it as an alternative. Some of the 
customers bring their kids here to buy books for them. Sometimes the kids 
want the videos instead of books. I think parents find videos of popular 
children‟s stories to be a better compromise.124 
 
                                                 
124
 Trader interview: Jahdel, Harare, October 2007. 
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Second-hand book traders had to constantly look for niche markets which they 
could take advantage of. Artson, who explicitly identified himself as a “book 
dealer” indicated that sometimes it was difficult to make sales every day given the 
economic situation in Zimbabwe. He said:  
Books are seen as luxury commodities. I mean, who would come and buy 
books when they do not have anything to eat? I can‟t sell novels every day. 
I make sure that I have out-of-print books from the Rhodesian era. These 
sell for up to ten or more times than other ordinary books. For example, 
the Rhodesiana collections are very popular with some people. They are 
real collector‟s items. Some of my customers go on and sell these books 
on the Internet. I know it and they know it. I can always charge them much 
higher prices for these books. The good thing is that if I sell one or two of 
these books they take care of my costs for that week and I even have 
something left over if I don‟t make sales that week, which is rare, of 
course. On Saturdays I am bound to always sell books. It‟s a busy day.125 
 
Prices were normally written in on the inside page of the book. Traders normally 
used pencil for easy erasing in case prices had to be changed in future. However, 
in recent times the traders had resorted to not pencilling in prices at all. This was 
because of the hyperinflationary environment which necessitated a regular upward 
revision of prices. Traders said regularly changing price stickers was tedious so 
they kept a list of prices by category of books.  
The book traders also had “privileges” that other traders did not have. 
They tended to have larger spaces that everybody else because books need more 
display space. Six of the book traders (all male) had been at the market for 
upwards of five years. This meant that they had been the first beneficiaries of the 
larger original stands. In recent times, with more people engaging in informal 
trading, there has been an increase in the number of people coming to the market 
in search of stands. There was greater pressure on space and stalls got smaller 
                                                 
125
 Trader interview: Artson, Harare, April 2007. 
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because of “demarcations”. With more people taking up informal trading there 
was also greater competition, and with the worsening of the economy business 
was low for most traders. Those book traders (and other traders) who could afford 
to transport their goods sometimes tried to increase sales by going to events like 
sports festivals and music festivals where traders were allowed to sell goods. 
Tina and Louis took advantage of the weekend flea market at another 
shopping centre. There were certain advantages to going there. Louis said: 
Here … customers tend to be much wealthy and they rarely ask for price 
reductions. We can charge them more than we would at…. Sometimes 
some of my suppliers come by to drop books they want to dispose of. It‟s 
close by for them since they live in the area. It‟s a win situation for both of 
us because I do not have to make an extra trip on another day to come and 
pick the books. At the end of the day I just put the new stock together with 
those books I brought on the day on the truck that we hire to bring us here. 
I don‟t have to pay extra for the extra load.126 
 
While going to the weekend flea market had its advantages for the book traders, it 
also involved risks. For example, none of the book traders owned a pick-up truck 
so they had to hire somebody to take their books to the other market. Traders had 
to pay the equivalent of ZAR25 for a return trip to the market and there was no 
guarantee that they would sell books there.  
Attending the weekend-only market was also hard work given that traders 
largely relied on their own labour to pack books at the beginning and end of the 
day. Most stalls were “one-man” operations. Traders did look forward to the 
prospect of making money but the prospect of having to pack and unpack a stack 
of several hundred books, for example, was not very attractive. However, the 
traders themselves understood that it was something that they had to do if they 
                                                 
126
 Trader interview, Harare, October 2007. 
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were going to make any money given the economic environment. Christian, a 
book trader, noted indicated that: 
Saturdays, Sundays and Mondays are my busiest days. Towards end of 
day on Saturday I have to pack the books into several boxes in preparation 
for the Sunday market at…. Then on Sunday I have to wake up early to get 
to the … market and wait for the guy we hire to pick us up. Then we have 
to load the boxes on to the truck and we head off to…. This has to be done 
early because it takes a lot time to unpack the boxes and to also put them 
on display. Sometimes I am here by six in the morning. At the end of the 
day on Sunday I have to pack the books again and it‟s back to…. 
Normally I am so tired by then that I just leave the boxes at the stall and 





Book traders, unlike other traders, printed out fliers which they gave to their 
customers and to potential customers who sometimes asked for their contact 
details. This was a form of advertising which the other types of traders at the 
market did not do at all. While traders like the clothes and shoe traders incurred 
cross-border transport costs and costs for visas and travel documents, this was not 
the case with most book traders. However, second-hand book traders did have 
their own business costs, like the printing of fliers to advertise their operations. 
Tina and Louis often mentioned that they had to be “organised” to make a 
good impression on the customers and on their suppliers. If a potential supplier 
came by but was in a hurry, they often just took out a flier with their contact 
details and gave it to the customer. That way the trader did not have to waste time 
writing down the contact details. In the case of Artson, who also owned a small 
formal bookshop close to the flea market area, giving out the fliers also presented 
him with the opportunity to advertise his bookshop business. 
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 Trader interview: Christian, Harare, January 2008. 
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The case of Artson is significant to the study in the way it demonstrates 
the existence of close connections between the informal and the formal segments 
of any economy. When asked why he owned a stall at the flea market as well as a 
small formal bookshop nearby, his response was: 
Well, at the bookshop I have to make sure that prices are attractive to 
customers and this means that they have to be reasonably priced. Also, it is 
a good front for getting deliveries. Often potential suppliers are impressed 
when they know that I have a legitimate bookshop. I always tell them that 
I deal in second-hand books and they are more than willing to keep 
coming back. Ultimately the books make their way to the flea market, of 
course, but suppliers do not have to know this. At the flea market I can 
also charge much more than I can here at the bookshop. Here at the 
bookshop I have to make sure that I am constantly changing prices 
because nobody wants to come to a bookshop and be told the price of 
something off the top of the head. They will be suspicious and think I am 
trying to rip them off. At the flea market I can just charge any price that I 
want. I can inflate the price and when a customer complains I will offer a 
discount. They will take the discounted price but I know I will have made 




His case demonstrates the multiple backward and forward linkages that exist 
between the formal and the informal segments of any economy. For example, 
goods sourced in the formal part of the economy may be resold in the informal 
part. In addition, earnings, which had fallen drastically among second-hand book 
traders at the time of research, made in the informal may be invested in the formal 
and vice versa. 
In recent times, with the worsening of the Zimbabwean economy, traders 
said that for regular sales they now relied on their regular customers whom they 
had been doing business with for a very long time, in some cases for longer than 
five years. Traders indicated that their sale of novels, for example, had taken a dip 
while traders who could access school textbooks said they made a “bit of money”. 
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 Trader interview, Artson, Harare, April 2007. 
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They mainly sold textbooks for the secondary and high school level, especially in 
periods leading up to the mid-year exams and to the final year-end exams. This 
could be attributed to the fact that consumers normally cut down their spending on 
“luxuries” such as novels and instead spend more money on necessities. Two 
traders at the market reported that they now had to rely on intermittent sales to 
customers in Johannesburg to weather the decline of sales locally. 
Two male traders at the market indicated that they sold rare books to 
collectors in Johannesburg and that they personally made the trips there to deliver 
the books. In November 2007 one of the traders reported that he had made three 
such trips to South Africa during the course of that year. The other trader said he 
had made two trips to deliver a consignment of books. Among the rare books, the 
most popular was the “Gold Series”, a collection which consisted of 36 volumes 
focusing on the settler history and development of colonial Zimbabwe. These 
were reprints of the original titles and they were issued between 1968 and 1974. 
Included in the series was a volume by John Thomas Baines and one by Frederick 
Courteney Selous.
129
 This made the whole series, and some of the individual 
volumes in the series, very expensive. Louis, a successful trader sometimes had a 
few titles in the series for sale. For example, he said that he had sold Selous‟ 
volume titled Sunshine and Storm in Rhodesia for US$100 to a tourist. He had 
bought it from one of his suppliers for ZAR200.  
                                                 
129
 Both men are well-known for their explorations of southern Africa. Baines is now best known 
for his paintings of life in the then colonial southern Africa and Australia. Some of his paintings 
are kept at the National Archives of Zimbabwe. Selous is best known as a hunter of big game, a 
naturalist and a conservationist. Zimbabwe‟s capital Harare still has roads named after the two 
men. The notorious Selous Scouts, an elite military group in colonial Zimbabwe, then Rhodesia, 
were named after Selous in honour of his “stellar” military career. 
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 Other sought-after books from colonial Zimbabwe included the book 
Contact written by John Lovett, which chronicles the history of the Rhodesian 
army and its operations. The Collectors‟ Edition was limited to just 115 copies 
which were individually numbered and bound in elephant hide. One hundred of 
the books were put up for sale; of the other 15, some were given to what was then 
the Rhodesian National Archives, some to senior servicemen and a few to high-
ranking politicians. One trader claimed that he once sold an original of the 
Collectors‟ Edition for US$500; he had bought it from an itinerant stranger for 
US$100. (Other traders could not corroborate these claims, but the original limited 
editions of Contact are priced upwards of US$1200 on some Internet sites.) Only 
one or two traders made “good” sales, and these were usually very intermittent. 
Most of the book traders, like the large majority of traders at the market, struggled 
to sell books on a regular basis. While there was good money to be made from the 
sale of rare books, these were hard to find, even for the well-connected traders, 
and it was also very difficult to sell them. 
The two traders who had contacts in South Africa reported that their 
business with these contacts always involved rare, valuable books because there 
was no point in shouldering the heavy time and money costs involved in travelling 
all the way to Johannesburg only to incur a loss. The only travelled that far if there 
was “good money to be made”. For example, Artson said, “One can always make 
a killing if you play your cards properly”.  
One of the dealers in South Africa said that that he sold most of the rare 
books to ex-Rhodesians or to kin of ex-Rhodesian who wanted to know about 
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“their country”.130 A researcher at a local university said that the crisis in the 
country, seen as caused by a black-led government, had in the recent past actually 
heightened yearnings for colonial Zimbabwe among some white ex-Rhodesians 
who felt they had been dispossessed by the post-independence black government; 
they felt that things were better then than they were in the present conjuncture. 
Some customers expressed a deep sense of nostalgia for the past. Anthropologist 
Pamila Gupta (2009: 55) asks, “What, exactly, is it about colonialism that we are 
nostalgic for?” and suggests that “nostalgic power may rest … in its remembered 
(or rather forgotten) way of life in the past (its „order‟ and „rules‟ as opposed to 
the „chaos‟ of today)”. This may explain the yearnings for the colonial past by ex-
Rhodesians who obviously had much more advantaged lives in the colonial 
period. However, some traders even yearned for the early post-independence 
Zimbabwe when they felt that “things were better then”. Some traders said, 
“Things were all right back then” in reference to the past; they equated that past 
with decent lifestyles and bemoaned how the same regime that brought them such 
a “past of plenty” had also propelled them into survivalist activities in the present 
conjuncture.  
The majority of the book traders, just like the majority of traders, struggled 
to make ends meet from their survivalist activities. Their lives were precarious 
and income was very unpredictable. Like other traders, some of the books traders 
would sometimes act as middlemen in small foreign currency deals so that they 
could either pay the daily rental for the stall or so they could purchase a cheap 
meal. The small amounts of money acquired from acting as middleman were 
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 Personal email conversation, June 2008. 
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sometimes essential contributions to the bus fare for the trip back home at the end 
of the day, especially in cases where a trader might have failed to make a sale. 
Generally most of the traders could not save money at all, and they had deep-
seated fears and anxieties about falling ill unexpectedly, about basic necessities 




This chapter set out to demonstrate the occurrence of instances of “globalisation 
of the local” in the trading of arts and crafts and at some moments in the trading of 
second-hand books. Through transnational circuits that involve social networks 
and ties between the local traders and their customers, arts and crafts flow out of 
the country to regional countries and also to international destinations. These 
social networks produce the social capital that traders rely on, especially given the 
economic crisis in Zimbabwe.  
The case of arts and crafts traders and some of the book traders also 
demonstrates the need to conceptualise a different moment of globalisation which 
is not considered by some theorists of globalisation, like Castells. Seemingly 
disconnected, un-networked individuals like the traders at the flea market may 
actually be connected to the global. It is through the survivalist, informal 
economic activities they engage in at a local level that they are connected, albeit 
in an unequal way, to the global network society.  
The activities of the arts and crafts traders, especially those who send kin 
and friends to sell goods on their behalf, besides illustrating the importance of 
social ties, also indicate the ways in which there has been an informalisation of the 
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social welfare economy in Zimbabwe. Traders in Zimbabwe receive money from 
the sale of their goods in South Africa, not through the banks but through friends 
and kin travelling back to Zimbabwe. The formal banking system and that of 
money transfer agencies is circumvented. 
Like other traders, the lives of traders in this chapter illustrate the 
importance of social networks and social ties in the daily lives of individuals in 
African cities like Zimbabwe, especially during periods of crisis. In such times, 
when the institutions of the state have all but collapsed, it is left to the citizens, in 
this case the traders, to put in place alternative informal forms of organisation to 









7.1 A changing context 
 
Since the completion of the fieldwork for this study in the middle of 2008, the 
situation in Zimbabwe has changed. In one sense it worsened, with inflation 
reaching 231 million per cent in July 2008 according to the Central Statistical 
Office in Zimbabwe. On the political front, there was the formation of a 
Government of National Unity (GNU) between the opposition MDC and ZANU 
PF in November 2008. The GNU has gone a long way in stemming the tide of 
economic collapse. As of July 2009 the battered Zimbabwean dollar ceased to be 
official currency, and there have been tentative signs of economic recovery; 
inflation is now in the single digits, for instance.  
Across the border, the South African government relaxed the regulatory 
regime for Zimbabweans migrating to South Africa in May 2009. The new 
regulations enable Zimbabwean citizens to stay for up to three months in South 
Africa without a visa. The relaxed visa regime has resulted in those Zimbabweans 
who could not migrate under the previous, more restrictive visa regime moving 
into provinces such as Gauteng and Western Cape where they are frequently 
subject to exploitation by unscrupulous employers and labour brokers. In Western 
Cape some are employed as casual farm workers and earn as little as ZAR60 a 
day. Some have also been the target of xenophobic attacks by the local populace. 
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For instance, in November 2009 there were attacks in the De Doorns farming 
community near Cape Town, where Zimbabwean casual workers were accused of 
accepting lower wages than local South Africans, thus “robbing” locals of crucial 
seasonal employment (Pillay, 2009).  
Despite the difficulties that Zimbabweans and other foreigner nationals 
encounter in South Africa, the country, as the economic powerhouse in the region, 
remains an important node in the economic activities of traders, such as the cross-
border clothes and shoe traders who source their goods there. Informal traders 
source goods which have origins in global sites like Asia from traders in both the 
formal and the informal segments of the economy in South Africa. These goods 
are then sold to locals in Zimbabwe who, like the traders they buy from, also live 
precarious lives in precarious times. 
 
7.2 On precariousness 
 
This thesis has demonstrated that heterogeneous informal economic activities in 
Zimbabwe are central to the survival of the majority of the populace, and the 
traders in particular, who have been subjected to the vicissitudes of an economy 
that has been in crisis for over a decade. The thesis has also shown that the market 
where traders are based is a social as well as an economic nexus where a range of 
social activities occur in addition to the production and exchange of goods. While 
traders struggle to survive, they demonstrate qualities of resourcefulness and 
innovation. Like other citizens, they have not just been passive victims of the 
Zimbabwean crisis. An excavation of their lives and the informal economic 
activities they engage in, using the extended case method, reveals a latticework of 
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connections that in some cases span the globe. These connections illustrate that 
there is a need to reconsider how we conceptualise globalisation in the present 
conjuncture. In addition, while traders may have very low levels of economic 
capital they are endowed with social capital in the form of social ties and social 
networks which are important in the precarious times they live in. 
Across the globe, precariousness is a dominant feature of most informal 
economic activities. In recent times, with the broad restructuring of economies, 
precariousness has also become prevalent in formal work. Both informal and 
formal aspects of work are now even more uncertain and unpredictable. The 
traders who are the subject of this study lead insecure lives where incomes are 
variable and consequently unpredictable. Precarious work not only creates 
anxieties and uncertainties among traders concerning their work, but its effects 
cascade into other spheres beyond the work situation. These effects may have a 
deleterious impact on family relationships and on relationships with colleagues. 
The majority of traders did not have pensions or emergency health care funds. 
None of the traders interviewed belonged to any medical fund. When they fell ill 
they had to pay medical costs up front from their meagre savings. The majority of 
those interviewed also reported that health care was now out of reach for most of 
them. Traders reported deep-seated fears about issues such as their unpredictable 
incomes and about the possibility of being evicted from lodgings as a result of 
their inability to pay rent. 
Some of the anxieties that traders expressed can be linked to the negative 
impacts of the implementation of ESAP in the late 1990s, which resulted in the 
Zimbabwean state “downloading” the task of social reproduction onto the 
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populace. Economic restructuring was a mode of inserting Africa and the 
developing world in general into the global economy (Ferguson, 2006). This was 
a complete failure, as illustrated by the negative impacts of the policy instruments 
instituted under the restructuring regime – for instance, cost recovery measures 
across a range of essential services. The commodification of services such as 
health and education made them unaffordable for the majority of the population. 
Some of the traders reported that they had dropped out of school because their 
parents could not afford school fees as a result of retrenchments or because their 
wages were inadequate. This propelled them into informal economic activities in 
order to survive. Other traders were retrenched workers who had previously been 
employed in the formal economy. There were also some traders who had left 
formal employment willingly and anticipated that they had a better chance of 
success in the informal segmentof the economy, as wages in the formal segment 
of the economy were hit by hyper-inflation.  
 While precariousness in terms of employment and general livelihoods 
may have been triggered by the structural adjustment programme, this was later 
worsened by factors such as economic mismanagement and also the protracted 
political impasse which compounded the difficulties in the economic and political 
realm. Traders, such as those dealing in arts and crafts, were affected by the 
negative image of the country abroad which resulted in a decline in tourist 
arrivals, which consequently meant lower sales. Those supplying goods to local 
clientele also suffered because a majority of Zimbabweans had their lives 
violently assaulted by the economic crisis and possessed very little in terms of 
disposable income. Potential local clientele faced difficulties as companies either 
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shut down permanently or retrenched workers. The buying power of the meagre 
wages earned by those still in employment was truncated by the hyperinflationary 
economic environment, and this affected all traders. 
The hyperinflationary environment in Zimbabwe before the “dollarisation” 
of the economy also meant that traders could not accumulate savings to fall back 
on in case of emergencies. Traders invested most of their capital in the goods that 
they sold at the market, and with the decline in the economy their sales 
plummeted. The outcome of this was that traders had a very low income base on 
which to cushion themselves against the impacts of the economic crisis. Their 
lives were a constant struggle in an environment where, for instance, there was a 
shortage of basic commodities, where landlords took advantage of their situation 
to raise rents, and where they could not rely on the state to come to their aid if 
they faced financial and social difficulties.  
Generally, traders lived insecure lives. Webster, Lambert and 
Bezuidenhout, 2008 assert that: 
To understand insecurity, it is not enough to identify the sense of 
helplessness, fear, depression, anger…. It is necessary, as Mills argued, to 
identify the broad social forces, institutions and organisations that 
manufacture this insecurity.  
 
One of the dimensions of the extended case method used in this study is 
“extending out from micro processes to macro forces, from space-time rhythms of 
the site to the geographical and historical context” (Burawoy, 2000: 27). The fears 
and anxieties among the traders in this study have their origins in the economic 
restructuring process. In this sense the Zimbabwean case demonstrates that micro-
processes at the local level are in fact connected to global, macro forces. 
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Within the difficult environment that traders live in, social networks and 
social ties based on relationships of reciprocity, trust and co-operation emerged as 
important in their struggles to eke out a living. 
 
7.3 On social networks and social ties 
 
The illegalist school of thought, popularised by neo-classical and neo-liberal 
economists over the decades, argues that there is a conscious and intentional 
motive among informal entrepreneurs to avoid taxation and regulations, and in 
certain cases to engage in criminal activities. However, it is necessary to examine 
the motives of traders when they try to evade regulations. Chief among these 
reasons is the restrictive and cumbersome nature of state regulation, which may be 
steeped in ideological positions that perceive urban informal economic activities 
as an eyesore which spoils the urban landscape. Roberts (1994: 8) asserts that: 
The issue is not regulation per se but the form of regulation. All markets 
are regulated … so the issue is the balance between formal regulation 
based, ultimately, on the state, and informal regulation based on personal 
relations such as those of kinship, friendship or co-ethnicity. Personal 
relations and the cultures that sustain them may, under certain conditions, 
prove more efficient in regulating economic activity than do formal 
structures…. 
 
This thesis had shown that the relationships of traders in terms of their informal 
trading activities and also in other spheres of their lives depend on and are 
embedded in the various social networks and ties based on trust, reciprocity and 
co-operation that they have with people such as kin, friends and colleagues. 
Traders are not just atomised individuals. For instance, arts and crafts traders 
relied on kin based in South Africa in their economic activities. These kin and 
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colleagues had better market access to sell goods on their behalf, and remitted 
money back to Zimbabwe. This money was important in cushioning them against 
the deleterious impacts of the economic crisis. Kin also sometimes sent basic 
commodities which were scarce in Zimbabwe. The social ties and social networks 
among traders worked because there were governed by norms of reciprocity and 
trust that had been established over long periods of time. 
Social ties and networks are also important in the lives of traders in terms 
of watching each other‟s stalls when they travelled to source goods in other 
countries. Female traders reported that they relied on kin or colleagues at the 
market to look after or check on their children when they travelled. Both male and 
female traders reported that they shared food expenses when at the market and 
when they travelled together, and they also shared accommodation expenses in 
cases where they slept overnight in South Africa, showing the importance of long-
established social ties and social networks they had developed with other traders 
at the market. 
These social relations have also contributed to the informalisation of the 
money transfer system. Generally, traders and other Zimbabweans rely on kin and 
colleagues to physically carry money into the country from outside. This reflects 
how the social welfare economy, broadly, has become informalised in Zimbabwe 
(Bracking and Sachikonye, 2006, 2008). Such informal frameworks for money 
transfer are based on social relations of trust, reciprocity and co-operation. 
Meagher (2005) indicates that analogies that examine social networks have 
emphasised the role that social forces, which are deeply embedded in popular 
relations of “solidarity” and “trust”, may play in providing an efficacious and 
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flexible framework that regulates informal economic activities. This thesis has 
demonstrated the utility of this informal regulatory framework which does not 
depend on state regulation or on largely defunct state institutions in Zimbabwe.  
The social networks and ties among traders may in some cases enable 
them to connect to the global from the local. 
 
7.4 On global-local connections 
 
One of the aims of the extended case method is to extend theory. Theorists like 
Castells (1998) argue that much of Africa is an “un-networked,” marginalised 
black hole where wars, hunger and poverty are pervasive. This thesis has argued 
that there is a need to reconsider such conceptualisations of globalisation, 
particularly the place of Africa in the current conjuncture. Africa has always been 
globally connected, dating back to the time of slavery and colonialism when vast 
amounts of cheap labour and wealth were appropriated from the continent. James 
Ferguson notes: 
Looking at globalization from the vantage point of recent research focused 
on Africa brings into visibility things that might otherwise be overlooked 
and forces us to think harder about issues that might otherwise be passed 
over or left unresolved (Ferguson, 2006: 29). 
 
The market that is used as a case for this study is not a zone of exclusion on the 
margins of the global political economy. It has both direct and indirect 
connections to the global. Arts and crafts sold at the market are in some cases sold 
on to customers coming from Asia, Europe and North America. Visual images, 
such as movies, developed in North America are pirated through technologies 
such as the Internet and are sold to locals in Zimbabwe. This shows that there are 
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always exchanges between the local and the global. As indicated by Doreen 
Massey (2005: 102), “The local is implicated in the production of the global” and 
vice versa.  
Burawoy, Krotov and Lytkina (2000), in their study of how people 
survived in the context of the “degeneration” of the Russian economy, argue that 
in the context of economic involution individuals revert to a “primitivist” 
domestic economy that is inward-looking in order to survive. This study builds on 
and extends this argument by showing that in some cases the informal economic 
activities of traders in economies that have imploded, in this case the Zimbabwean 
economy, may in fact have qualities of extraversion that connect the local to the 
global.  
Although Africa‟s position in the global economy is based on inequality 
and exploitation, it still is a relationship that spans the globe. China, for instance, 
is making considerable investments in Africa, and African oil resources are 
fueling the economies of the USA and China itself. Africans in the diaspora play 
an important role in remitting money back to the continent, which is central for 
survival among those whose lives have been violently assaulted by the 
restructuring of economies. In terms of crime, large swathes of East, West and 
North Africa are reported by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) to be emerging hubs for exporting heroin and cocaine into Europe. 
Countries such as Guinea-Bissau, Mali and Guinea are also becoming centres for 
the manufacture of synthetic, illegal drugs. UNODC (2008) reports that cocaine 
worth some US$2 billion in wholesale prices in European cities is being imported 
from the West African region. Rather than being a black hole, Africa is being 
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incorporated into the “black economy” in these instances. Oil, crime, clothing, 
textiles and remittances are connecting Africa to the global in compelling ways.   
A few of the traders who are the subject of this study reported receiving 
remittances from kin based outside the continent in places such as the United 
Kingdom. Though intermittent, these remittances were important in cushioning 
them against economic difficulties as sales of their goods declined. A few of the 
traders also received goods such as DVDs and video game consoles, showing how 
commodities are becoming important connectors in the current conjuncture. 
Clothes and shoe traders connect to the global through the commodities that they 
sell to locals. Some of these goods have origins in places such as China, which 
has over the past decade emerged as the hub of the textile and clothing industry, 
manufacturing for both poor and wealthy consumers across the globe.  
China becoming the centre of this type of manufacturing can be linked to 
the restructuring of the world economy, which has been felt by workers in both 
the advanced industrialised countries such is in Europe and North America and 
also by workers in the developing world like South Africa. For example, traders 
from Zimbabwe acquire their goods from “Chinese” shopping complexes such as 
China City and Dragon City. This economic restructuring has resulted in the 
relocation of manufacturing across a range of industries such as textiles, clothing 
and automobiles to cheaper sites of production like China. Workers in both the 
advanced industrialised countries and in the developing world have been 
witnessing the pernicious impacts of global forces on their livelihoods. Across the 
globe there has also been the informalisation of work, with more workers 
becoming “contingent workers” who are largely underpaid, uninsured and do not 
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have pensions. This, as indicated earlier, makes their working and non-working 
lives very precarious. 
 
7.5 On the linkages between the formal and the informal 
 
History teaches us that in periods of economic crisis there is a progressive 
increase in informal income-generating activities as people either lose jobs or seek 
to supplement their incomes. It could be argued that historically people have 
always engaged in informal economic activities as a way of building a “protective 
moat” against the tide of economic involution. In an analysis of the case of 
Zimbabwe, Mupedziswa and Gumbo (1998) consider the negative impact of the 
country‟s economic decline on the population in general, and specifically on 
vulnerable groups such as women and the working class. The authors illustrate 
that as the formal segment of the economy went through accelerated negative 
growth more and more people entered the informal segment of the economy to 
survive. Some operated in both the formal and the informal segments. Among the 
working class, money earned in the formal part of the economy was sometimes 
invested in informal economic activities. 
Contrary to the dual economy thesis, the approach in this thesis has 
emphasised that the informal and the formal are not two distinct, separate 
economies. Rather, they exist within a deeply segmented single economy. By 
revealing the connections that exist between the formal and the informal, the 
thesis has demonstrated that it is flawed to think of the so called “second 
economy” (informal) as separate from a “first economy” (formal). To reiterate, as 
asserted by Webster, Benya et al. (2008: 7): 
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The concept of a second economy is a metaphor that should not be taken 
literally to mean that there are two geographically separate economies. 
Instead, the notion of a second economy is best seen as a form of short-
hand to describe the deeply segmented nature of an extremely unequal 
economy.  
 
Some of the traders who are the subject of this study acquire goods and raw 
materials in the formal segment and then sell them in the informal segment of the 
economy. Some traders may have operations in both segments of the economy, 
and income earned in the formal may be invested in the informal and vice versa. 
For instance, a second-hand book trader reported owning operations in both 
segments of the economy – a stall at the market and a bookshop nearby. Some of 
the traders reported that they had left their jobs in the formal part of the economy 
and invested the savings they had accumulated to set up operations in the informal 
segment. This demonstrates that it is not only people who move between the 
formal and the informal (churning), but also money and various commodities that 
traders source or manufacture and then sell. 
As the Zimbabwean economy totters to some semblance of stability, 
informal economic activities are definitely going to play an increasingly important 
role in the lives of the poor and the working class, and they will also play a role in 
the economic recovery. The state needs to put in place policies that are 
progressive and that recognise that those in the informal part of the economy 
actually supply much-needed affordable goods and services to those in the urban 
areas who have been pummelled by the economic crisis in recent times. The 
destruction of vibrant “home industries” engaged in a variety of activities such as 
welding and manufacturing furniture and also the attacks on street trading 
activities during Operation Murambatsvina were retrogressive.  
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The state needs to consider urgently how some of these home industries 
can be revived, as they provided crucial income and employment for the urban 
poor. There may even be a need to extend lines of credit to some of the 
entrepreneurs in this segment of the economy so that they can build and expand 
capacity. With adequate monitoring and quality control, some of these industries 
could provide goods and services for the formal part of the economy. Working 
together with civic groups and local government authorities, the national state has 
to urgently put in place less restrictive legislation which allows, and encourages, 
street and flea market traders to carry out their informal income-generating 
activities. This will enable them to earn a living and to contribute to the revival of 
the Zimbabwean economy. The state also needs to contribute to and lead the shift 
in thinking among legislators, municipal authorities, planners and the police, who 
may view informal economic activities in urban areas as contributing to crime and 
the defacing of the urban landscape. 
However, these policy implications are long-term and beyond the scope of 
this thesis. In the immediate term, the lives of the informal traders described in the 
pages of this thesis provide some insight into the current desperate and daily 
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